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CHAPTER I 
I NTRODUCTION 
Inflation is def ined as a condition of g eneral 
rising p rice levels. A more comprehens ive def in i tion which 
po i nt s up the causal re lati onsh i p behind inflat ion, states 
that inflation is present in a g iven economy when the general 
or aggre g ate demand for g oods and services is greater than 
the general or aggre g ate supp ly of goods and services at 
the pre-ex isting p rice levels with the economy in the con-
dition of general f ul l emp loyment. The resQlt of the above 
situation is upward pressure upon price levels, since the 
d emand value chasing the goods and services is greater than 
the supp ly value of those g ood s and services. 
Another general c ausal analysis of inflation states 
tha t inflation will occ u r when p lanned investment exc eeds 
planned saving , and with the qualification that the e con omy 
be at the f ull employment position . The out come of the 
above condition will be a rising national income which will 
continue to increase until p lanned saving then comes into 
equilibrium with p lanned investment. In this case the 
result will not be a rise in real income or real output, 
since the economy is already producing its maximum product. 
But the inflationary gap and the disparity between planned 
saving and p lanned investment will be closed by rising p rice 
levels . This is a p seudo-increase in national income. 
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Actually, such cause-eff ect definitions d o not present the 
true picture behind a condition of general hyper-inflation. 
The true meaning underlying inflation is inequity. It means 
inequity in the proper allocation of resources to the general 
welfare and common good. It means inequity in income distri-
bution and e conomic hardship in resource allocation among 
the economic classes of the economy. 
If e a ch price, price level and cost in the economy 
increased on a pro rata basis, then, there would e x ist a 
s tat e of inf lation according to the f irst definition of 
inflation stated above . But because the inflation arose in 
the form of a proportional increase in all prices and costs, 
this condition does not accentuate the problem of income 
distribution inequity caused by the inflation, since none 
exists . Each income recip ient--other factors remaining con-
stant--has the same command over the same amount of goods 
and services as it had before the inflation occurred, hence 
there will be no increased inequity in income distribution 
stemming from this rise in price levels . 
But in actuality , this problem of income distribution 
inequity caused by inflation does e x ist . It exists because 
certain groups in the economy have greater control over the 
d etermination of their incomes than do other groups in a 
period of severe upward spiraling prices . Because of this 
power held by certain economic classes in periods of in-
f lation , these factions have the power of not only main-
taining their position but also of increasing their position 
economically in the distribution of the national income at 
-- . -~--- -- ---- - - ~ -- __::__ ~ ------ - -- -
the e xp ense of other gr oups which do not wield such power. 
Although the over-all economic p ie has been absolutely 
growing in the long run and the relative shares have been 
increasing also in the long run, certain of the slices or 
p ortions of the p ie going to the vario u s economic classes 
of the economy in the short run have been either losin g in 
their real share of the whole p ie or else they have not 
3 
been g aining at all in a real income sense. Hyper-inflation 
is a short run problem. A short run problem of economic 
ine quity and hardship for certain classes could p ossibly lead 
to greater long run problems. 
The numerous major and minor wars, from the Revolutionary 
'iJ ar to the Korean War, in which the United States has been 
a p rincipal participant, have been accomp anied in the majority 
of cases by a strong inflation either during the war years 
themselves or in the post-war years of reconversion to peace. 
Although there have been mediocre attempts , never have these 
inflations been controlled to the satisfactions of the major 
p rop ortion of the American working public, the primary econ-
omic group which suffers under spiraling price levels. 
Thus the problem of inflation when it arises, is 
still a major future concern to the American public. The 
reme dy to this problem may be in the greater intensive and 
profound app lication of our present economic tools of infla-
t ion control. Or it may be found in a stronger scrutiny of 
our knowledge and historical experiences with these anti-
inflation mechanisms. And as equally important, the solution 
to this twentieth century "Gordian knot" may be found in new 
4 
te chniques, new app roaches and new methods . The economic 
policy makers and enforcers of today and even the American 
pe ople in general should not close their eyes , ears and 
minds to ne w means to this old problem of controlling infla-
tion . They should be conscious of new tools and ideas 
designed to prevent the evils of inflation. Likewise, they 
should be willing to give these new methods of inflation 
control the emp irical test. F or empiricism seems to be the 
only true me ans of finding the worth of these new ideas and 
tools in the social sciences. This does not call for the 
economic policy that all new techniques along these lines 
should be hastily and thoughtlessly placed into the arena 
of economic reality for e xperimental purposes. This 
/ 
naivete could possibly result in unexp lored and earth-
shaking economic p roblems greater than those p resented by 
the inflation itself. Of course, common sense reasoning must 
be applied to these new methods before they can be risked 
in the realm of economic actuality . But after they have 
passed the common sense tests, fear and pressure on the part 
of special interest gr oups should not stand in the p ath of 
truly putting these new mechanisms to the "acid test" of the 
ac tual economic environment. 
Lastly, the subjection of these new approaches and 
ideas to this empirical test also must be followe d by proper 
evaluation of these new mechanisms concerning their correct 
economic policy significance. The very same groups which 
are willing to apply these new concepts to actual exp erimen-
tation and who by doing this tak e up on themselves unforeseen 
risks also should be as willing to accept and abide by the 
conclusions and evaluations drawn from the experimentation . 
Failure to stand by the conclusions and evaluations as to 
the effectiveness of these new methods of inflation control 
reg ardless of whether the new tools prove to be feasible or 
non-feasible would nullify this avenue by which man can 
increase his knowledge and control over his social and 
economic environment . 
Thus , it was with the Voluntary Credit Restraint 
Program which was put to the true test of e xperience from 
early 1951 to early 1952 . Thus , it should be with the c on-
clusions of that real-life experimentation concerning the 
effectiveness of the Voluntary Credit Restraint Program ' s 
approach to inflation control . The evalu ation should stand 
and be recognized as wisdom from the economic past . 
But first, Chapter II will point out the severity 
and breadth of the Korean inflation, beginning with the 
background of the recession of 1949 and concluding with the 
lull in the inflation pressures in early 1951. In Chapter 
I II , the b asic ramifications , nature and characteristics of 
the Voluntary Credit Restraint Program will be presented 
to the reader . Chapter IV will be a consideration of the 
basic mechanics of the VCRP in acti on. The last and most 
important of the main sections of this paper, Chapter V, 
is an attempt by the writer to point out various conditions 
found both in the general economic milieu and in the program 
as inherent characteristics per se which bear directly or 
indirectly upon the task of the program in fulfilling its aims . 
6 
Also, in the last chap ter , there is an attemp t by the writer 
t o g ive an evaluation of the program in its actual encounter 
with the forces of inflation from March , 19Sl, to April , 19S2. 
CHAPTER II 
KOREAN INFLATION, JUNE , 1950 - FEBRUARY, 1951 
1. Introduction: Recession of 1949 
In order to present a clear and understandable 
discussion of any given period of economic history -
whether the period is rather recent or more distant in the 
chain of historical happening s makes no difference - a pre-
view of some of the economic conditions prior to this period 
will help to throw some light upon the subject that will be 
analyzed later. 
In 1949, the American economy experienced what has 
now been properly labeled as an inventory recession. This 
type of economic slump can prove to be dangerous or merely 
a normal retrenchment of the economic position with a 
healthy flexion of the economy 1 s business muscles. Whether 
the former or the latter will result depends upon the other 
economic forces at play during this readjustment . Actually 
for the American economy as a whole, the realignment of retail , 
wholesale and manufacturing stocks did not thrust upon us 
a major economic crisis with mal-reverberations that would have 
been heard and felt in all sectors of the commercial, pro-
ductive and financial structure of the business economy. 
The reason for the absence of a major crisis , although 
the gross national product fell by only . 8 billion dollars 
from 259.0 billion dollars in 1948 to 258 .2 billion dollars 
8 
in 1949 and at the same time failed to achieve its historic al 
3 percent rate of growth by 9.6 billion dollars, was because 
persona l consump tion e xpenditures continued to increase from 
177.9 billion dollars in 1948 to 180.6 billion dollars i n 
1949, and total Federal, State and local government p urchases 
of go ods and services incre ased by 7 billion dollars f rom 
36 .6 billion dollars in 1948 to 43.6 billion dollars in 1949 . 
This incre a se in personal consumption e xpenditures and 
g overnment purchases of goods and services of 9 .7 billion 
dollars was enough to offset the decline in gross private 
domestic investment of 9.2 billion dollars from the 1948 
level of 42.7 billion dollars to the 1949 mark of 33 .5 billion 
dollars. 
But in analyzing the components of gross private 
domestic investment, it is found that the greatest decline 
occurred, not in new construction or p roducers' durable 
equipment expenditures, which fell by only 1.7 billion dollars, 
but in the net changes in business inventories which had a 
p ositive 5 billion dollar chang e in 1948 and a negative 2 .5 
billion dollar change in 1949 for a total net chang e of a 
minus 7.5 billion dollars. Thus, the recession of 1949 can 
be accurately called an inventory phenomenon.l (The data 
presented are not complete ly accurate because of rounding .) 
Wholesale prices, (1947-49=100), all commodities, declined 
lThe Economic Re ort of the President, January, 
1953, p . 1 , Hereinafter referred to as Economic 
Rep ort") • 
9 
5 . 2 percentage p oints from 104.4 in 1948 to 99.2 in 1949 . 
Consumers' price index , (1935- 39=1 00), all items, fell only 
1.7 percentage p oints from 171.9 in 1948 to 170.2 in 1949. 2 
Total national income f or 1948 was 223.5 billion 
dollars. In 1 949, it had fallen b y 7. 2 billion dollars to 
216. 3 billion dollars not considering the changes in price 
levels as pointed out above. But during this period, 
employees' comp ensation, that is wage and salary receipts 
and other labor income, plus employer and employee contri-
butions to social insurance, declined by only .3 billion 
fr om 140.2 billion dollars in 1948 to 139.9 billion in 1949. 
Corporate income before taxes, declined by 6.7 billion. 
Income of unincorpor ate d enterp rises fell by only 1.5 billion 
dollars. 3 Certain minor fluctuations have been omitted. 
Personal income declined in 1949 from the previous 
post-World War II high of 209.5 billion dollars in 1948 to 
205.9 billion dollars. Personal tax payments did not de-
crease appreciably during this period. Personal disposable 
income declined from 188 .4 billion dollars in 1948 to 187.2 
billion dollars in 1949, a drop of only 1. 2 billion dollars; 
and yet, in this same time period, personal consumption 
expenditures, that is, personal income less personal taxe s 
and personal net saving , increased from 177.9 billion dollars 
in 1948 to 180.6 billion dollars in 1949. This was a net 
2Economic Report, January, 1953 , pp. 1 88 , 190. 
3Ibid., p . 171. 
-- . 
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increase of 2.7 billion dollars in spite of tbe decline in 
personal income and small declines in personal taxes. The 
answer to this increase in consumpt ion is found in the fact 
that net personal saving decreased from 10.5 billion dollars 
in 1948 to 6.7 billion dollars in 1949 . As a percentage of 
disposable p ersonal income, personal net saving declined 
from 5.6 p ercent to 3.6 percent from 1948 to 1949, or a 
p ercentage decline of 36 percent from 1948 to 1949.4 
Also during this period, 1948-1949, unemployment, 
which had been declining from the post-World War II high of 
2 ,270,000 unemployed in 1946, or stated in another way 3 . 9 
p ercent of the total civilian labor force, be g an to rise in 
1949 . In 1948 , unemployment as a p ercentag e of the total 
civilian labor force was 3 . 4 percent or 2 ,064 ,000 unemployed 
out of a total civilian labor force of 61,442,000 . In 1949, 
the ratio of unemployment to the total civilian labor force 
had risen to 5.5 percent or 3,395,000 unemployed out of a 
total civilian labor force of 62,105,ooo.5 
From these few economic indicators, it can be seen 
that the economic readjustment in 1949 was truly an inventory 
fluctuation i n the private business sector. Personal con-
sumption e xpenditures actually increased in the face of 
dec lining personal income and increasing unemployment. The 
increase in p ersonal e xpenditures was found in durable goods, 
4Economic Report, January, 1953 , p . 174 . 
5 lb i d • , p • 177 . 
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esp ecially automobiles and parts, and services whereas 
non- durable goods e xpenditures declined . Government purchases 
of g oods and service s was another of the strong sustaining 
factors that offset the decline in gross private business 
investment and prevented the declining business investment 
outl a ys, especially in inventories, from playing havoc with 
the economy . Also it was found further that the decline 
in the business sector's purchases of goods and services 
was mainly confined to a fall in inventory accumulation; 
whereas , the other areas of private investment declined by 
only 1.7 billion dollars. 
The question which interested most economists at 
this time was whether the recovery from this inventory 
recession was well under way before the outbreak in Korea, 
or whether the impacts of the exogenous factors brought on 
by the Korean War were the primary forces in bringing about 
recovery from this economic setback. 
2 . First Phase: Re c overy from 1949 
According to the President 1 s Council of Economic 
Advis e rs, "The economic history of 19.50 divides into three 
distinct parts: the period of recovery from the recession 
of 1949; the period of e xpansion of the defense program 
f ollowing the Korean outbreak on June 2.5; and the more intense 
p eriod following the beginning of major Chinese hostilities 
in late November . 11 6 
6Economic Report, January, 1951, pp . 33-34. 
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The recovery from the recession of 1949 , according 
to the Council of Economic Advisers, began in August of 1949. 
Hesitant business activity grew more vig orous and sustained 
an upward trend in early 1950. Industrial production in-
creased more than 10 percent from February to June, 1950. 
Employment followed a similar course. Of the 4 .7 million 
unemployed in February, 1 950, one-fourth had jobs by June. 
Personal incomes, enlarged by the veterans' insurance re-
fund of 2.6 billion dollars, as seen in Chart 1, and in-
creasing wage payments fed a growing volume of consumer 
expenditures. Personal consumption expenditures increased 
from the 1949 annual rate of 180.6 billion dollars to the 
se asonally adjusted annual rate of 18 7.1 billion dollars in 
the first half of 1950. 7 Average gross hourly earnings in 
selected industries were up $0.05 by June, 1950. Average 
gross weekly earning s in selected industries were up almost 
$4.00 from 1949 to June, 1 950 . 8 Res idential construction 
starts, which declined less than seasonally in winter, 
sprang upward in March to new heights at an unprecedented 
pace by the second quarter. Investment in p lant and equip-
ment, after a decline in the fir st quarter, expanded greatly 
by the second quarter as seen in Chart 9 . 9 
The Council of Economic Advisers stated: 
This rising level of business activity in the early 
months of 1950 was not based upon transitory causes which 
7Economic Report, January, 1953, p . 169 . 
8Ibid., pp. 180-181 . 
9Economic Report, January, 1951 , loc. cit. 
8/J, J... I "NS 
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Chart 1. Personal Income 
Source : Economic Report , Midyear, 1951. 
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might have been expected to terminate expansion toward 
midyear . The payment of the veterans' dividend which 
some observers overstressed , contri buted to the recovery, 
but was not the basic factor in recovery. Nor did the 
upward movement have the ephemeral quality of an inven-
tory boom . Producers and me rchants were cautious about 
a cc ept ing t he b ounding market as a f irm foundation for 
a reversal of the i r inventory p olicies . Manufacturing 
inventories ( seasonally ad jus ted ) did not e x ceed the 
Sep tember, 1949, level until May , 1950 , and the increase 
in value from January to June was 3 percent . The in-
crease in value of retail inventories during the same 
period was 5 pe rc ent . In both cases, inventories were 
expanding less rapidly than sales.10 
Rising prices have often a ccompanied business 
recovery , and thus , the moderate upward trends at this time 
we r e not viewed with alarm in the first half of 1 950 . Whole -
sal e prices (1 926=100 ), all commodities, rose f rom 151 . 4_ 
in January , 1950, to 157 . 3 in the last week of June , 1950 , 
represent ing a 4 per cent increase for the period . The index 
of industrial prices rose b y only 3 percent. The consumers • 
price index, ( 1935- 39=100 ), all items, in January, 1950 , 
was 168 . 2 by June , 1950 , it had risen to only 170 . 2 or less 
than a 2 percent i ncrease over the J anuary, 1950 , figure . 11 
Bank credit and monetary expansion, which was inter-
rupted in 1 948 and the f irs t half of 1949 , be g an to increase 
in the 12 months ending June, 1 950 . 11 •••• It is estimated 
that pr ivat e l y -held deposits and currency amounted to about 
170 billion dollars on June 30 , a new peak for that date, 
an d ab out 4 . c billion dollars more than a year earl ' 111 2 :.; J. e r ••••• 
l OEconomic Report , January, 1951, pp . 33 - 34 . 
11Ec onomi c Indicators , March , 1951 , p . 3 . 
1 2 11 Resumpt ion of Bank Credit and Monetary Expansion . " 
Federal Rese rve Bulletin, 36 : 771 , July , 1950 . 
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See Chart 5. This expansion resulted pr imarily from a 
mounting volume of real estate and consumer loans, together 
with sustained bank investment in State and local government 
securities. The expansion in credit in the 12 months ending 
in June, 1950 greatly accounted for and propelled business 
recovery . But this was mainly confined to the consumer credit 
are a and real estate loans. From June, 1949, to June, 1950, 
consumer credit e x tended by all lenders had increased 
roughly from 14 billion dollars to 17 . 5 billion or about 3 . 5 
billion dollars, resulting in an increase of about 25 percent. 1 3 
See Chart 10 . 
Business loans at commercial banks, which had been 
fluctuating since 1947, declined much more than the usual 
seasonal amount in the first half of 1949. 
Since mid- 1949 business loans have recovered p art 
of the decline of the first half of that year . • .•. 
Demand for business loans continued strong in the first 
six months of 1950 . As business a ctivity has accelerated 
in recent months, businesses generally have made sub-
stantial seasonal additions to inventories and customer 
receivables , a portion of which is ordinarily financed 
by bank loans . They . have al so maintained their plant 
and equipment expenditurey
4
at levels only slight l y 
lower than last year ...•• 
Af ter two years of little change at high levels , 
the volume of deposits and currency held by business and 
individuals increased by about 4.5 bi l lion dollars duri n g 
the 1 2 months ending June , 1950 , to a new peak level for 
the mid- year . The expansion was very substantial compared 
with that in the two preceding 12 month periods as seen in 
Chart 2 . 
13rbid ., p . 773 . 
14 I bid . , p . 774. 
8 I). i.. I <'AIS 
0,.t: 0 ~./.1.Jrf? ,5 
./0 
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Chart 2 . Changes in Dep osits Adjusted and Currency . 
Source : F e deral Reserve Bul letin . 
Holdings of United States Government securities by 
16 
the banking system (Feder a l Reserve , c ommercial and mutua l 
savings banks) declined substantial ly in the first four months 
of 1950 , but increased in May and June. Strong c ash posi -
tions of corpor a tions and others , combined with i ncreased 
yields and resumption of bond sales by the Federal Reserve 
System, found the basis for a shift in Government securities 
to non-bank investors in early 1950 . 15 
The principal force propelling the growth in the 
15 Ibid ., p . 775 . 
17 
private ly-owned money supply in the 12 months ending June, 
1950, was the enhancement in the volume of bank credit, 
especially to borrowers other than the g overnment. Treasury 
operations, that is, including changes in Treasury deposits 
with the banking system and new financing, had only a small 
contractive effect over this period as a whole. A small 
g old outflow also tended to contract the privately-held 
money supply •16 
The increase in privately-held deposits in the 12-
month period under consideration here was accompanied also 
by an increase in the rate of demand deposit turnover. The 
increase in the turnover rate of demand deposit s began in 
the last half of 1949 after declining since 1948 for other 
leading cities and early 1949 for New York City. " •••• This 
higher rate of money use combined with a larg e money supply 
reflects a larger volume of expenditures than in any earlier 
comparable period •.•• rrl 7 
The industrial production index, (19J5-J9=100), all 
industries, in 1948 was 192--in 1949 it had fallen to 176. 
Then, for the seasonally adjusted annual rate for June, 1950 ? 
it rose to 199. 18 These economic data definitely indicate 
that recovery from the inventory recession of 1949 was well 
under way before the outbreak of hostilities on June 25, 1950. 
16Ibid., p. 776. 
17Ib id., p. 777. 
1 BEconomic Report, January, 1953 , p. l B2 . 
18 
This is not to s ay that the increased prosperity that was 
evident in early 1950 would have continued without the help 
of the e x ogenous imp etus of the Korean conflict, but it 
c an be concluded from the evidence shown here that recovery 
h ad been started. 
Thus, with the increase of the industrial production 
index to new heights, combined with the rise in consumer 
expenditures, the total consumer credit outstanding , 
decrease in unemployment, and the expansion in the money 
supp ly and business investment in plant and equipment and 
inventories at increasing levels plus the fact that bank 
deposits were increasing along with an increase in the rate 
of turnover of these deposits and with the wholesale and 
consumer price index es increasing at a moderate but n ot 
a l arming rate; with all these economic indicators pointing 
to recovery, the only conclusion that could be supp orted 
was that recovery was well underway before invasion of 
South Korea from the North. 
3. Second Phase: Korean Impact 
With the invasion of the Republic of South Korea 
by the North Korean Communist puppet g overnment, the impact 
of inflation from this international political c onf lict was 
felt n ot only in the United St a tes, but by repercussions and 
time lags throughout a large portion of the world. The 
event thus opened the second phase of the economic history 
of 1950 as set out by the Council of Economic Advisers in 
the citation above. This second period joined by the third 
period, has since become the second great era of inflation 
since the depression of the nineteen-thirties. 
19 
There were two basic causes for the strong inflation 
climate at that time. First , the psychological causes will 
be considered. At that time, the economic psychology was 
divided into two camps. On the one hand, there were the 
numerous consumers who remembered the shortages of consumer 
goods during the Second World War, the hard-to-get auto-
mobiles and automotive parts, the rationing of foods, shoes, 
gasoline et cetera, and the complete absence of many other 
items from the markets. The hard-hit consumers of the last 
great military conflict had learned a lesson they had not 
forgotten. Thus, consumer expenditures began to expand 
rapidly. 
The other economic-psycholog ical outlook was that of 
the businessmen. Their quest for profits led them to 
large-scale inventory accumulation which in turn was followed 
later by i ncreased business investment in capital equipment. 
These two group outlooks were enough to create a general 
over-all demand that could not be met by the general supply. 
This economic condition of course meant inflation. 
The second basic cause for the tremendous burst of 
inflationary pressures was the fact that the economy was 
already coming out of the recession of 1949 and was well on 
the road to recovery. In the words of the Council of 
Economic Advisers, "The shock of the initial involvement in 
Korea fell upon an economy which was experiencing a high 
level of prosperity, with few slack resources or signs that 
I 
i' 
the boom forces were leveling off ..... 1119 That is to say, 
a boom was being superimposed upon a growing recovery or a 
potent ial boom. 
20 
After the Korean outbreak, many economic indicators 
accurately pointed up the inflationary effect of the sudden 
open hostilities on the Korean peninsula. 
Prices. The wholesale price index , (1947-49=100)' 
all commodities, which had risen less than two points from 
a Januar y , 1950, position of 97 . 7 to a May level of 99 . 6, in 
June was resting at 100 . 2 . By November, 1950, before the 
entrance into the third phase of the inflation it had shot 
up to 109.3. This was almost a 2 point increase per month. 
From Table I and especially Chart 3 of wholesale prices, 
this can be seen more vividly. 
Month 
January 
F ebruary 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
TABLE I 
WHOLESALE PRICES, ALL COMMODITIES 
(1947-49=100) 
19.50 1951 
97.7 115 . 0 
98.3 116.5 
98 • .5 116 • .5 
98 . 5 116 . 3 
99.6 115.9 
100 . 2 115 . 1 
103.0 1 ll, .• 2 
105 . 2 113.7 
107.1 113.4 
107 . 7 113 . 7 
109 . 3 llJ . 6 
112 .1 113.5 
Source : Federal Reserve Bulletin 
1952 
113 .o 
112.5 
112.3 
111 . 8 
111 . 6 
111 . 2 
111. 8 
112.2 
111.8 
111.1 
110 . 7 
109 . 6 
19Economic Report, January, 1951, pp . 34-35 . 
W~ ES/Ii.. £° 'RICES 
Chart 3. Wholesale Prices. 
s ource: Economic Indicators . 
TABLE II 
WHOLESALE PRICES, SELECTED COMMODITIES 
(1947-49=100) 
Group 
Farm Products 
Processed Foods 
Textile Products & Apparel 
Hides , Skins & Leather 
Fuel, Power & Lighting 
Chemicals & Allied Prods . 
Rubber and Products 
Lumber & NOod Prods . 
Metal & Metal Prods . 
Ma ch inery & Mo tive Pr ods . 
Nonmetallic Minerals 
June 
19.50 
94.5 
96.8 
93 .3 
99 . 1 
102 . 4 
92 . 1 
109. 5 
112 . 4 
108 . 8 
106. 3 
10.5 .4 
·ource : Federal Re serve Bulletin 
Nov . 
19.50 
104. 2 
103 • .5 
109 .1 
116.6 
105 . 4 
103 ·~-
149 . 2 
122 . 7 
117 . 7 
112 . 8 
110 . 7 
21 
/I() 
Feb . 
1951 
117 . 2 
112 .9 
115 . 7 
127 . 7 
107 . 4 
112 . 6 
152 .5 
126 . ~-
123 . 7 
117.7 
113 . 7 
22 
From the index of selected commodities, the wholesale 
picture can be viewed more precisely . The manufacturing 
raw material supplies led the group with rubber and products 
in the lead followed by chemicals, lumber, metal and metal 
products, mac h inery and nonmetallic structural minerals . 
The cons umer s ' p rice index , (1935- 39=100), all items, 
showed a similar pattern of movement though not as pronounced 
a s the wholesale price index . In January , 1950 , the index 
was steady at 168 . 2 and in May had risen to only 169 . J and 
in June to 170 . 2 , but by November, 1950 , it had j umped 
6 . 2 p oints to a hi gh of 176 . 4 percent . 
Co SU/1£ f'l(ICE 
/,,l<J 
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Chart 4. Consumer Prices . 
Source : Economic Indicators. 
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TABLE III 
CONSUMER PRICES, ALL ITEMS 
(1935- 39=100 ) 
Month 1950 1951 
January 168 . 2 181 .5 
February 167. 9 18J . 8 
March 168 .4 184 . 5 
April 168 .5 184 .6 
May 169 .3 185 . 4 
June 170. 2 185 . 2 
July 172 . 0 185 . 5 
August 173 . /.j.. 185 .5 
Sept ember 174.6 186 . 6 
October 175 . 6 18 7 . l.j.. 
November 176 . l~ 188 .6 
De cember 178.8 189 .1 
Source: Economic Indicators 
TABLE IV 
CONSUMER PRI CES, SELECTED ITEMS 
(1935-39=100) 
Items June 15, Nov. 15 ' 1950 1950 
Food 203 .1 210 . 8 
Apparel 184 .6 194.3 
Rent 130.9 132 .5 
Fuel, Electricity 
& Refri geration 139 .1 142 .5 
House f urnishings 184.8 201.l 
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin 
23 
1952 
189 .1 
187.9 
188 . 0 
188 .7 
189 . 0 
189.6 
190 . 8 
191.l 
190.8 
190.9 
191.1 
190 .7 
- -·--Feb . 15 ' 
1951 
226 . 0 
202 .0 
134 .0 
143 . 9 
209 .7 
The wholesale price index had increased by roughly 
9 percent from June to November, 1950. The consumers' 
price index had advanced by approximately 4 percent in this 
identical time period. The explanation is rather simple. 
Strong consumer scare buying although supplies were plentiful; 
the rush to stockpile raw materials by businessmen, especially 
those which would be needed in the defense effort upon which 
foreign suppliers and importers had to be relied for procure-
ment; and business profiteering in the consumer market, 
were some of the factors. The rise in prices of products 
going into the military program had eaten up almost the 
entire 4.5 billion dollars in new taxes just voted by 
Congress before they could be collected. 20 
The average market cost of 28 basic commodities 
jumped 21 percent between June 23 , the week before the 
attack, and the end of August. Farm products and f oods 
were up 8 percent, industrial commodities, 5 percent. The 
heaviest price press ure was upon raw materials. Since 
April , copper had risen 27 percent; lead 52 percent; steel 
scrap 58 percent; zinc 62 percent; cotton cloth 50 percent; 
rubber 80 percent ; wool 45 percent ; lumber 15 percent and 
t 21 hus the story went. 
Durable go ods prices took the same route, especially 
in automobiles and parts , furniture and household appliances. 
The price indicators clearly point up the severity of the 
2 0 11 Galloping Inflation." New Republ ic, 123:5-6, 
October 2 , 1950. 
21Ibid . 
25 
Korean inflation from June to November, 1950 . 
Agricultural Position . During the first half of 
July, prices of farm products rose 7 percent . Income of 
farm proprietors since June had averaged about one-eighth 
higher than in the same period last year, but about one-
fourth below the record level for the year, 1948. From 
mid-July to the latter part of August, buying interest in 
domestic foodstuffs receded mainly because of large and 
increasing market supplies plus huge carry-overs which were 
released onto the markets , plus indications of the imposi-
tion of curbs on inflation by legislative action . But in 
the last week of August when the prospect for the immediate 
promulgation of direct controls vanished, wholesale prices 
of foods and farm products advanced again. At the end of 
August, prices of farm products were 8 percent above June 
and 16 percent above the low at the be ginning of the year . 22 
"The farm price support program has had diverse effects 
on prices in recent months . While purchases of some products, 
particularly e ggs and dairy products , have been a fac t or in 
maintaining prices , releases of other products have limited 
Price advances. 1123 The price increases reflected increased 
demands for farm products due to increased incomes of con-
sumers and expansion in employment . They were not a re-
flection of reduced crop production and seasonal decreases 
in livestock marketings . 
2211 Recent Developments in Agriculture . " Federal 
~~rve Bu~letin, 36 :1099, September , 1950. 
23Ibid . 
-
26 
According to the index of prices received and paid 
by farmers for goods and services and the parity ratio index, 
(1910-14=100 ), in June, 1950, the index of prices received 
by farmers was 247, while the parity index o:f prices paid by 
farmers was 254 giving a parity ratio of 97; but by January, 
1951 , the farmers ' prices received index was JOO and the 
index of prices pai d was 272 giving a parity ratio of 110. 
This indicated an improvement of the farm income position 
from June, 1950--provided one can rely up on indexe s and 
statistical methods for presenting a true picture of the 
economic situation . 24 
Monetary and Credit Developments. The money supply 
and credit outstanding, which for most purposes serve the 
same function in the economy, are of course i mp ortant tools 
of economic control. At the same time they are excellent 
indicators of economic activity. The great and more immed-
iate inflationary i mp act of the Korea incident arose from 
the rapid increase in expenditures of businesses and con-
sumers in anticipation of shortages of civilian goods and 
of advances in prices. The rise in the money supply and 
credit, was well under way prior to June, 1950. See Chart 5. 
Bank credit continued to expand in the third quarter 
of 1950. Commercial banks increased their total loans by 
an estimated 4 billion dollars in the third quarter and their 
holdings of state and local government and corporate sec uri-
ties by about 800 million dollars. In the four -month period , 
------
2¾;conomic Repor~, January, 1952 , P • 190. 
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Chart 5. Money Supply 
Source: Economic Indicators. 
July to October, the loans of all commercial banks increased 
more than 5 billion dollars or 11 percent. See Chart 6. 
The expansion since June in credit to private 
borrowers and to state and local governments, which 
has been in part seasonal, has exceeded that in any 
peacetime period of similar length. Much of the recent 
sharp expansion in loans reflects commitments made before 
restrictive credit policies began to be imposed. Some 
of the expansion may have ref lected anticipation of 
future needs. 25 
25"R . 1 t II E,_ederal ecent Monetary and Credit Deve opmen s. 
Reserve Bulletinz 36:1276, October, 1950. 
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Chart 6 . Bank Loans and Investments 
s ourc e : Economic Indicators . 
Businesses were great borrowers in the third quarter . 
Th e great surg e for credit was due to anticipat e d shortag es 
of ma terials and increased prices . Inflation was feed i n g 
on i nf lation . Bank loans to businesses accounted for more 
than h a l f of the over-all loan expansion in this quarter , 
greater than the same period in 1946 . Credit e x tended by 
banks and other lending group s to p urchasers of houses was 
a large factor in the recent expansion of private credit . 
Ne w loans on small residential properties during the first 
few months of 1950 wer e estimated at slightly less than 11 
billion d oll ars or an annual rate of almost 14 .5 billion 
29 
compared with roughly 11 billion dollars in each of the past 
three years . Reflecting a more rapid expansion in new debt 
than in repayment of previously contracted loans , mortgage 
debt outstanding on 1-4 family homes increased nearly 2 
billion dollars in the third quarter compared with an increase 
of less than 4 billion dollars during the entire year, 1949. 
Loans of commercial banks on homes and other real estate 
increased during this three-month period by about . 9 billion 
dollars which was about as much as in the preceding six 
months . 
Consumer buying had advanced even before Korea . 
After June, 1950, consumer installment credit increased 
more sharply . The expansion of about 1 , 200 milli on dollars 
in the third quarter compared with 8 00 million dollars in 
the same period of 1949 and the amount outstanding at the 
end of Sep tember exceeded 13 , 000 million dollars , about 
one-third above the level 12 months earlie r . Consumer loans 
by commercial banks increased about 900 million dollars in 
the third quarter, thus matching the growth during the entire 
last half of 1949 . 
Banks bad also increased substantially their invest-
ments in corporate, state and local government securities 
during this peri od . Commercial bank portfolios of these 
securities increased by an estimated 800 million dollars, 
which was equal to the increase in the first half of the 
year . The bulk of the pllt'chases were state and local oblig ations . 
The money supp ly increased in the third quarter by more 
than 2 billion dollars, and " . .• . this rapid rate of increase 
30 
almost equaled that of the third quarter of 1947 - a period 
of substantial inflation. 1126 But calculated on a June 30 to 
November 29, 1950 , basis, the increase was somewhat greater . 
The money supply, 27 that is, currency outside the banks, 
adjusted demand deposits, government b alances at the Federal 
Reserve and commercial banks, Treasury cash and foreign 
deposits at commercial banks, on June 30, 1950 , was 118.8 
billion dollars. On November 29 , 1950, it had increased 
to 122 . 3 billion dollars or an approximate increase of J.5 
billion dollars. The most influential factors responsible 
for this increase in the money supply were increased loans, 
both total commercial and industrial loans. These had 
increased approx imately 6.7 billion dollars but this was 
offset by a decrease in total investments of 3 .1 billion 
dollars . The greatest decrease in investments was in U.S. 
Government obligations which declined by 4.1 billion 
dollars. Corporate, state and local obligations held by 
the commercial banks increased, by roughly .9 billion 
dollars. Adj usted demand deposits increased from 85.0 
billion dollars to 90.J billion or an increase of 5.3 billion 
due to commercial and industrial loans. Government deposits 
at commercial and Federal Reserve banks declined by 1.3 
billion dollars. The other determinants of the money supply 
26Ibid ., p . 1277. 
. 
27Note, the money supply calculated by this formula 
differs from the money supply used by the Federal Reserve 
System 1 s publications because in this formula time deposits 
are not included. 
Jl 
remained relatively stable. 28 
After rising almost steadily during the first half 
of the year, the turnover of demand deposits at banks in 
leading cities outside New York, accelerated during the third 
quarter. In that period, deposits were more active than in 
the corresponding quarters of any postwar year. 
Because of the strong demand found at that time in 
the money markets, short term money rates tended to stiffen 
during most of that year, reflecting growing credit demands. 
This was modified somewhat by the Federal Reserve policy of 
purchasing short term securities. But rates on three-month 
bills, which were about 1.10 percent at the end of 1949, 
rose to 1.17 percent by June, 1950, while the one-year rate 
rose from 1.10 to 1. 23 percent. In the latter part of 
August ·and early September, yields on short-term securities 
increased by about 1/8 of 1 percent. Yields on new Treasury 
bills were at l.J2 percent by September and on securities 
with one year to maturity about 1.35 percent. Long term 
treasury bonds were at extremely low levels at the end of 
1949 but increased in the first half of 1950 by about 1/8 
of 1 percent.?9 
28A balance of the determinants of the money supply 
given here is impossible because of rounding and the non-
consideration of other factors which were not too dynamic 
during this period. 
2911Recent Monetary and Credit Developments. 11 
Eederal Reserve Bulletin , J6 :1280, October, 1950. 
32 
Personal Consumption Expenditures, Saving and 
Installment Credit. Personal consumption expenditures rose 
by around 7 p ercent from the second quarter level of 188.7 
billion dollars to the third quarter annual rate of 202. 5 
billion dollars . This was the greatest quarter-to-quar•ter 
increase in a decade . JO Consumer purchases of durable goods, 
mainly in automobiles, automotive p arts, household furnishing s 
a nd durable app liances, incre ase d about 25 percent . This 
d emand occurred at a time when the industries producing 
these goods were operating at production peaks with rising 
price levels. After the consumer buying spree in July and 
August, consumer exp enditures declined but were still larger 
in relation to the previous year. Automobile workers' 
wage increases set the stage for further labor demands which 
spread rapidly, resulting in increased personal incomes and 
expenditures. Also , longer working hours and increased 
employment led to increased expenditures. 11 1n 1950, the 
e xpansion of consumer installment credit outstanding accelerated. 
The increase of 2 .4 billion dollars in the first nine months 
was larger than that for any full postwar year . 11 31 
Another factor which led to increased consumer 
expenditures was that of consumer dis-saving. One source 
Pointed out : 
JO"Re cen t Developments in Installment Credit. 11 
Eed~al Reserve Bulletini 36:1427-36, November, 1950. 
31~. 
One factor in the recent increase in spending bas 
been the reduction in certain types of liquid asset 
33 
holdings of individuals . During the third quarter , time 
dep osits at commercial and mutual saving s banks declined 
by approximately one-half billion dollars , redemptions of 
saving s bonds exceeded purchases by ab out one-third 
billion, and share - holdings at savings and loan associa-
tions were also drawn down . In the same period of last 
year saving s deposits showed little change, while pur-
chases of saving bonds e x ceeded redemptions, and share-
holding s at saving and loan associations showed a sub-
stantial increase . In recent weeks, however, there has 
been some slackening in the reduction of total liquid 
asset holding s by individuals . 32 
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Chart 7 . Consumer Income, Spending and Saving . 
ource : Economic Indicators . 
3211 Recent Monetary and Credit Developments." 
Federal Reserve Bulletin , 36 :1278 , October, 1950 . 
34 
A striking development in 1950 was that in the third 
quarter expenditures for private new construction, producers' 
durable equipment and consumer durables accounted for more 
than 29 percent of the total national product. But, Federal 
Government purc hases of goods and services were only 7 . 5 
percent of that total, the smallest proportion since early 
in 1948 . Outlays for private investment were the major 
factors in the expansion of 1950, along with consumer demand. 
Personal saving as defined in the national income 
and product accounts, that is, personal disposable income 
less personal consumption expenditures, decreased in the 
third quarter 1950 both in dollar amount and as a percentage 
of disposable income . From an article in the Federal Reserve 
Bulletin, it was pointed out that: 
With disposable income in the first quarter of 
1950 swollen by payments of National Service Life 
Insurance dividends and with consumption expenditures 
cont inuing to increase only moderately, personal 
saving rose very sharply. As payments of dividends to 
veterans tapered off in the second quarter, disposable 
income declined slightly; consumption expenditures 
continued to increase , however, and both the volume 
and rate of saving declined . 
In the third quarter disp osable income advanced 
by the near-record amount of 9.1 billion dollars . 
Consumption expenditures, however, increased by 13 . 2 
billion, and personal saving declined to 6 . 4 billion 
(annual rate) or only 3 .1 percent of disposable income, 
the lowest rate since the first quarte r of 1948 . Per-
sonal saving and the savings ratio will probably show 
an increase in the fourth quarter.33 
3311Expenditures and Incomes in 1950." Federal 
~erve Bulletin, 36:1565-76, December, 1950. 
35 
Inventories. Tbe liquidation of business inventories 
in 1949 was a major factor in the decline of employment and 
income during 19~.9. A reversal developed early in 1950, 
accounting for much of the recovery in business activity in 
the first half of tbe year. More tban half of the substantial 
increase in total national product from the last quarter of 
1949 to the second quarter of 1950 was accounted for by the 
shift from large liquidation of inventories to substantial 
accumulation . Strong efforts were made to build up inven-
tories following the outbreak in Korea, but sales of both 
consumption and capital goods increased so rapidly however, 
that inventories declined sharply in July. See Chart 8 . 
I) 
Chart 8 . Inventories. 
Source : Economic Indicators. 
Af ter July, with p roduction a t record levels, inventories 
increas ed and a substantial rate of accumulation occurred 
in the four t h qu arter . 34 
Business and Government Expenditures . Total gross 
p rivate domestic investment on a se a sonally adjusted 
36 
annua l rate, (1951=100 ), in the s e cond hal f of 1 950 decre a sed 
from a second quarter annua l r a te of 5 3 . 2 bil l ion dollars 
t o 49 . 2 billion in t h e third quarter; p riva te domestic 
investment increased in the fourth quarter at the annual 
r a te of 61 . 9 billion dollars . Ne w construc tion rema i ned 
rat h er stable from a se c ond quarter annua l r a te of 23 . 4 
billion dollars to a fou rth quarter annual rate of 24 . 1 
billion . Producers 1 durable equipment followed a similar 
p attern over this time period from the annual rate of 23 . 9 
billion dollars to 25 .5 billion dollars. The dynamic f a ctor 
a gain was changes in business inventories . The second 
quarter rate of annua l change in inventories was +5 . 9 
billion doll ars , but by the third quarter , the annual 
rate of ch ange had b ec ome a ne gative 1 . 3 billion , 
ref lecting the tremendous consumer demand in July and 
Au gust f or both durables and nondurables . By the fourth 
quarter , the annual r a te of chang e wa s again positive and 
a t a high level of 1 2 . J billion dollars , reflecting in part 
the saturati on of demand at this time . 35 
J L~Ibid., P . 1 5 69 . 
35Ec onomic Report , January , 1952 , p . 169 . 
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Chart 9 . Business Investment . 
Source : Economic ReJ?_~ , 1952 . 
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Total federal , state and loc al government purchases of 
goods and services remained ste ady during the third and f ourth 
quarters of 1950, but declined slightly in the third quarter . 
During the fourth quarter , there was an increase in total 
expenditures calculated on the seasonally adjusted annua l rate 
of 43 . 1 billion dollars in the third quarter to the fourth quarter 
38 
annual r L of !1'} . 1 billion dollars . 36 This points out the 
Ct th t t . 'c . c :1~;a effort was just beg inning to increase 
OJ:;J i 
ma.jo 
)r - i .o r' c ~, c .Jnf lie t leve 1 and the ref ore was not a 
or ce Ln Lhc i :1flationary situation in the second half 
0 9 o. 
~_;nLl?.:t.!21C r1._'.,_ ..: nd ·,rJages. Unemployment declined between 
un n Fo 1950 , from 3,384,000 to 2 , 24 0 ,000 . Un-
emp l o m t a s o c:· centage of the total civilian labor force 
d er 
On 0 
1 or 
f r ot:1 L' . ; :Jercent in June to 3 .5 percent in November . 
the br,::; · c re:0.sons for the decline was that the total 
or e . , .i nc lud :ing armed forces, declined from 66 . 2 
milli on · n June t o 65 . 5 million in November while the armed 
fo ce s l so inc::-·cc:<,o d from 1.3 million in June to 1 . 9 in 
ovembe- . 'I'hus there were two forces tending to decrease 
t e r ti o or LU e:n;11oyment to total civilian labor force, the 
d cli e n t l1c l:ot ~~ l labor force and increase in the armed 
f or ces . 7 
indu 
' h c vc r D: :c week ly hours worked in manufacturing 
rj e s .incr'E. 1:.,s e:1 from 40.5 in June , 1950 , to 41 . 1 
i n No vem e ' .. J1t'1u1taneously average hourly and weekly 
e r _ i n r:; s i. s e J. c c Lcd industries increased f rom the June 
level o ,pl . I( (ll) r hour or $58 .85 per week to the November 
r a t of ( 1 . :;1 per k our or $6 2 . 23 per week . 38 
-----------
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Inflation, June-November. From the foregoing 
indicators of economic activity, it can be factually con-
cluded that the third quarter of 1950, the period immediately 
following the Communist invasion of South Korea, was a period 
of hyper-inflation. This inflation arose from private, 
rather than public pressures. By this, it is meant that the 
impetus behind the forces of inflation came from the private 
business and consumer sector rather than the public or 
governmental sphere of economic endeavor. Consumer demand 
was propelled by fear and past experiences with inflations; 
scare buying was strong . Businessmen, with their eyes on 
future profits, demanded credit for production purposes . 
Immediate inventory accumulation for speculation and profiteering 
was the second force in the private sector of the economy 
Which induced the inflationary environment upon the economy. 
While the fury was raging in the private sphere, we have 
seen that governmental economic activity was rather calm 
throughout the third and early part of the fourth quarters 
of 1950. Cash receipts for the Federal Government in the 
first half of 1950 were less than cash payment s. But in 
the second half of 1950 cash receipts were greater than cash 
Payments, giving an over-all cash surplus of the Federal 
Government for the year of .4 billion dollars. This surplus 
however was offset by the state and local governments having 
a cash deficit for the year of .9 billion dollars. The 
result was a cash deficit for all governments of .5 billion 
dollars.39 Gross public federal debt declined a small 
39 6 
~., p. 1 o. 
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amount from the June, 1950, level of 257.4 billion dollars 
to the October level of 257.0 billion dollars, but after 
that a small increase occurred.40 This is further evidence 
that the inflation was perpetrated primarily by forces in 
the private segment of the economy in the immediate six 
months that followed the outbreak of the Korean War. The 
inflation in this period, or in the immediate six months 
followin g , cannot be blamed upon hug e g overnmental deficits 
f inanced by what businessmen like to call "monetization of 
p ublic debt. 11 This type of public financial policy labeled 
as the basic cause of inflation in the last few decades by 
businessmen and their outspoken leaders, was not in ex istence 
at this time. Yet, we had a tremendous inflation during 
this period. The businessmen's thesis is that price fluctua-
tions and scare buying are only symptoms of an inflation. 
Therefore, they say price, wage and rationing cont rols do 
not get to the cause of inflation, and do not hold as being 
valid during this period of spiraling prices . Inflation 
does, however, feed on inflation. 
By the latter part of September and early October, 
1950 , the consumer buying spree of July and August had 
subsided . Price indexes on wholesale and retail levels were 
not advancing as rapidly as they had in the previous 12 weeks. 
The industrial production index declined one point. Anti-
cipations were that the "police action" in Korea would be 
over in a short time. The assumption was that the defense 
40ib id., p . 19 5. 
program would move forward b y stages with defense exp enditures 
re a c h ing a peak rate in two years. 
11 It followed that for the first twelve months, the 
d i vers ion of productive resources would n ot require drastic 
read justment of the civilian economy. The initial pro gram 
of the resident to stabilize the economy was based up on 
this hypothesis . n4l 
4. Third Phase: Intensified Mobili z ation 
The Chinese intervention in late November blasted 
the hope that the Korean campai gn could be brought quickly 
to a clo se and that the G. I . 1 s would be home for Christmas . 
Russia's supp ort of China disclosed dangers of inc alculable 
magnitude and made necessary a vigorous increase in the 
speed and size of defense prep arations.42 Selective Ser -
vice calls were increased 100 percent in mid- winter . Mili-
tary procurement p lans were revised upward. In December , 
congress was a s k e d to app rop riate additional f unds , but 
there was no great change in the placement and scheduling 
before the end of 19SO. Industrial production in December 
remained close to the level established during October and 
November. Employment (when seasonal variations are removed) 
was steady. Ye t, national income and consumers income 
continued to rise under the impact of rising prices and rising 
4l~omic ReEort , January, 1951, p . J8 . 
4 2 Ibid • , p • 3 9 • 
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wage s. Thus the economy had entered into the third stage 
of the economic history of 1950 . This period was to become 
one of renewed inflation with an intensity similar to that 
of the early third quarter , 1950 . The period was to e x tend 
fr om late November , 1950 , to February and March, 1951 . 
Prices . Prices again began to rise rapidly . The 
wholesale price index, (1947-49=100) , all commodities, in 
September and October had been rather steady . In Oct ober, 
it was 107 . 7 , but by February , 1951 , i t had risen b y 8 .8 
p oin ts to an all time h i gh of 116 .5 percent . This is an 
8 p ercent increase over the October level . The consumer 
pric e index , (1935-39=100), all i t ems , was als o mov ing 
upward . In October , 1950 , it was 175 . 6 by February, 1951, 
it had advanced 8 . 2 points to 183 . 8 p ercent , a percentage 
increase from October of 4 .1 Jt-3 In view of the fo l lowing 
table of selected items, it is clear that food led the flock . 
It was followed by house furnishings and wearing ap parel . 
The others remained stable . 
Fo od 
TABLE V 
INCREASES IN SELECTED ITEMS, CONSUMER PRI CES (1935- 39=100 ) 
Nov . 15 , Feb . 15 , 
--
Point Item 1950 1951 Increase 
-· 
210 .8 226 .0 15 . 2 
App arel 194 . 3 202 . 0 7 . 7 
132 . 5 134 . 0 Rent 1 . 5 
Fuel , Electricity 
and Refrigeration 142 . 5 143 .9 1 .1+ 
House Furnishings 201 .1 209 .7 8 . 6 
Source : Federal Reserve Bulletin 
43EconomJ:_c Report, January , 1952 , pp . 188 - 189 . 
43 
Selected classes of commodities on the wholesale 
level of prices also continued their upward trend from 
Novemb e r to February . Leaders in the field were farm 
p ro ducts; hides, skins and leather; p rocessed foods; chem-
icals and allied products; textile products and apparel and 
some metals and machinery. Other items are shown in Table 
VI below. 
TABLE VI 
INCREASES IN SELECTED ITEl.v[S , WHOLESALE PRICES 
(1947-49=100 ) 
Nov ., Feb ., Point Items 1950 1951 Incre a se 
F arm Products 104. 2 117. 2 13.0 
Processed F oods 103 . 5 112 . 9 9 .4 
Textile Products & Apparel 109.l 115 .7 6 . 6 
Hides, Skins & Leather 116.6 127.7 11.1 
F uel, Power & Li ghting 105 . l-1- 107.4 2 .0 
Chemicals & Allied Prods. 103 . l~ 112 .6 9 . 2 
Rubber and Products ll+9 . 2 152 . .5 3 . 3 
Lumber & Wood Produ cts 122 .7 126 . J.j.. 3 .7 
Metal & Metal Pr oducts 117.7 123 .7 6 . 0 
Machinery & Motive Pr ods. 112 . 8 117.7 4 . 9 
Nonmetallic Minerals -
Structural 110.7 113.7 J.O 
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin 
Reasons g iven f or these swift elevations in the 
wholesale and retail indexes are : (a) efforts by sellers to 
increase prices before price freezes ; (b) the evaluation by 
businessmen of the pressure on prices which would flow from 
an accelerated defense program; (c) continuing upward trend 
of money incomes; (d) the seasonal Christmas spurt in sales; 
and (e) possibly renewed scare buying. 
Monetary and Credit Position . Monetary and credit 
policy at this time was an important factor behind the 
• 
inflationary situation, especially the relati on between the 
Treasury and the Fe deral Reserve System . Beginning in the 
latter part of 1949 and early 1950 when the recovery beg an 
to make its appearance, the money markets began to ti ghten; 
interest rates , to rise. Whe n the Korean War broke out and 
inflationary pressures became evident, officials of the 
Federal Reserve System thought it was their place to use 
their delegated powers to help control this run- away i n flation . 
Thus, the Treasury-Federal Reserve feud, which had been evi -
dent in the post second World War inflation , broke ou t into 
the op en a g ain . It continued with threats of resi gnations 
from members of the Board of Governors, while President Truman 
and his Council of Economic Advisers were supp orting the 
Treasury rs position of low interest rates. The fight con-
tinued until the middle of March when an accord or a gree -
ment was reached whereby the Federal Reserve System stopp ed 
the policy of supporting government long and short term 
securities, and c eased being an "engine of inflation . 11 
But the damag e had been d one . The barn door had 
been closed after part of the horse had been st olen . From 
November, 1950, to February, 1951, prior to the accord , 
g overnment obligations held by the commercial banks declined 
from 61 . 5 billion dollars to 58 . 9 billion dollars, while in 
that same period , Federal Reserve Bank holding s of g overnment 
obligations increased from 19 . 7 billion dollars to 21.9 billion 
dollars while total g overnment oblig ations outstanding declined 
by 1.1 billion dollars. One conclusion from this is that 
the banks were drawing down their holding s of Government 
s ecurities in order to grant business loans, which 
4 5 
in turn were directly feeding the forces of inflation.!+!+ 
During the same p eriod, investments of all commercial banks 
d eclined from 73.9 billion dollars to 71.5 billion of which 
United States Government securities declined from 61 .7 
billion dollars to S9.l billion. Other securities increased 
f rom 1 2 .1 to 12.4 billion dollars. Total loans of all 
commercial banks during this period increased from Sl . 5 
billion to 53.5 billion or, a 2 billion dollar increase. 
Two writers pointed out the laxity found in general 
monetary controls because of the Federal Reserve policy of 
supporting government securities, which in turn, was one of 
the chief factors leading to increased inflation. They 
pointed out in tabular form, which is reproduced below, that 
p art of the inflation was due to the increase in member bank 
reserves because of such a policy . 
But Steiner and Shapiro failed to p oint out the 
fact that the reserve requirement increases did not occur 
until the 11th of January, 1951, and therefore the increase 
in member bank reserves prior to that date would be the 3 .1 
billions before the reserve requirements were increased and 
that this was the inflationary period and not after March 
when the increased reserve requirements did take effect . 
4-1-l-11 The Reluctant Bankers." New Republic , 1 23 : 9, 
December 4 , 1950. 
-TABIE VII 
INCREASE IN RESERVES AVAILABLE FOR EXPANSI ON IN 
THE BANKING SYSTEM, JUNE JO, 1950, TO MARCH 28, 1951 
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(Billions of 
dollars) 
--------------------------------
Increase in Government security holdings 
of the Federal Reserve banks: 
Increase in all other Federal Reserve credit: 
Decrease in monetary gold stock: 
Decrease in money in circulation: 
Other factors, net: 
Increase in member bank reserve balances: 
Less: Increase in required reserves due to 
increases in reserve requirements: 
Increase during period in reserves 
available for expansion: 
+4 . J 
+0 . 9 
-2.4 
+0 .1 
+0.2 
+J .l 
-2.0 
+1 .1 
Source: w. H. Steiner and Eli Shapiro, Money and 
&anking. Henry Holt Co. (New York, 1953), p . 719. 
By calculation with the formula used above, the money 
supply increased by 1.3 billion dollars from November 29, 
1950, to February 28 , 1951. Components determining this 
increase were: demand deposits up JOO million dollars; 
U.s. Government deposits at commercial and Federal Reserve 
banks up 1.1 billion dollars; foreign deposits up 100 
rn • l 1 lion dollars ; currency outside the banks down JOO million 
dollars. On the asset side of the consolidated balance 
sheet: gold holdings were down 900 million dollars; loans 
~ere up 2.4 billion dollars; holdings of U.S. Government 
securities down 700 million dollars and other security 
holding s up JOO million. These fl uctuating factors give 
a money supply of 123 . 6 billion dollars on February 28 , 1951.45 
---------
45 B 11 tin Data will not b Source Federal Reserve u e • 
alance because ~f rounding and omissions. 
Demand deposit turnover on November 29, 1950, was 28.1 in 
New York City and 14.9 in other reporting centers; by 
February, 1951, the rate of turnover in New York City had 
declined to 26.1 and in other reporting centers to 14.3. 
Thus, with an increase in the money supply, there occurred 
a decline in e xpenditures in the latter half of February, 
1951.46 
47 
Personal Consumption Expenditures, Saving and 
Installment Credit. From Novembe r, 1950 , to February, 1951, 
personal consump tion e xpenditures increased from a fourth 
quarter seasonally adjus ted annual rate of 198 . 4 billion 
dollars to 208 . 2 billion dollars, a reflection of mid-
winter seasonal buying plus the spurt in consumer purchases 
of durables, nondurables and services following the entrance 
of the Chinese Communist a rmie s into the war in Korea.47 
Total consumer credit (as seen in Chart 10) had its mid-
winter seasonal increase in December, 1950, increasing from 
the November, 195 0, level of 1 9 .4 billion dollars to the 
December, 1950 , level of 20.1 billion dollars and then 
dropp ing back in February, 1951, to 19.5 billion dollars.48 
This refle cts the ef fectiveness of Re gulation W up on consumer 
credit which had been imp osed in the fall of 1950 and also 
the saturation of consumer demand for durable goods by this time. 
------------
46 d 1 R Bulleti·n De cember, 1951, p . 1542 . F e era eserve , 
4 7Economic Report, January, 1952 , P · 167. 
4 Bibid., p . 192 . 
48 
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Chart 10. Consumer Credit . 
Source: Economic Indicators 
1.r-
Personal saving decreased in the fourth quarter 1950 
and f irst quarter 195 1 from a seasonally adjusted annual 
r ate of 16 . 8 billion dollars to 8.5 billion dollars. Since 
net saving as a percentage of disposable personal income 
also fell from 7. 8 p ercent to J.9 percent, this also indi-
cates the increase in personal consump tion e xpenditures du.ring 
this period. 49 
Business and Government Expenditures . During the 
last quarter of 1950 and the fi rst quarter of 1951, the 
------
4 9 Ibid • , p . 175 . 
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gross national product increased on the seasonally adjusted 
annual rate from 303 .7 billion dollars to 319 . 0 billion 
dollars. The strone factors behind the increase were: 
( a ) increased c onsumption expenditures as we have shown 
ab ove, (b) increase d government purchases of goods and ser-
vices from an adjusted rate of 47. 8 billion dollars to 53 . L~ 
b illion dollars, while gross private domestic investment 
remained stable at 60 . 2 to 60 .l billion dollars on the 
quarterly annual rate . 50 This change in the component 
p art s of GNP is in contrast to the inflation period in 
the third quarter of 1 950 . In the earlier quarter, business 
inve s tment and personal consumption were the driving forces; 
in the later inflationary episode, g overnment investment 
and again personal consump tion g ave impetus to renewed 
inflation . 
Inventories. The ratio of total manufacturing and 
t r ade inventories to sales which reached a p ost-Korean 
invasion hi gh in November of 1.45; declined to l.~.3 in 
December, 195 0; 1.35 in January, 1951, and increased in 
February to 1.41 and l .~-7 in March of 1951. 5 1 A further 
ind ication of rather strong demand relative to supply; the 
vital law of inflation. 
Emp loyment and Wa__ges. Unemployment increased in 
mid-winter, 1950-51, from a November level of 2 , 240,000 to 
50ibid., p . 167. 
5 1Ibid., p . 1 86. 
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a F ebruary level of 2 , L~07, 000 . Unemployment as a percentage 
of the total civilian labor force increased in that identical 
time period from 3.5 percent to 3 . 9 p ercent. 52 But the 
outlook was for increased employment which later did 
materialize . ·while the average work week in selected 
i ndustries declined from 41 .1 to 40 . 9 hours, 5 3 wee.kly 
earning s rose from $62 . 23 to $63 . 84 . 54 This was an indica-
tion of increase d barg aining power of the labor unions, but 
it was not because of the tightening of the employment 
situation. As we have seen, unemployment was increasing 
at this time . But it was due to the fact that employers 
were willing to grant voluntary wage increases in mid-winter, 
1 950 - 51, in order to be in a better bargaining position 
later on when labor would be scarce and the wage freeze 
would prevent certain employers from having the bargaining 
streng th to call for the use of more labor p ower.55 
We can see from the foregoing economic indicators 
a nd supplementary discussion tha t the inflation was a great 
dang er and of vital concern to the average American . Some 
members of society do g ain in an inflationary period, but 
they are in the minority. As President Truman stated in 
h is opening message of the midyear ~conomic Report : 
" ·· •• Those fortunate enough to have rising incomes were able 
to maintain their living standards. But more than half the 
5 2 r bid ., p . 177. 
53Ibid ., p . 179. 
54Ibid., pp . 180-18 1. 
5 5Economic Report, Midyear, 1951, p . 40 . 
families of the Nation had no income g ains between early 
1950 and early 1951 and almost one-fifth suffered actual 
declines. 11 56 
51 
The question mi ght be raised as to what was done 
during these eight months after June, 1950, when wholesale 
p rices rose on the average of 15 . 3 percent and consumer 
p rices by 8.4 percent. At the same time the money supply 
had increased by 4.8 billion dollars. Loans and invest-
ments of commercial banks had increased, roughly by 6 
billion dollars, and consumer exp enditures were at an 
all-time high and consumer credit was expanding . During 
this same p eriod unemployment was at a p ost-World War II 
low, and many industries had reached their productive 
capac i ties. It was at this time that wage increases were 
quickly granted, thus leading to greater income and expendi-
tures. 
What was being done to subdue this economic disease 
of social inequity? 
5. Controls, June, 1950 - February, 1951 
Some steps were taken to control the economy during 
this time. The discount rate at all Federal Reserve banks 
was raised from 1. 5 to 1.75 percent in order to discourage 
member banks from adding to their reserves, the increase 
being accompanied by the statement that, "Within the past 
56Ibid. , p. 13. 
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s ix wee k s loans and h oldine s of corporate and municipal 
securities have e xpanded by 1.5 billion dollars at banks in 
leading cities alone. Such an e xpansion under present 
conditions is clearly excessive. 11 57 However , because the 
F ederal Reserve System was following the policy of pe gging 
g overnment securities, this tool was not too effective as 
seen by the amount of U. S . Government securities that the 
commercial banks shoved onto the Reserve bank s . Secondly, 
open mark et op era tions were directed toward discouraging 
sales to the F e deral Reserve banks of short-term U.S. 
Government's, including sales by banks for reserves. Early 
in August the Board of Governors joined Federal and state 
bank supervisory a gencies in requesting voluntary coopera-
tion of banks and other lenders in restricting credit expansion. 
Effective September 18, 1950, under authority of the Defense 
Production Act , the Board of Governors placed consumer 
installment credit under Re gulation W, which increased 
minimum down payments and reduced maximum peri ods over which 
installment credit could be paid off. Later, on October 16, 
Re g ulation W was streng thened by a g ain increasing down pay-
ments and reducing payment periods . Effective October 12, 
t he Board of Governors under authority of the Defense Pro-
duction Act , with concurrence of the Housing and Home Finance 
Administrator, placed under regulation credit not extended, 
ins ured or g uaranteed by the Federal Government, Federal 
57Federal Reserve Bulletin , J6 :1110, September , 1950. 
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Housing Administr a tion or the Veterans Administration . The 
Treasury also raised the limits on the purchase of Series F 
and G saving s bonds in order to encourage more saving . More 
selective credit restraints were attempted through Re gulation 
X on real est a te and Re gulations T and U on credit granted 
to brok ers and dealers for carrying securities. There were two 
significant tax measures taken during this 8 -month period. 
The first was initiat e d almost immediately after Korea. 
Agreement was reached between the Administration and Con-
g ress to convert t h e p ending tax revision bill that was then 
unde r deb a te into a substan tial revenue-raising measure. 
The President requested an increase in taxes of 5 billion 
dollars; the Congress enacted an increase in tax es of 4.7 
b illion dollars . Le g islative action was comp leted in 
suff icient time for higher income tax withholding rates to 
become effective October 1 , 1950 . The second measure was 
t he Ex cess Prof its Tax Act of 1950, which was passed in the 
f inal wee k of the 81st Congress and affected approximately 
half of the 195 0 profits . In 1951, there was a new Revenue 
Act which did not become effective until October of that 
y ear and which adop ted one-half of the revenue asked by 
the President from individual, corp oration and excise tax 
sources. 58 The seriousness of the inflation was not felt 
until after "Red China" entered the Korean affair in late 
November. 
58Economic Report, January, 1952, pp . 131-132 . 
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On December 16, 1950, the President declared an 
emergency proclamation and established the Office of Defense 
Mobilization and the Ec onomic Stabilization Agency under the 
Defense Production Act, 1950. Wa g e and price controls were 
then placed into effect r ep lacing the freeze which had been 
in effect since the first of January. Materials allocation 
was set up under the Nat ional Production Authority but did 
not become effective until summer of 1951 . The Board of 
Governors again came back into the picture with more anti -
infl ationary p olicy in the form of an increase in member 
bank reserve requirements in January , 1951 . Reserve require-
ments at Central Reserve City and Reserve City banks were 
increased on January 11, from 22 percent to 23 percent and 
from 18 p ercent to 19 percent respectively on demand deposits 
and from 5 to 6 percent on time deposits for all classes of 
banks . Country bank reserve requirements for demand deposits 
were incre a sed from 1 2 percent to 13 percent , but not until 
January 16. Later that month , January 28 , the Central 
Reserve City and Reserve City banks reserve requirements 
were a g ain increased one percent to 24 and 20 percent 
respectively , and the Country banks reserve requirement was 
advance d from 13 to 14 percent the first of February, 1951 . 
Th i s was of course an anti-inflationary step . 
In p ointing out attempts to curb the inflationary 
imp act , it bas been seen that the economic disease of 
spiraling prices always seemed to be one step ahead of any 
c ont rols which could be imposed for inhibiting this menace . 
By the end of February , 1951 , it appeared that the inflationary 
Press,,- h 
...... -es ad subsided 
' 
demands, Prices h ad stabilized and inventories were again 
coming· 
into alignment with sales. The short-run outlook 
supp lies were catching up with 
Was for a 
slackening in inflationary pressures, but in the 
long-run th 
' e possibility for greater inflation was still 
imm1 
nent because Government defense expenditures were just 
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beginning t 0 take greater portions of the GNP and would con-
tinue to do this. 
e~Penditures 
were at the annual rate of 12 billion dollars; 
in the th' 
lrd quarter at an annual rate of 14 billion dollars 
In the f irst half of 1950, defense 
accounting 
for about less than 5 percent of the total gross 
nat1 0 
nai Product. In 1951, defense expenditures were expected 
to 
more than . t double those of 1950, and from an ex post poin 
of View 
they did just that. Thus to have slackened the 
economic 
controls then might have proven disastrous in the 
futUr e. 
The intelligent policy was to strengthen controls 
as much as 
Possible and not to be caught asleep at the 
SWftch 
' as h ad happened in mid-1950. As the Council of 
Econom· 
Be le Advisers pointed out in the January, 1951, Economic 
ort of the President: 
t At the end of 1950 the nation al economy was subject 0 forces of inflation'far more powerful than those which f~0 Se following the original outbre ak in Korea . Original ly, 
m·~ advances in prices which had slowed down during the 
p 
2 
-autumn, was accele;ated under pressures which 
T~~mised to continue until curbed by positive ~ction. 
b outlook is that to these pressures there will soon 
m~l added the direct effe cts of the r apidly exp anding 
d~c£~ary Program, wi t h i ts increasing draf t up on pro-
ive resources. 59 
-------59 
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CHAPTBR III 
THE VOLUNTARY CREDIT RESTRAINT PROGRAM 
1. Need for the Program 
As it was pointed out in the last f ew paragraphs 
of Chap ter II, the inflationary forces had subsided some-
what by March of 1951. But also it was shovm that national 
security e xp enditures, which had only been taking a 5 per-
cent payment out of the gross national product in 1950, 
would more than double in 1951 over the 1950 level of 
defense e xp enditures. Thus , in addition to the general po-
tential inflationary forces - which had receded in the early 
months of 1951, but which were expected to become more 
active as the year moved forward, especially in the later 
months of the second half of 1951 - were superimposed the 
anticipations of increased stepped-up national security 
e xp enditures. Consequently, this was no time to be thinking 
of relaxing the anti-inflationary controls which had been 
p laced into commission in the previous 'eight months. Actually 
during this p eriod, greater steps were being taken to sta-
bilize the present and future inflationary pressures . The 
price-wag e freeze, which had been in service since January 1, 
1951, of course could be expected to serve only as a temporary 
stop-gap measure. A more effective and stronger measure 
in the form of price and wage ceilings with adequate enforce-
ment provisions was being undertak en by the creation of the 
Off ice of Pr ic e S t ab i li z ation and the ·L'1 age Stabilization 
Bo a r d wh ose duty it would be to promulgate and enforce 
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these ceiling s. But the establishment and elevation of 
these control agencies to an effective and forceful position 
i n the defense economy could n ot be accomplished overnigp.t. 
S tud ies had to be made, employees and administrators hired 
and trained, forms printed and routines of procedure and 
channels of communication set up . This meant delay and the 
loss of vital time as well as failure to curb the dangerous 
inf lation threats . Another reason for the delay in the 
imp osition of price and wag e controls was the fact that t h e 
g reat upward movement of prices and wages prior to the 
g eneral f reeze in January had not been uniform . Some prices 
h ad greatly outrun others. A similar condition had occured 
t o wage levels . This meant that comprehensive studies would 
have to be made before controls could be imposed in an 
equitable manner . 1 Another factor which resulted in more 
delay in getting wage and price ceilings into position as 
a contra-inflationary measure was the multiplicity of amend-
ments which successful pressure groups had appende d to the 
Defe n se Production Act . " .••• The amendments weakened the 
p owers of price control by preventing certain necessary 
actions and by requiring a number of adjustments all of which 
could only have the effect of raising ceiling prices •.••• 11 2 
1Economic Report, January, 1952 , p . 1 41-1-· 
2 Ibi d . 
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'rhu s a p r ogram of work ab le price and wage control structures 
h ad to wa i t until t h e mi d -summer or early autumn of 1951 before 
the y c ould b e consi dere d a substanti a l f actor in the over-all 
p ol i c y of inflation control . 
Another i mp ortan t s tep tak en a t this time to ward 
off the further evils of s p iraling prices was the Federal 
Res e rves' op en mark e t p olicy of ceasing to support long term 
g o v ernment securities . This was an indirect step chiefly 
i n the monetary and credit field to which reference was made 
in Ch ap ter II. By removing the p e gs from U. S. Government 
ob li g atio n s, prices of these securities were allowed to seek 
the i r levels . As a result, they imme diately fell below par . 
Be c a use of this, institut ions holding such securities would 
tak e a cap ital loss if they attempted to sell their bonds. 
This policy was p rincip ally aimed at the commercial bank s 
which prior to this were unloading their U. S . Government 
s e curities onto the Federal Reserve Banks at the supp orted 
p rices and building up reserves upon which inflation- feedin g 
ind ustrial and commercial loans could be extended . When 
t he Treasury-Federal Reser ve acc ord was reached on March 1 2 , 
1 9.51, the inflationary forces of credit expansion were gre atly 
inh i b ited by this long over due policy change . 
Theref ore, it can be concluded from the evidence 
p ointed out in the immediate few paragraphs above and the 
discussion on controls in the last part of Chapter II that 
those offi c ials in charge of the anti - inflationary program 
of the g overnment were not anticip ating a lull in the war 
a g a i nst inflation . The government was pursuing a "shotgun 
method" vis a vis inflation, that is, no anti-inflation 
t echniques were left untapped, no stops left open in the 
struggle against rising p rices . Even a new technique of 
i nf lation control was being devi sed for a trial run. 
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A need was felt in the area of institutional invest-
ment f or a pro gram which would be an anti-inflationary policy 
a s well as a de vi ce for the diversion of funds from non-
essential to essential purposes. Concerning this, the Fed-
eral Reserve System stated : 
Institutional investors, including life and property 
insurance companies, commercial and mut u al savings 
banks, and saving s and loan associations , are at present 
the principal sources of long-term investment funds, 
while commercial banks have long been major sources of 
short-term business credit. During the postwar period 
1946- 50 , additions to the investment p ortfolios of 
these institutions accounted for 88 percent of the 
increase in real estate mort g a ge debt , and for 77 p ercent 
of the increase in long-term corporate and State and 
local g overnmen t debt . At the end of 1950, .•.• they 
held three-fourths of all real estate mort ga ge debt , 
over half of all State and local and long-term corporate 
deb t, and ove r two-fifths of Federal debt out standing . 
If the investment and lending activities of these 
financing org anizations could be directed, through a 
p ro g ram of voluntary credit restraint, toward the 
restriction of speculative uses of c redit and the 
diversion of funds from nonessential to essential pur-
poses , there was a real p ossibility that such action 
would help to check inflationary pressures and faci -
litate the di version of labor and materials to 
essential uses . 3 
In answer to this wish and as one of the new pellets 
in the Federal Government 's "shot gun barrage" against the 
inf lationary forces, was the Program f or Voluntary Credit 
Re straint . This program received great p laudits from those 
who initiated and participated in its proceedings, worked 
under its policies and were implement al in carrying forward 
its courses of action. On the other hand, public officials, 
3 11 voluntary Action to Help Curb Inflation." 
Reprint , Federal Reser~ Bulletin, November, 1951, pp . 2- 3. 
business leaders and many economists who were not c losely 
a ssociated with this program took a more or less neutral 
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or hands-off position in discussions of its value or worth 
as an anti-inflation force . This latter position is partly 
d ue to the inherent characteristics of the program itself -
wh ich will be discussed later - and partly due to the 
absence of any comprehensive or over-all study of the p rogram 
p er se . In this paper, the n , there will be an attempt 
to p oint out the former and remedy the latter while 
a ttemp ting to arrive at p recise c onclusions as to the value 
of t he program under various conditions whi ch impede or 
imp rove its usefulness as a force a gainst inflation . 
2 . Genesis of the VCRP 
Introduction. The previous statement that this 
Prog ram for Voluntary Credit Restraint was a completely new 
anti - inflationary technique may not prove to be entirely 
true when the background of this program is examined. 
But b efore the history behind this program can be 
presented , it will be necessary to g ive a brief de script i on 
of the p rogram itself for it would be difficult to present 
the origin of this credit restraint te chnique without first 
g iving the reader an enlightenment into the characteristics 
of the program . Searching into history without some pre -
c onceived ideas or concepts of what the aims of the search 
are intended to uncover is often n e.b ulous and mentally 
exhausting . 
The Voluntary Credit Restraint Program, in the 
g eneral terms of a synoptic preview, was an attempt upon 
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the p art of those i ndi v i duals and institutions which were 
d irectly ass ociated with the f inancial aspects of the Ameri-
can e conomy to devise a technique of self-control which would 
le ad to the promotion of the de f ense e f fort and simultaneously 
r e s t r ict and help s tabilize various inflationary pressures. 
Thos e directly particip ating were off icials of commercial 
banks , inve stment ban ks, lif e insurance comp anies who were 
l ater joined by the off icials of mutual saving s banks, 
saving s and loan associations p lus various other minor 
f inancial institutions. Since these institutional investors 
were the main sources for cap ital and credit other than 
v arious government f inancial institutions, it was more 
than appropriate that some type of control be imp osed in the 
sphere of institutional investment. These financial 
institutions under the ausp ices of the Board of Governors 
o f the F edera l Reserve System were mainly rep resented by 
t he i r resp ective trade associations. General p rinciples of 
p olicy were established to govern the lending policies of 
t hese financial institutions along with a National Committee 
and quite a few reg ional and subcommittees which were to be 
the g uiding hands in the p rogram. The princip les of the pro-
gram and the bulletins, after being widely promulg ated, were 
used as screens and bench mark s by which the lending of ficials 
of the particip ating institutions could transform their 
former lend ing princip les and conditions into a unified 
program of lending guides designed to help p romote the 
defense e f f ort and control inflation. The p rogram was 
volunt ary under gove rnment sanction; there was no direct 
compulsion that r equired the financial institutions to 
comply wit h its principles . 
From this brief preview there cru1 be obtained a 
general sketchy 
Progra m. After 
concept of the Voluntary Credit Restraint 
the bac kground and policy forerunners of 
this program have been discussed, there will be presented 
a much greater detailed discussion of the program in the 
part of this chap ter. last 
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Ori g!_n and Background - Capital Issues Committee. The 
genesis of this type of technique for defense or war finance 
and ant. . 1.-inflation control goes back to world War I and the 
org anization of a Capital Issues Committee. This committee 
'W'as b rought t h ogether under the need pointed out by the ten 
Secret ary of the Treasury McAdoo in his annual report to 
Congress in 1917. At that time he ref erred to the importance 
or avoiding unnecessary capital expenditures in both public 
enterprises.4 With no specific governmental and pr· 1.vate 
authorit y conferred up on the Secretary of the Treasury or 
the F ederal R d eserve Board to approve or disapprove the un er-
taking " ' A number of corporation executives, bankers a
nd 
rnun.icip a1 officials submitted plans f or new enterprises, and 
thereup on the Se cretary 
:Persons contemplating offering securities for sale or sub-
Seri Pt ions f . . . ' 1.rst submit them for an expression of opinion 
of the Treasury requested that all 
as to the comp atibility of the proposed issues with the 
----- -----1918 4Fifth Annual of the Federal Reserve Boar~, 
, p . t>"[i.. Rep ort 
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national interest. n5 Following this announcement, offerings 
for an expression of opinions on tentative financial programs 
were so great that it soon became evident that a more 
formalized procedure was necessary. Therefore, in a letter 
dat e d January 11, 1918, Secretary McAdoo requested the 
Federal Reserve Board " •.•• as another patriotic service, to 
assume the responsibility of passing upon such proposals as 
may be submitted, both in respect to capital expenditures or 
issues of new securities. 116 
The Board then appointed three of its members as a 
c ommittee to undertake the enlistment of various members of 
f inancial institutions to act as a voluntary advisory 
committee to assist in its work. An auxiliary committee, 
composed of five members, including the Federal Reserve 
a gent, who acted as chairman, and the governor of the Federal 
Re serve Bank , was app ointed. All served without pay . 7 
Work began F ebruary 1, 1918 . The committee resolved 
to pass upon industrial and public utility issues of no less 
than $500 ,000 and municipal issues of no less than $250 , 000 . 
Minimums were later reduced to $1 00 ,000. 8 
5rbid . 
7Ibid., p . 65. 
8 r b id. 
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The tests applied to security issues were: (a) whether 
the issue was timely and in conjunction with the financial 
policie s of the g overnment and (b) whether the funds to be 
raised would be used in the public interest. 9 
On April 5, 1918 , Article II of the War Finance 
Cor p oration Act, g ave le gal sanction to the Capital Issues 
Committee on authority granted to the President. The new 
cormnittee automatically superseded the voluntary committee 
of the Fe deral Reserve Board . Then, under government sanction 
it adopted the same general plan of administration and the 
same local committees as the previous committee had been 
using . 10 
As to the effectiveness of this Capital Issues 
Committee, the Federal Reserve Board stated: 
Notwithstanding its purely voluntary nature and 
the absence of specific legal authority, the committee, 
by reason of the hearty cooperation of other govern-
mental agencies and of bankers 1 associations, as well 
as of lending stock exchanges, was able, during its 
brief e x istence, to effect a considerable stopp age of non-
essential security issues.11 
In a st a tistical table, it was further pointed out 
that of a total of 479 million dollars in issues consi dered 
66 million dollars was disapproved. Of the amount approved, 
2S9 million dollars was for refunding , leaving a sum of 154 
million dollars of approved new issues. This 154 million 
9 Ibid . 
lOibid ., p . 66 . 
11Ibid., p . 6 5 . 
65 
dollars of new issues was then compared with the same period 
in 1917, the year previous, of new issues of 504 million 
dollars roughly 3 1/3 times greater . 1 2 This is pointed to 
as further proof of the efficacy of the program. But as it 
will be seen in the evaluation of the recent Voluntary Credit 
Restraint Program, just because the regional and national 
committees disapproved the capital extension does not mean 
that the advice was followed; because from the voluntary 
nature of the program, there was no means of seeing that 
the financial institutions did follow the opinions rendered 
by the re g ional and National bodies . 
Capital Issues Committee - VCRP . From this brief 
description of the Capital Issues Committee of World War I , 
there can be recognized many likenesses and unlikenesses 
with the present program under scrutiny here . In the first 
ins tance , the two programs were similar because both were 
voluntary in administrative composition, and both were 
staffed by the identical individuals who were being con-
trolled . That is, these two programs were techniques of 
self -control . Secondly , they both worked in close coordina-
tion with the Federal Reserve System and under government 
sponsorship . Thirdly , they were primarily concerned with 
p r omoting defense and war efforts and simultaneously reducing 
inflationary pressures by restraining unnecessary demands upon 
capital, labor and other productive resources . 
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Dissimilarities are fo und in the fact that the 
Cap ital Issues Committee , as s een from its tit le , was prin-
cipally concerned with the finance of capital securities, 
whereas the Voluntary Credi t Restraint Program - as it will 
b e seen later- not only dealt with this problem of inflation 
stemming from capital finance , but in the broader fields of 
i nventory , real estate , working cap ital, capital investment, 
spe culation et cetera. A second difference found between 
t hese two techniques of cre d i t cont rol is that VCRP was on 
a more formalized bas is. By t h is is meant there was more 
thought put behind its conception , there was a greater 
i nc lusiveness in scope and the program was more fo rmalized 
t hrou gh means of communication and techniques of admini stra-
tive p roc edure. This is possibly due to the exp erience 
a ccwnulated during the first attempt at any devic e of this 
type during World War I to t he most recent attempt of war 
control t echnique. 
But, the important point here is not whether they 
we re simil ar or dissimilar , but that the Capital Issues 
Commi ttee of 1918 was a forerunner of the recent Voluntary 
Credit Rest raint Program . 
Moral Suasion - A Predecessor. Some authorities 
have classified the Voluntary Credit Restraint Pro gram as 
f ormalized moral suasion . They define moral suasion as the 
use of p ersuas ion b a sed on an appeal to moral and ethical 
va l u es. These critics classify moral suasion into two types. 
One they call the indirect type of contact through oral or 
writt en st atements , app eals and warnings through poli cy 
The second or direct 
type of moral suasion is through supervisory processes, 
informal consultations et cetera. Tbese writers point out 
statements 
' 
the press et cetera. 
that: Tb · d se of direct 
e most recent and most formalize u . t 
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contacts bas been under tbe vo1untarY credit re
st
rain 
p rogram wbich includes insurance companies, inveS
t
ment 
banks, mutual saving s banks and savings and ioan ~ss~-
ciations as well as commercial bank• • TbiS organize . 
effort at direct contacts was instituted under au
t
boritY 
granted by the Defense Production Act of 1950 and has 
th
e o~jective of encouraging 1enders to limit t~e use 
of p rivate credit for none ssential and speculative 
purposes and thus to help restrain inflationary pressures 
from this source during the period of national defense 
emergency . .•. . 13 
They go on to relate that moral suasion was used in 
late l919 and early 1920 when the Federal Reserve Boa
rd
' 
concerne d about inflation trends, issued warnings 
th
at 
F e deral Reserve credit should not be used either directly 
In its Annual Repor! 
its preference for 
in irectly to finance speculation . o r · d " 
for 1 923 , the Board strongly expressed 
ro uctive credit" as contrasted to "credit for either 
"p d . 
investment or speculative purposes , " the essence of tbe VCRP • 
A classic period was in the expansion of speculative credit 
i n t h e late twenties when the Board issued statements in its 
monthly Bulletins and Annual Reports a gainst speculative 
credit expansion but to no avail. Tbe same bas been done in 
recent perio ds of inflation, but moral suasion as a tool for 
Debt ." 
l3
11
Monetary Policy and the Management of the Public 
Senate Do c ument No. 1 2 3 , Part 1, 1952 , p . 463. 
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monetary and cre d it control has proven to be ineff ective in 
the past. This is n o t intended to be an invective againS t 
moral suasion or to p oint up its ineffectiveness in dealing 
Wi th problems of inf lation. It is stated here merely to 
reveal that moral suasion as used in the recent paS t bas 
been a forerunner to the Program for Voluntary Credit 
Re straint, if one accep ts this program as formalized moral 
suasion. 
A.B . A. 1 s Influence. When the VCRP was briefly 
defined a fe w paragraphs above, it was pointed out that 
several financial trade associations bad been instrumental 
in th e organization and the functioning of this program . 
The American Bankers' Association was one of these trade 
group s . Not only was the A. B . A. influential in establishing 
and promoting the Voluntary Credit Restraint Program, but 
it also had been deeply involved in p romoting several predecessor 
schemes of a similar v o luntary nature among its members . This 
occurred years before the g overnment g ave its recognition to the 
voluntary anti-inflationary and defense promoting technique 
in early 1951. This org anization, which is the principal 
financial trade association of the commercial bank officials 
in this country, in the post World War II inflation took 
up on itself to set into motion a program among its members 
of an anti-inflationary type similar to the VCRP but without 
g overnmental sponsorship. This program was an attempt by 
the leaders of the American Bankers' Association via the use 
of moral suasion to persuade their fellow bankers to bold 
d own e x cessive credit extension which was a primary force in 
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the inflation of 1947-48 . 
Thus, the Voluntary credit Restraint program cannot 
be said to be a comp letely 
"I n a larg e sense, •..• the 
new method of inflation control. 
ide a had its roots in the A.B.A.'S 
Voluntary credit restraint program of 1948 , which was 
credited with achieving a g reat success. 1114 
3 . The Program Per Se 
Orga ni ?. ation. Th e Defense Pr oduction Act of 1950, 
Which was the leg islative rep ly to the request of the Truman 
Adm · · inistration for power to expand the defense program, 
maintain a sound defense economy and carry on the Korean War, 
was the leg islative enactment which g ave government recog-
nition to the VCRP . This packag e of legislation was all-
inclusive. Title I dealt with p riorities and allocations; 
Title II dealt with authority to requisition and condemn; 
Title I II was concerned with the expansion of p rod uctive 
capacity and supply; Title IV pertained to price and wage 
st abilization; Title V dealt with the settlement of labor 
disputes; Title VI was concerned with control of consumer 
and real estate credit and Title VII was a general provisions 
section. The Act became effective on September B, 1950. In 
a p erusal of the Congressional Record concerning debate upon 
the Act, much discussion is foW1d centered around wag e and 
p rice controls, priority and allocation power and means of 
1411 The Roots of Voluntary Credit Restraint . " 
Bank ing, 43 : 34, June, 1951 . 
70 
s et tling labor disputes , but little if any, centers around 
the Voluntary Credit Restraint Program. This was due to the 
fact that the idea of such an anti -inflation tool was not 
k nown to the leg islators at that time . Power to enter such 
v o lunt ary schemes was referred to in general terms , but no 
specific sing le device was debated. When the Ac t was finally 
passed , that section g iving g overnment sanction to the 
VC R was Title VII, the general provisions title . In this 
title, power was given only in general language leaving one 
t o conclude that the VCRf was only one of many voluntary 
devices contemplated under this provision . Actually 24 
such agreements were established, but none was to be more 
s ust aining or receive more publicity than the Voluntary 
Cred i t Restraint Progr am. 
As it was pointed out above, Title VII 9f the 
De e nse Production Act g ave g overnment endorsement to the 
CRP . Section 708 (a), (b), (c), (d) , and (e) of the Act 
state d : 
Section 708 (a). The Presiden t is authorized to 
consult with representatives of industry, business, 
financing , a griculture , labor and other interests, with 
a view to encourag ing the making by such persons with 
the app rova l by the President of voluntary agreements 
and programs to further objectives of this Act . 
(b) No act or omission to act pursuant to this Act 
which occurs while this Act is in effect, if requested 
by the ? resident pursuant to a voluntary agreement or 
p r ogram approved under subsection (a) and found by the 
resident to be in the public interest as contributing 
to the national defense shall be construed to be within 
the prohibition of the antitrust laws or the Federal 
Trade Commission Act of the United States . A copy of 
each such request intended to be within the coverage of 
this section, and any modificati on or withdrawal thereof , 
shall be furnished to the Attorney General and the 
Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission when made, and 
it shall be published in the Federal Register unless 
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publication thereof would in the opinion of the President, 
endanger the nationa l security . 
(c) The author ity granted in subsection (b) shall be 
dele g ated only (1) to officials who shall for the pur-
p ose of such de leg ation be required to be appointed by 
the ~resident by and with the advice and consent of 
the Senate , unles s otherwis e required to be so appointed 
and ( 2 ) upon the condi tion that such officials consult 
with the Attorney General and Chairman of the Federal 
Trade Commission not less than ten days before making 
any request of finding t hereunder, and (J) upon the 
c ondition that such officials obtain the approval of 
the Attorney General to any request thereunder before 
making the request • . For the p urpose of carrying out 
the ob jective s of Title I of this Act, the authority 
granted in subsection (b) of this section shall not be 
dele g ated e x cept to a sing le official of the govern-
ment . 
( d ) Upon withdrawal of any request or finding made 
h ereunder the provis ions of this section shall not apply 
to any subsequent a ct or omission to act by reason of 
such f inding or reqoo st . 
(e) The Attorney General is directed to make , or request 
the F e deral Trade Commission to make for him, surveys 
for the purpose of determining any factors which may 
tend to eliminate competition , create or strengthen 
monop olies , injure small business, or otherwise promote 
undue concentration of economic p ower in the c ourse of 
the administration of this Act. The Attorney General 
shall submit to the Congress and the Presi dent within 
n inety days af ter the approval of this Act and at such 
times thereafter as he deems desirable reports setting 
fo rth the results of such surveys and including such 
recommendations as he may de em desirable. 
On September 9 , 1950 , the day after the Defense 
roduction Act became eff ective, Executive Order 10161, 
d ele gating the resident's power for entering into voluntary 
agreements with many segments of business finance , labor 
and a griculture, was issued . The pertinent clause which trans -
f erre d the authority from the President to the Board of 
overnors of the Federal Reserve System and which led to 
c reation of the Voluntary Credit Restraint Program was : 
Section 701 (a) . The functions conferred up on 
the resident by section 708 (a) of the Defense Production 
Act of 1 950 are h ereby dele gated as follows : 
( 2 ) To the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System with respect to financing . 
By th· is executive action, the Boar d of Governors 
became the alter e go of the President in the matter of 
financ· 1a1 volun t ary agreements in promot ing the defense 
effort and counter rn· g inflation . 
There was a •teps delay of almost four months before any 
were tak 
Th
. en under th C ls del e authority granted by ongress. 
ay, as it 
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or the will be pointed out further on, was one 
cause s for in it the mediocre efficaciousness of the program 
s str 
b
o uggle against v ris · · Consultati·ons d1·d gin With ing prices. 
New y a meeting held at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Ork 
•Pre 19 , 1950 . The meeting, attended by ~ on December 
sen tat. 
l 
ives of th nvest e American Banke rs, Association, the 
lnsor erS• Association of America, the Life ment Bank 
ance t Associ t· he F a ion of America, and by representatives of 
Gove Reserve Bank of New York and the Board of 1edera1 
:rnor s 
the of the 
th P:resident of 
Federal Reserve sys tem, was called by 
the Federal Re serve Bank of New York at 
e :t> equest 
b:t11 ty Of 
8~a.nt1 
ng 
of the Board of Govemors to discuss the possi-
Voluntar · t th Y agreements or programs to restric e 
Of C le 
redit not needed in the defense effort. 
7 
result was the appointment of a subcommittee 
of two members t be repre-of each association o 
the meet · ing . 
for assist each of the groups, and with Federal Reserve 
ance 
~ommendations with respect to a vo1untarY 
It was decided that, with aid of 
Co . 15" 
l9~J. tte First l, peon Def Annual Report of 
P. 247_
24
;~se Production.
11 
the Activities of the Joint 
s enate Report No. 1040, 
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p rog r am mi gh t be f ormulated . On the basis of those recommen-
d ations, the c ommi t t e e which originally met on December 19 
app roved a p rogram f or voluntary credit restraint at another 
meeting held F ebrmry 2 , 1 951. 16 
This p rogr am was l a ter app roved by the Board of 
Governors which consulte d with the Attorney General and 
the Chairman of t h e Fe deral Trade Commission as required by 
section 708 (c) of t h e Def ense Production Act. 1 7 The pur-
p ose of this re quirement wa s to get anti-trust immunity 
f rom the Justic e Dep ar t me n t for those financial institutions 
which were to participate under this p rogram. The lall 
tree t Journal state d that th e Boa rd of Governors had some 
di ficulty in getting Justice Department approval of such 
a v o lunt ary credit res t r aint tool. The Journal also revealed 
that the Bo ard of Governors refused to make public a letter 
from the Justice Dep artment which reportedly promised anti-
trust immunity. The article stated that the Federal Reserve 
said that the Justice Dep artment was unwilling to have the 
letter released. Objection was said to be based on the 
fact that the most recent letter from Attorney General McGrath 
c arried re f erences to previous correspondence between the 
two a encies, and that p ublication of the last statement 
wo uld only p resent "one side" of the situation and this would 
not have been to the satisf action of the Justice Department 
17I bid. 
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ac or dlng to the Board of Governors . However , Board Governor 
£· 01,rnll emphasized t hat the Justice Department 1 s letter was 
11 very t a i ght - forward'' and gave 11 unqualified approval . 11 
Co1 1e ting on this , the ':Jal l treet Journal said, 11 Failure 
t om ( 6 the letter public, h owever, le aves unexp lained the 
ct terms of the Justice Department's endorsement. 11 1 8 C But, 
cast i ng a side this fl imsy comment which lacked any reliable 
proo , Justice Department approval was given in early March, 
an o the 9 th of that month , the Board of Governors issued 
Hs 11 request . " The Chairman of the Board of Governors , in 
me r ndum to all f i nancing institutions , urged t heir 
coope ation with i hap ogram . Copies of the 11 Statement of 
inc i p l es 11 and the "n.eques t by the Board of Governors 11 were 
sent to 90 , 000 leaders of both financial inst itutions and 
Po l i ic al entities , ranging in size from s mall townsh i p 
may to state governors and federal officials, and requestin 
them 11 • • •• to a c t and to refrain from acting , pursuant t o and 
n ccordance with provisions of the Program . . • •• 11 19 
St atement of Princip les . The agreemen t starts out 
b, r e ve alin g one of t he weaknesse s of the program per se. 
t is shown that the program is addressed to only one 
· i it e d source of inflationary pressure. "It is approp riate 
to Point out that this Program of voluntary credit restraint 
0 es n ot have to do with such factors as inflationary lending 
--
l C11 voluntary Credit Curb P l an Reported Backed by 
J Stice Department . 11 dal l Street Journal, 137 :3, March ll~, 
1951 . 
19 Federal Res erve Bulletin, 37 : 263- 266, Marc h , 1951. 
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by federal a gencies , unnecessary spending , federal, state or 
l ocal, and the wage - p rice spiral and other much more 
seriously contributine; factors . 1120 
The purposes of the program are found in a small 
p ara raph at the be g inning of the statement . 
"It shall be the purpose of f i nancing institutions to 
e xtend credit in such a way as to help maintain and increase 
t h e streng th of the domestic economy through the restraint 
o f i nfl ationary tendencies and at the same time to help 
financ e the defense program and the essential nee d s of 
a g riculture , ind ustry and commerce. 1121 Thus, the program 
had a twofold duty . One , to help restrain inflation 
by limiting the e xpansion of credit , and two, to act as an 
a lloc ation or rationing mechanism to see that the defense 
and t he defense supporting credit demands received pref-
erence ove r the non-defense credit deman ds, and in so doing 
t o help p romote the defense effort . 
Pointing out the difference be t ween this voluntary 
cont r o l and the general and select i ve types of credit 
restraint the Federal Reserve stated : 
In contrast to general measures which influence 
t he over-all supp ly of credit, and selective restraints 
wh i ch influence the demand for s p ecific types of credit 
through re gulation of loan terms and conditions , the 
Voluntary Credit Restraint Program seeks to direct the 
flow of credit away from nonessential and s p eculative 
uses by the voluntary action of lenders in approving or 
20~. 
21~. 
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disapproving applications for funds . To do t h is it has 
been necessary to have certain criteria that would be of 
aid in assessing objectively the merits of individual 
loan app lications and proposed bond and stock offering s 
in relation to over- all economic c ondit ions and require-
ments . 22 
In order to pursue this pol ic y , it became the 
ob l i g ation of every financial institution which considered 
i tself an advocate of this credit restraint technique to 
" ••.. screen lo an applications on the basis of their purpose, 
in addition to the usual tests of c r edit worthiness . The 
criterion for sound lending in a p eriod of inflationary 
dang e r bo ils down to the fol lowin g : Does it commensurately 
incre as e or maintain production , processing and distribution 
of' es sent i al goods and services ? 1123 The lending institutions 
we re to foll ow not only their own criterion for making loans 
b u t those under the "St at ement of Princip les" of the VC R? 
and the bullet in s that were i ssued f rom time to time after 
the pr og ram was inaug urated . These bulletins and ancillary 
memoranda will be dis cussed i n the foll owing chap ter . 
To g ive the proe ram a greater initial imp etus, 
certain general guides were established from the be ginning 
fo r the s creening of loans by lenders . 
Proper loans under the p ro gram were : 
1 . Loans for defense production , direct or in-
d irect, i ncluding fuel , power and transp ortation . 
22 
"Voluntary Act ion to Hel p Curb Inflation . ll .£12.. cit., 
p . J . 
23Federal Reserve Bullet in, 3 7: 263- 266, March, 1951. 
I 
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2 . Loans for the production , processing, and orderly 
d i stribution of agricultural and other staple products , 
inc luding export and import as well as domestic , and of 
goods and services supplying the essential day- to - day 
needs of the country. 
J . Loans to augment working capital where hi gher 
wages and prices of materials make such loans necessary 
to sustain essential production , processing or distri -
b ut ion services . 
4. Loans to securities dealers in the normal con-
duct of their business or to them or others incidental 
to the flotation and distribution of securities where 
the money is being raised for any of the foregoing 
p urposes . 
This Program would not seek to restrict loans 
guaranteed or insured, or author ized as to purpose by 
a Gove rnment agenc y , on the theory that they should be 
restricted, in accordance with national policy , at the 
source of guaranty or authorization . Financ ing in-
stitutions woµld not be restricted in honoring previou s 
commitments . 24 
Improper loans under the program were : 
1 . Loans to retire or acquire corporate equities 
in the hands of the publi c, including loans for the 
acquisition of existing c omp anies or plants where n o 
over - all increase of production would result . 
2 . Loans for speculative investments or purchases . 
The first test of speculation is whether the purchase 
is for any purpose other than use or distribution in the 
normal course of the borrower 1 s business . The second 
test is whether the amounts involved ar e disprop ortionate 
to the borrower's normal business operations . This 
would include speculative expansion of real estate 
holdings or plant facilities as well as speculative 
a ccumulation of inventories in e xpectation of resale 
instead of use . 
The foregoing princip les should be applied in 
screening as to purpose on all loans or securities not 
covered by Regulation U or T . 25 
The "Princip l es" further stated that , 11 •••• financing 
institutions should not only observe the letter of the 
- --------
21+Ibid . 
25Ibid . 
--
e x isting re gulations .••. but s h ould also apply to all their 
lending the spirit of these and such other regulations and 
g uiding principles a s the Government may from time to time 
nnounce in the fi ght a g ainst inflation." 26 It was also 
revealed that, "This p rog ram is necessarily very general 
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in nature. It is a voluntary p rogram to aid in the over-all 
e.f.forts to restrain inflation . To be h elpful, this program 
must rely on the g ood wi l l of all financin g institutions 
nd the over-all intention to comp ly wit h its s p irit. 11 27 
The voluntary basis of the pro gram was delineated 
by several facts . F ir s t, lending institutions in the United 
S tates were not comp elled to join the program. This is not 
to say t hat there was n o influence placed up on them to get 
them to jo in in cooperation with the spirit and enthusiasm 
which was f'oun d in many sectors of the pro gram . Many 
p sychological and socia l pressures could be placed against 
recalcitrant financial leaders who were somewhat skeptical 
a bo u t the merits of' the p lan to help i mpl ement the defense 
e .fort • 
•••• While neither the National Committee nor the 
regional committees have any authority to direct the 
policies of the cooperating finance institutions, they 
can and do e x ert considerable inf'luence on the thinking 
and decisions of' lending officers and upon prospective 
b orrowers who know of the Program and are in sympathy 
with its princip les and objectives. 28 
26 Ibid . 
27Ibid . 
28 11 Voluntary Action to Help Curb Inflation." loc. cit. 
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Second -
It should be emphasized that the Program is in 
every sense of the term a voluntary undertaking on the 
p art of the financing institutions. Pursuant to the 
r equ irements of the Program, a member of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System is Chairman of 
t he National Commi t tee and personnel from the various 
Federal Reserve Banks are members of most of the regional 
committees . The F ederal Reserve System, however, does 
not impress its views up on the National or regional 
committees as to the typ es of loans that are appropriate 
or inapp ropriate under the circumstances, and undertakes 
no action to oblige lending institutions to part icipate 
in the Program . 29 
The Federal Reserve has repeatedly stated that the 
p urp ose of the presence of their officials on the National 
Committee and the re g ional subcommittees was to protect the 
p ublic interest. By this, they meant that it was these 
of f icials' duty to see that there was no illegal anti-trust 
c o l lusion or similar activity among the members of the many 
credit restraint b o dies to the detriment of the general 
p ubl ic . But one may raise the question concerning the rela-
tionship of the Federal Reserve officials to the other mem-
bers of the various committees when the question of loan 
p olicy came be f ore the credit restraint policy determining 
bodie s . Did they remain mute at these times in the pro-
ceeding s ? Or , did they actively reveal their op inions and 
in turn those of the Federal Reserve ? From p ure conjecture 
on this writer 's p art , the answer to the latter question 
;,.rould be "yes l " 
Third , and this was the strongest characteristic 
29s en a te Document No. 123 , Part 1, .£E• cit., 
p . 43 1 . 
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which g ave this program its voluntary characteristic, was 
t he p rovision that the final decision as to whether a loan 
voul d have been granted or rejected, after the re g ional or 
ational committees had rendered their op inions, rested 
solely with the lending institution itself. 
The plan is based on the p remise that a substantial 
de gree of cooperation can be obtained on a voluntary 
b a sis p rovi ded that: (a) the lending standards which 
lenders are asked to follow are realistic and app ropriat e 
to the economic environment; (b) such standards are 
nondiscriminatory as between borrowers of the same 
general class; and (c) part icipating financial 
institutions are fully informed as to the desirable 
lending standards. JO 
Procedure fo r Implementing the Program. The central 
c oordinat ing organizat ion in the program was the National 
Cr edi t Res traint Committee, members of which were app ointed 
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The 
National Committee was composed of four represent a tives from 
t he commercial banks, four f rom the life insurance companies, 
fo ur from the investment banks and two representatives from 
the savings and loan associations and two from the mutual 
savin g s banks , resulting in a National Committee of seventeen 
members counting Federal Reserve representative Oliver S. 
owell . Members of the commi ttee were selected so as to 
achieve representation from various geographic areas and from 
sma ll, medium and large financine institutions. Addit ional 
members and alternates we re designated by the Board of 
Gov e rno r s of the Federal Reserve System. Governor Oliver S. 
301..2..i£ . 
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owell of the Board of Governors was c hairman from the 
progr am 's be g inning to its conclusion . Alternate chairman 
v.r s e orge B . Vest , General Counse l of the Board . The 
J tional Committee avoided building up a large organization. 
It h ad n o budget and relied almost entirely upon part time 
a ssistance of re gular staff members of the Board of 
Governors. 31 
In order to give an ide a of the type of banking and 
l i f e i nsurance officials who comp osed the National Committee 
and what positions they h eld with their respective financial 
i nst itut ions and to see the composition of this committee, 
the make up of the Nat ional Committee as of March l~-, 1951 
is g iven below . It will be noted that the officials tak ing 
p a.rt i n the p rogram were hi gh ranking off icers of their own 
finan cia l entities . Chairmen of the Board, Presidents, 
Vice Presidents and Partners were the predominant offices 
t hat the members of the Nat ional Committee held with their 
respe ctive companies . This g ave increased prestige and 
effec tiveness to the VCRP . 
National Committee3 2 
Commercial Ban k s 
Georg e • Moore, Vice President, the National City 
Bank , r ew York , New York . 
Carlisle R . Davis, Vice President, State-Planters 
Bank and Trust Company, Richmond, Virg inia. 
Kent on R . Cravens , Vice President, Mercantile 
Commerce Bank and Trust Company , St . Louis, Missouri. 
Everett D . Reese, President and Trust Officer, 
Park National Bank, Newark , Ohio. 
31 Ibid ., p . 432 . 
3 2Federal Reserve BulletinJ 3 7:379-384, April, 1951. 
Life Insurance Companies 
Geor ge L . Harrison, Chairman, New York Life 
Insurance Company, Ne w Yor k , New York . 
Carrol M. Shanks , President, Prudential Insurance 
Company of America , Newark, New Jersey . 
E . B . S tevenson, Jr., Executive Vice President , 
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l ational Life and Ace ident Insurance Company , Nashville , 
Tennessee . 
Claude L . Benner, President, Cont i nental Americ an 
ife Insuranc e Company, · ilmington , Delaware . 
Investment Banks 
Lee M. Limbert, Vice resident, Blyth and Company, 
Incorporated, lew York , New York . 
Rudolf Smutny, P artner, Salomon Brothers and Hutzler , 
New York , New Yor k . 
Francis Kernan, Partner , mite, Weld and Company , 
New York , New York. 
,J illiam IL Barclay , Jr . , Partner , Stein Brot hers and 
Boyce, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania . 
Occasionally, due to circumstances , the comp osit i on of 
the National Committee changed its original membership . This 
included the addition and subtraction of alternates plus 
t wo more permanent member s each from savings and loan asso-
ciations and mutual saving s banks . 
Functions of the National Committee were as follows:33 
( a ) ith suc h assistance f rom the Board and the 
Federal Re serve Banks as may be necessary, distr i bute 
this statement of the Pro gram, including the Stat ement of 
Pr inciples , to financing institutions to such extent 
a s may be deemed desirable in view of any distribution 
previously made ; 
(b) App oint the subcommittees ••• • ; 
(c) Meet for the p urpose of considering the 
f unctioning of the Program, advising the Boar d with 
resp ect thereto, and suggesting for the considerat ion 
of the Board such changes in the Program, including the 
Statement of Princip les , as may from time to time appear 
appropriate . Meeting s of the Committee shall be held 
at the call of an of ficial of the Federal Re serve System, 
de sign at ed by the Board ; shall be under the chairmanship 
of such an official; and an a genda for ru ch mee t ings 
shall be p rep ared by such an official . Full and comp lete 
minutes of each meeting shall be kept in the files of tre 
Board avail able for public inspection . 
33Federal Reserve Bulletin, 37 : 263- 266 , March , 1951 . 
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(d) Issue bulletins or memoranda from time to time 
t o the subcommittees or to financing institutions re -
garding general matters relating to the Program and 
related credit problems, including statements imple -
mentine or clarifying the Statement of Principles , and 
describing the types of credits which in the Committee ' s 
op inion, should or should not be re garded as proper under 
the terms of the ro gram. 
(e) Request the chairman of the Committee to desi g-
nate an employee of the Board of Governors to serve as 
secretary. Such secretary, in consultation with the 
chairman of the Committee , is authorized to conduct 
correspondence on behalf of the Committee in conformity 
with actions taken by the Committee within the scope of 
the Proe;ram . 
Re g ional or s ubcommittees played the key liaison 
po sition between lending institutions and the National 
Committee. Membership of these subcommittees was drawn from 
divergent geo graphic areas and from small, medium and large 
institutions . This was to give as broad a representation 
o varying viewpoints as p ossible and to carry back to the 
many re gions the principles of the program in as unified 
a manner as possible . At the same time , it g ave a feeling 
or membership to all institutions re g ardless of size and 
locat ion. It will also be seen in the examples g iven below 
th t these committees were de velop ed from the same caliber of 
men as the National Committee . The number of subcommittees 
re w as the needs became evident, and by the end of 1951 
t ere were 43 re g ional committees divided as follows : 19 
or the commercial bank s; 4 for the life insurance companies ; 
4 f or the investment banks; 4 for the mutual saving s banks 
and 12 for the saving s and loan associations . A Federal 
2e serve Bank officer was a member of each subcommittee wbich 
ad headquarters in a city in which there was located a 
•ederal Reserve Bank or a branch bank thereof . The reason 
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o r the pre senc e of these off ici a ls 1vas st a t e d : "Adequate 
saf e guards we r e e s tablished by t h e Defense Pr oducti on Ac t 
t o a ssure t h at t h ere wou l d be no infr i n gement of anti - trus t 
tatutes . A re pres e n t ati ve of the Federal Reser ve Sys t em 
i s p resent to represent t h e public interest i n practic a lly 
a l l re g i onal or n a tional meeting s of those taking part in 
t he Voluntary Cre dit Restrai nt Program • .• •. 11 34 The r eas on 
i ven here may be true , but as it was stated above, in t h e 
writer ' s opinion , ther e wa s a lso the question of p olicy 
cont r o l on the p art of t h e Fe de ral Reserve . 
An e x ample of the membership of th e different cla sses 
of r e g i ona l committees is g iven bel ow . Th is i s f or the s ame 
p urpo ses st a ted above when the me mbersh i p of the Na t ional 
Commi ttee was pre sente d . Be c ause of t h e l a c k of space, only 
one c ommi t t ee is give n f or eac h c lass of f inanc ial insti t ution . 
Sele cted Re g ional Commi tte es35 
Twe l f th Di stri ct Commercial Bank i ng Volunta~redit 
Re s t raint Commit t ee 
E . C . S ammons , Chairman , 
Pr es ident , The Uni ted State s National Bank of Portlan d , 
Po r t l and , Ore g on . 
I . Warren He l lman , 
Presi dent , :Jells F arg o Ban k and Un ion Trust Comp any , 
San Franc i sco , Califo rnia . 
Chester A. Rude , 
Cha i rma n , Ex ecuti ve Commi t tee, Se curity- F irst Nationa l 
Bank of Lo s An geles , Lo s An gele s , Calif ornia . 
James Lo ckhe ad , 
Pres i dent , American Tr u st Comp any , San Fr an cisc o , 
Calif orni a . 
F . A. Fe rrog g iaro , 
Senior Vice Chairman of t he Boar d , Bank of America 
National Trust and Savings As s o ciation, San Fr an-
ci s co , Califor n ia . 
3411 voluntar y Action to He l p Curb Inf lation . " loc . c i t . 
35Fe dera l Reserve Bu l le ti n L 3 7: 3 79 - 384 , April, 1951 . 
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Thomas F Gl 
· eed 
President ', Wash· ' ~eattle- F irst National Bank , Seattle , 
E R ington. 
• · • Millard 
Vice res ! d San Fran ~ ent, Federal Reserve Bank of san Francisco, 
cisco, California . 
Mid-Weste Robert B r ~ . Insurance Voluntary credit Restraint Comrnitte~ 
Presi· d 1.chardson, Chairman 
ent w ' T . A, hilli ' es tern Life Insurance Co ,, Helena , Montana , 
Chairmanp~f -o ,, St P the Board , Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance 
W. T . Grant . aul , Minnesota. 
Chairma~ Kansas c! Bus iness l en • s Assurance co , of America , 
Frank J . T 1.ty , Missouri . 
Vi ravers 
ce Presid ' Indian ent, American United Life Insuran ce Co ., 
Willard N apolis, Indiana . 
Vice p Boyden , 
Chicag~eside1;t, Continenta l Assurance Company, 
A. L. Olson' 111.nois. 
Vice p ' Chicag~esildent, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 
' linois. 
Southwest C ern In 
J h 
_onunittee vestment Banking Voluntary Credit Restraint 
o n H -R • R • ausche auscher ~' Chairman, Dallas 
1
' Pierce and Co Mercantile Bank Buildinr.: , 
H • H . Dew , Texas ·' ~ 
ar · 
Dewar ' 
· illi """erce Bu . ld n and Pancoast , National Bank of Con,.., ' Robertso 
Fr C. Jacki ing , San Antonio 5 , Texas . 
rst S son, Jr 
Ed Dallas ~ut~weS t Co :, Mercantile Bank Bldg,, 
ward Rota, exas. 
Rot n, T an , Mos1 ex s. e and Moreland, 806 Rus k Ave ., Houston 2 , 
D. Gentr 
First ;[ , Dal Vice p . las T resident Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas , 
' exas . ' 
Main f 
unctions of the regional committees were : 
( a) Them regional OS t important single function of the 
cornrn. t l tees was to 
as t 
consider inquiries from financial 
institutions 
o whether a particular applicat ion for 
in accord with the standards or guides to lending credit was 
policy set in the St atement of Principles , bul letins forth . 
or 
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1 oran d a of the ational Committee . 
records of their (b) Re Gional committees maintained 
ac t i o , ." " nd d i 1 Commi t tee showing 
u ma e re ports to the Nat ona 
t h f the advice 
Lypcs of cases considered and the nature 0 
1.i 
l-:: n .'n e ach instance . This t 
collated information was la er 
b,· l' 
" c 1Jational Committee and digests of representative 
c s es 0 nd opin ions were distributed to the various re g ional 
C lnt ' ll J.·t ees f or their information . 
The first line of attac k upon inflat ion by th is 
Ct•e c1 i t N t · nal res t r aint p ro gram was not found i n the a io 
r, 
'-'O • b t 
t 1 ,tee or in the various re g ional subcommittees, u 
i t h ,, i 
" thous and s of financ i al institutions which were n 
t contact with those potential borrowers who se credit 
r 8 would have been powerful forces behind increased 
.L nrl · t · 
on, i f the y had not been he ld in check by a pro gram 
0 
L L1 t yp e . I t urg ed financing institutions to screen 
l o1:1 n 
~·>p lications not only o n the credit worthiness of the 
b0 l ' r 
•
1er , but also on the basis of purpose for which the 
l oan ) ~oc e e d s would be used. F or some lenders this was a 
., L 
" j ' 
• · - j_ g de p arture from customary practice under which no 
r1t 
o , rnation was ne ces sary as to the use of loan proceeds . 
(j th 
e r l enders wh o had been obtaining such information 
ll. .:::i e 
c .Lt as a factor in their appraisal of credit risk and 
~
1 
'.3 a separate and special criterion in passing on a 
l o 
pp l i c a tion . The lending institutions which worked 
u. 0 
e :r, t h is vo l unt ary credit restraint mechanism looked not 
00 l \/ . t th b . l . t f h t 
·
1 n o ea 1 1 yo t e borrower o repay the loan but 
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l · e , lse at the standards set by the National and regional 
c o mmittees . 
A large and perple xing prob lem in developing the 
9 r o gram was that of trying to establish some useful , workable 
standards or bench marks for distinguishing between those 
;, urposes which were consistent with the program and those 
not c onsistent with its aims . Loans to finance defense 
production posed no problem since such credit needs had to 
be met even at the expense of inflation . In s p ite of the 
efense program, however, some 8 0 percent of the gross 
nat i onal product continued to g o to the civilian sector of 
the economy , and this high civilian demand required sub-
stantial amounts of credit. In this civilian area of credit 
ema nd , the National Committee encountered the difficult 
task of trying to devise some standards for differentiating 
between essential production, which should have continued 
to receive financing , and nonessential activities , which 
could have been appropriately delayed . 
In coping with this probl~m of lending standards , 
the Nat ional Committee recognized that comprehensi ve 
and precise rules and regulations would not be consistent 
with the essential voluntary character of the program, 
and might well discourage many institutions from even 
attempting to p articipate . Consequently , it was deemed 
more appropriate to phrase the standards for extending 
credit in fairly broad terms , ra~her than to list a 
host of detailed and specific cr7te~ia for lending 
Practice and to rely up on the willingness of lending 
institutions to conform to the spirit of the program 
rather than to comply with numerous legalistic rul es . 
Hence the lending standards set . forth in the Statement 
of ~rinciples and in the bullet 7ns a~d memoranda of the 
National Committee are couched in fairly broad and 
general language . 36 
36Senate Document No . 1 23, Part 1 , £I?. • ~~t., p . 434. 
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Governor Oli ver S . Powell, chairman of the Nat i onal 
Committee of the VCRP epitomized the function of the program and 
possibly one of the reasons for its implementation when he 
stated : " •••• This program is in essence nothing but enlist -
ment of the collective horse sense of all kinds of lenders 
to sort out the kinds of credit which should have priority 
under today ' s conditions and in that way to avoid Gove r n -
ment reg imentation of c r edit which , at best , must be a 
clumsy affair • • • . • " 37 
37 Oliver S . P owell , " Restraints up on Credit . '' 
Commerci al and Financial Chronicle , 173 : 10 , May 10, 1951 . 
CHAPTER IV 
THE VOLUNTARY CREDIT RE TRAINT PROGRAM IN ACTION 
1. Issuance of the Bulletins 
It was shown in Chap ter III that the first basic 
_runction of this voluntary p ro gram for the control of credit 
e . p ansion involved the review of the past and present 
,rene ral credit and inflationary conditions and the forecast 
a s t o future trend s b y the National Committee and its staff 
at n ume rous meeting s c alled by this Committee . A second 
_fundamental function was the promulgation of bulletins, 
memoranda and letters asking the thousands of financial 
· nstitutions participating under the pro gram to conf ine their 
lending policies to the principles and provisions of this 
voluntary program as stated in these bulletins, memoranda 
et cetera . In this respect, the re gional committees were 
to act as a liaison team between the thousands of financial 
institutions and the National Committee. They interpreted 
t h e p olicy statements issued by the National Committee and 
answered inquiries f rom lending institutions or other 
g ermane matters in their re gional areas . Thus , it can be 
said that the survey of the past and present and the pre -
d i c t ion of the trends of the economic future - especially in 
ma tters pertaining to credit and inflation - and the issuance 
of bul letins and memoranda, were designed to promote the 
p rincip le s behind the program which were the primary and 
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principal f w1ction s of the National Voluntary Credit Restraint 
Committee. In this chap ter, then, there will be a general 
discussion cent ering around these important functions of the 
VCRP and its National Commi t tee. 
The National Committee held its initial meeting in 
Washington on March 14 and 15 , 1951~ The Committee reviewed 
various aspects of credit granted to private institutions in 
relation to commodit y prices and the defense effort and 
work was started on organizing the regional or subcommittees. 
Also, the Committee reviewed the scope of banking , credit 
and other statistics then available to measure changes in 
credit conditions and the need for further statistics along 
those lines. The Committee felt that it would be desirable 
to send bulletins to the subcommittees from time to time on 
specific credit problems . To avoid delay while subcommittees 
were being organized , bulletins were mailed directly to the 
90 , 000 private financing institutions in the United States.1 
Bulletin No. 1. The first bulletin issued by the 
ational Committee dealt with inventory accumulation. As 
it was pointed out in Chapter II , inventory accumulation 
f inanced mainly by bank credit was one of the stronger forces 
behind the sp iraling prices in the Korean inflation, parti-
cularly in the two great spurts of inflation that occurred 
i n t h at p eriod and which were mentioned in Chapter II. 
" .... Inventories continued to rise sharply through the early 
months of 1951 and were at extraordinary high levels in 
1Federal Reserve Bulletin, 37:379, April, 1951. 
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mid-March when the National Committee held its initial meeting 
and selected this area as the subject of its first Bulletin . 11 2 
Between January and February, 1951, total manufacturing and 
trade inventories increased from 62 . 1 billion dollars to 
63 . 4 billion dollars annually. During this same time 
period , total manufacturing and trade sales declined from 
45 . 9 billion dollars in January to 44.8 billion dollars in 
February. This resulted in an increase in the ratio of 
i nventories to sales from 1 .35 in January to 1 . 41 in Feb-
ruary of 1951 . 3 But this February figure was still somewhat 
below a past average of 1 . 51 for inventories to sales . 
Since statistical data of this type are usually at least 
30 days or more behind the time when they are first published , 
it can b e assumed that the statistical figures that the 
Nat ional Committee was using in their review of the economic 
environment were those in the time period cited above . 
F rom these data, then , it can be seen that there was a 
short run potential trend in the direction of increased 
inventory accumulation as measured by historical c omparison, 
since inventories were increasing while sales were de c lining . 
P art of the increase in inventory a c cumulati on was due to 
a price phenomenon , since inventories are carried at book 
value. But nevertheless, there was other evidence of an 
2Ibid . , Reprint, "Voluntary Action to Help Curb 
I nfl ation . " November , 1951, pp . 4-5 . 
3Economic Report , January, 1952 , p . 186 . 
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expansion in the physical holding of inventories. 
With this inventory trend confronting the National 
Committee plus the rec ollection that inventory acc-wnulation, 
or the attempt to do so, had played such a predominant role 
in the two great spurts of inflation after the Korean out-
break , it thus became the p aramount concern to the Committee 
membership that this problem should be the subject of the 
first bulletin of this new anti-inflationary technique in 
early 19Sl. 
Bulletin No. 1 stated: 
Inventories in the United States, particularly at 
wholesale and retail establishments, are at peak level s 
even after allowance is made for the sharp increase in 
p rices a t which inventories are carried . An important 
part of this abnormal increase in inventories ms been 
f inanced by borrowed money . 
Excess inventory accumulation has already contri-
buted directly to the rise of wholesale and retail p rices 
beyond any level justified by the supply situation. It 
obviously has created undue compet ition in scarce 
materials. 
In t he light of the above, the Voluntary Credit 
Restraint Committee e xpressed the hope that all financing 
institutions would , in carrying out the terms of the 
Program 
(1) Refrain from f inancing inventory increases above 
normal levels relative to sales, or reasonable require-
ments by other conservat ive yardsticks, 
( 2 ) Encourag e borrowers who already have excess 
inventories to bring these c ommitments and i nvent ory 
positions in line as promptly as is reasonably practical, 
thereby 1,reducing the amount of credit being used in this 
manner • '+ 
This bulletin was mailed to all 90,000 financ i al 
institutions on March 19, 19Sl . But as it will possibly be 
/+pederal Reserve Bulletin, 37 :379, April , 19Sl. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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seen in the next chapter , the plea fo r credit restraint may 
have been too late in the strugg le against the Kore an infla-
tionary p re ssures . 
Bulletin No . 2 . The next meet ing of the Nat ional 
Voluntary Credit Re straint Committee, which resulted in the 
promulgation of the second bulletin as a primary function 
under this p r ogram , was held on April 18 , 1951 . The survey 
conduc ted by the Dep artment of Commerce and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission during the first quarter of 1951, 
revea ed that business concerns were anticipating exp enditures 
on new plant and equipment of nearly 24 billion dollars 
during 1951 . Such e xp enditures, if realized according to 
the survey, would have rep resented an increase of 11 percent 
f rom the seasonally adjusted annual rate in the fourth 
quarter of 1950 , and would have been a lmost 25 percent above 
the p revious all -time record of 19 . 2 billion dollars in 
1948 . 
Anticipated increases from 1950-1951 in plant and 
equipment exp enditures of major industries ranged from 
45 per cent in manufacturing to 10 percent in the commercial 
and miscellaneous group . Part of the anticipated increase 
in business capital outlays reflected high er prices rather 
than an increased physical volume. Estimates indicated 
however, that on an over-all basis the increase in physical 
volume of business c api tal formation would be as much as 20 
percent . 
On an over-all basis, it appeared at that time that 
defense or defense-supp orting industries would account for 
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Perhaps half of the business plant and equipment expenditures 
anticipated for 1951 . Thus, the other half of the anticipated 
ex.pen di ture s for plant and equipment was intended for the 
non-def ense area of the economy . 
Because of this , and the 
fact that the economy by this time was reachi ng its level 
Of fUll employment for both men and resources, the Nati onal 
Committee issued its second bulletin pertaining to business 
c ap· t i al expenditures . In making it public, the National 
Committee unanimously stated: 
to sAmerican business concerns are currently planning 
mentp e nd ' and are spending , record sums for the enlarge -
to a and modernization of their facilities . According 
Plan/ecent survey of business plans , outla;i-s for new 
doll and equipment during 1951 may total 24 billion 
near~rs, a n increase of 29 percent from the 1950 level, 
dit Y one-fourth greater than the previous peak expen-
dol~re of 19. 2 billion in 1948, and t hree times the 
ar.expenditures in 1941 . fai This huge e xpenditure for cap itaf investment bids 
corr to exceed the total amount of savings, both 
Pe horate and individual, for the next twelve months . 
ber aps some substitution of bank credit for saving s will 
mat necessary . But at a time lik e the present when 
we ~ri~ls and labor are scarce , it becomes imperative if 
ca esire to curtail inflationary forces , that great 
inr: be exercised by financ ing instit ut i ons participating 
er d~e Voluntary Credit Restraint Program in extending 
de it for investment purposes where such an extension 
d~;s not tend to increase output essential for the 
ense program . 
sp In nondefense industry , business saving s , if not 
caent on plant and equipment, could be u~ed as wor~ing 
Pital to meet payrolls carry inventories, and finance 
acco t ' · d d th un s of buyers of their products . Tbis woul re uce 
e need for bank loans and other credit . 
of Roughly half of the anticipated capital expenditures 
d business concerns during 1951 may be c l assed as 
1
:fense or defense supporting, with emphasis on tbe 
b tter . Included in these categories are expansion of 
tasic productive capacity in such manufacturing indus -
r1ies as steel aluminum and petroleum; additions to 
e ect · ' ' · f · 1 · ti s a ric power generating and transmission aci i e , 
r:~ the purchase of additional rolling stock by the 
ilroads . Every effort should be made to assure 
availability of materials equipment , and financing 
ess t ' · t en ial to the c ompletion of these proJeC s . 
I 
I 
I 
! 
I 
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On the other hand , approximately half of the capital 
expenditures planned by business for 1951 falls in a 
more or less indeterminate class so far as their rela-
tionship to the defense effort is concerned. Some are 
clearly nonessential and deferrable , while others border 
closely on the defense-supporting area . There is, for 
example, the 5 .4 billion dollar capital expenditure 
anticip ated by the commercial and miscellaneous group , 
a large part of which could undoubtedly be postponed 
without detriment to the defense effort and in the interest 
of reducing inflationary pressures and conserving labor 
and materials . Limitations on construction of specific 
types and g overnmental restrictions and allocations of 
materials should p lay a large part in curtailing some 
business plans for capital expenditures and in eliminating 
others. Thus the resp onsibility of financing institutions 
will be limited to those cases whose essen tiality has not 
been predetermined by Government a gencies . 
Since it may be difficult in individual cases to 
differentiate essential from nonessential capital expen-
ditures, as well as those which it would be desirab l e to 
postpone in the interest of longer run economic sta-
bility, certain tests are suggested to financing inst i tutions 
cooperating in the Voluntary Credit Restraint frogram 
in making f inancing decisions . Among the nonessential 
uses of long term financing that in the judgment of the 
Committee migp t be postponed to a more propitious time 
are those for such purposes as: 
(1) Construction of facilities to improve the 
competitive p osition of an individual producer of non-
essential g oods . 
( 2 ) Expansion and modernization expenditures of 
concerns i n distribution or service lines where the 
distribution or service is not defense supporting . 
(3) Expansion and modernization programs for the 
manufacture of consumer g oods not related to the defense 
effort . 
Financing institutions are urged to g ive equal 
consideration to the needs of small as well as larg e 
business ip screening applications for long term 
f inancing • .'.:J 
The estimated survey by the Department of Commerce 
and the Securities and Exchang e Commission of new plant and 
equipment e xpen d itures of 24 billion dollars was too con-
servative by 5 .6 billion dollars when the actual year-end 
fi gures for 195 1 were tabulated . 6 
5rbid., 37 :495-496 , May, 1951 . 
6Economic Report, January, 1953 , p . 170. 
Bul l e tin No. J. It soon became evident to the 
National Committee 
members and its advisors, that if' the 
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Pro gram wast 
o h ave any ef'f'ectiveness as an anti-inflationary 
• 
and def 
ense ef'fort supp orting mechanism, that all important 
finan · 
cia1 institutions of the economy must play their roles 
in carrying ~ th th 
~or is program . And they , in turn, must 
comply with h 
t e genera l credit policy ramifications ct.' the 
Program . 
There coul d be no comp lete cooperation from one 
sector 
of the economy if another was granted freed om from 
the control 
of the program or given immunity privileges under 
this er d. 
e it restraint technique . It will be pointed out 
later in t h is 
chap ter t hat the failure to completely follow 
this p . • 
rincip le, that no sector of the economy be granted 
Priv1 1 
eged immunit y , became a strong force in bringing about 
the t 
errnination of the VCRP in early 1952 . 
'I
1herefore, it became evident to the National Committee 
that th
e State and local governments too must be brought under 
the influence 
of t h is voluntary program . And yet at the 
same time 
, it must be remembered that certain Federal 
Gov 
ernrnent financial agencies were oper ating without being 
subject 
to the program, a fact which bas been pointed out 
earlier i· n t his p aper . Bulletin No . 3, therefore , dealt 
~
1th 
St ate and local government borrowing . The Committee, 
at it 8 meeting of May 3, 195 1, discussed the matter of St a te 
and l 
oca1 government finance . Since Korea, nearly 2 billion 
dollars of P bl" ·t· u ic securi ies had been raised by new mone y , 
in 1951 
reaching an all time 
----------= 
high approaching 22 billion dollars . 7 
7Fe deral Reserve Bulletin, 3 7: 49 7- 49 9 , May , l 95l . 
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Projects f or e xp anding or modernizing municipally 
owned f a cilities c onstituted the major demand for public 
c ap ital borrowing . Roads, schools, water systems , drainage 
and sewer p rojects and the like were the principal purposes . 8 
I n the majority of cases local governments can borrow only 
on t h e approval of the electorate . This means that long 
p eriods intervene between the first proposal and the final 
financing . In many cases funds had been authorized some 
time p revious to finance projects that we re just being put 
un derway in 1951 or which were to be started shortly there-
after . Some projects which had voter approval before Korea , 
turned out to be underfinanced at the current prices and 
require d additional financing if they were to be carried 
forward on the basis of original plans . 9 The Committee 
estimated t h at e x amination of t hese plans under tre program 
of the VCRP would eliminate many nonessential loans and avoid 
more b orrowing . 10 
In issuing its third bulletin , the National Committee 
pointed out an importart source of nonessential inflationary 
credit expansion on the State level in the realm of veterans ' 
bonus payments . 
Soldiers' bonus issues are inflationary under 
today ' s conditions. They add to the spending power of 
the public through the creation of credit . It would 
seem desirable to postpone such issues until a time 
when immediate purchasing power is needed to counteract 
u nemp loyment and when it might be more beneficial to 
8Ibid . 
9 Ibid . 
lO i bid . 
the veteran. 
Among the types of State and local government 
capital outlays for which, in the judgment of the 
Committee, the financing should be postponed are : 
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(1) Replacement of any existing facilities that can 
continue to perf orm their function during the emergency 
p eriod . 
( 2 ) Construction of facilities of the types not 
recommended by the Defense Producti on Administration -
such as recreational facilities and war memorials . 
(J ) Acquisition of sites or ri ghts - of - way not 
immediately needed . 
(4) Purchase of p rivately owned utilities by muni -
cipalities, which involves borrowing to rep lace equity 
cap ita1 . ll 
The bulletin went on to urge lenders to encour a ge 
State and local e overnments to balance their budgets . 
Borrowing in anticipation of taxes should be held to a 
minimum . Also, temporary bor rowing for cap ital purposes , 
unless anticipating current r evenues , s hould be judged by 
standards specified above for long term capital loans . 
Endorsement was g iven to the Wilson l etter which i s dis -
cussed be low . 
In strong support of Bulletin No. J and as a more 
or les3 reinforcement of it , Char l es E . Wi lson , Director of 
Defense Mobilization , sent a letter which was made p ubl i c 
simultaneously with the pub l ication of Bullet i n No . J, 
which went to the Governors of all states , mayors of major 
cities, and financial officials of pr incip al counties and other 
p olitical subdivisions . It ur ged compliance with the program 
in e;eneral , requesting that all expenditures of 1 million 
do llars or more receive the go - ahead sign from their re g ional 
subcommittees which had jurisdiction in the particular cases 
99 
Wb. 
icb were subJ"ect to 
scrutiny by these voluntary credit 
control committees.12 
Mr. Ni lson, in his letter , g ave p articular emphasis 
to the 
S t ate financia l plans for soldiersr bonuses, war 
memorial 
s and municipal recreational projects. These were 
definitely 
l abeled as inflationary and not in accord with the 
P.r>inc · . 1 i p es of the VCRP as well as Bulletin No. J of the 
Nat· 
ionai Committee . 
The letter from the Director of the Off ice of Defense 
Mobilization 
s p ec if ic ally stated: 
bo . ••. on behalf of our Government I ask you to postpone rro · Pro. wing , no matter how worthwhile the purpose, if the 
ar Ject is p ostp onable. While many municipal projects 
we urgent, others might be set back to a time when they 
1~Uld contribute t o maintaining a high level of employment 
m a P eriod of slack busin ess . So ldiers' bonus payments, 
a.r>any war memorials and municip al re creational projects 
Wh~ b u t a f e w i mportant e xamp les of postp onable p rojects 
ich Will serve the nation better at a future time . 13 
It went on to urg e comp liance with the program and 
.r>equested that all 
expenditures of l million dollars or 
tno:r,e 
receive the O.K. of the vari ous committees invol ved 
llnder the Program . 
~st Virginia Veterans ' Bonus Case . The reason back 
Of the 
great emphasis p laced in Bulletin No . J and the Wilson 
l etter 
' was based on the fact that, under the current economic 
Condit . 
ions, the financing of veterans ' bonus p ayments by 
State 
g overnments would be inflationary and contrary to the 
-------
12Ibid. 
--
t9S03i 
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p rinciples of the VC RP . It was pointed out that two states , 
VJest Vir ginia and Missouri , had scheduled bonus payments to 
be made in 1 9S l . Prior to this, and by the e n d of 1949, 
Alaska and eighteen states had authorized the payment of 
about 2 . 6 billion dollars in bonuses to about 7 . 8 million 
living 'dorld War II veterans and survivors of deceased 
veterans . 1 4 
"By May VCR had grown strong enough to do battle 
with g iants . The state of West Virginia announced i t was 
ready to float f67 , SOO , OOO worth of bonds to fi n ance 
a veterans bonus . If V. C. R . coul d secure deferral of so 
inflationary an adventure , other states might put off bonus 
plans of their own ..•.. 11 1S The situation was both pre c arious 
and explosive, with the veterans ' organizations ready to 
hoist any dissenter , and the sensitive states - righters 
ready to join in at the f i rst evidence of 11 outside" inter-
ference ~16 But the National Committee stuck to its guns and 
issued Bulletin No . 3, whi ch is presented above, along with 
the moral support of Charles E . Wilson 1 s letter . 
The outcry following t h e position he l d by the National 
Committee was " .•.• the loudest that financ ial men had heard 
in many a year • 11 l 7 Some se c urity dealers and politicians 
14Irving H. S iegel and Edgar Weinberg, "State Bonuses 
for Veterans . " Journal of Politi c al Economy, 58 : 70-74, Feb ., 19SC 
1511 The Bankers Do A J ob . 11 Fortune, 44: 93-94+ , Oct ., 1951 . 
16Ibid . 
l?Ibid . 
Who stood to profit from the bonus payment declared that 
If 
· · · -many of the ~est Vir ginia veterans had already spent 
their 
share of the bonus on cars, TV sets, and so on -
a cur· ious rationalization that suggested inflation control 
shou1a always 18 ,, go to improvidence." The inflation 
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occurred rr 
' one banker de cl ared, "when the bonus was voted l nl9 
But none of this swayed the convictions of the 
National Credit Restraint Committee. When investment bankers 
SUbmitt 
ed underwriting p lans to the Eastern Investment 
Bankin g Voluntary Credit Restraint Committee, they were told 
the 1 ssue was not in keeping with the program. The Governor 
Of We st Virginia and his advisers, the tom-toms thumping in 
their 
ears, de cided to g o ahead anyway in a direct test of 
the st 
rength of the VCRP's influence . Late in May, 1951, 
State auth . . 
· 0 r1t1es declared the bonus bond issue op en for 
bids . 
"N ot one was submitted . The nation's underwriters bad 
collect· ive1y decided the credit restraint program was worth 
more than the half million dollars any one of them could have 
lsrossea rr 20 
• 
V· l.rginia 
This victory of the VCRP over the State of West 
was 
seen l 
a feather in the former's cap , but it will be 
ater in this chapter that its triumµiwas short-lived. 
Porth 
e Politicians in west Virg inia did not g ive up the 
strugg le t 1 at the first skirmish . Time to them, mean on Y 
---------18Ibid. 
-
19Ib id . 
-
20Ibid. 
-
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a reg 
rouping of their forces . 
f,aliforni·a Bonus O. K.,a. The VCRP did not frown on 
a11 new 
Veteransr benefi t bonds however. If the offering 
cou1 ' 
d qualify a s nonini'lationary, it received approval. 
This · 
l.S What th e California bonus case indicated in June, 
1951, When ·t 1 received the O. K. for comp etitive bidding on 
25 mi11· ion dollars in new bonds issued under the state 1 s 
Veterans, 
Bona Act of 1949 . 21 
The distinction made between the California and 
the 
Wea t Virginia c ases was that the former 1 s bonuses were 
tnore like I loans, whereas the latterrs were outright gifts. 
n the 
California instance, the money was used to help 
Vet 
et>ans b 
uy homes and farms under a program which had been 
0:Perat i 
ng for the past JO years . Each veteran had to pony 
ll.:p a 5 
Percent i · 10 t nitial p ayment on a house or percen on 
a far ~ m. Limit s of $10 ,000 on homes and $15,000 on farms 
et>e i 
mposed and the veteran must undertake to pay his debt 
~:i.thin 20 
years , at J percent interest. 22 
orniin the light of those terms, ODM ruled that Calif-
sha a rs bond issue was not inflationary. That was a 
.$6 7~~ r:ve:al of its thumbs down last sp:in~ ?n a proposed 
fort million bonus bond issue by West Virginia. Reason 
a st h~ West Virginia rejection: The money would ~ave been 
tionra~ght gift to veterans, putting .m?ney into circula-~ any increase in productivi t y . 23 
Bu 2111 v t ·r · o.K . 1 ct ." 
~iness . e erans r Bon d Issue in Ca li ornia 
~- i eek, July 14, 1951 , p . 116. 
22Ib 
---1.£. 
f 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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The writer questions the position taken in these two 
cases b 
Y the VCRP that there was a basic distinction between 
bonus case and the West Virginia bonus case. the Calif ornia 
linder the VCRP 
the d iffer ence between an inflationary loan 
a.nct one Which was not inf lationary turned on two points . 
One h 
'w ether the loan was productive or non- productive and 
speculative 
, and, second, whether the loan proceeds would 
be sp ent t 0 Promote the defense and defense supporting 
areas of 
the economy or whether the proceeds would be spent 
in sorn 
e non-defense civilian sectors of the economy. Point 
number one does 
not lend strength to the distinction between 
these 
two cases. 
The West Virginia bonus proceeds were classified as 
a gift 
and it was prejudged that these veteran appreciation 
Payments T.rould f . ·1· 
w go into the purchase o civi ian consumer 
goods 
, e. g ., clothing , beer, television sets, automobiles, et 
Cetera. 
But it is impossible to draw a distinction between 
one or th 
e other of these uses of the bonus proceeds by the 
gauge of 
Productivity . Surely, the manufacture of beer, 
television 
receivers and automobiles can be classifi&d as 
be· ing just 
as p roductive as the use of funds to build urban 
l:'>esid 
ential homes and rural dwellings, outbuildings and the 
of farm land back to fertility. Thus the first 
cannot be used in the writer 1 s opinion in the 
dist. inc t · · t ion between the west Virginia and California ve erans 
bonus 
cases. 
The second ruler may prove to have been the pivot 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Upon Whi ch these two 
cases were decided . It may be much 
easier t 0 def end the dist inction between these two cases 
on the 
ground that the construction of farm and non-farm 
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t>esident1a1 
Property contributed more directly to the defense 
effort th 
' an the manufacture of consumer luxury goods. But 
sti 11 th 
. ere was no way of knowin g what the recipients of the 
West V· 
irginia bonus payments would have done with their 
Shares. 
Some might have made payments on essential real 
estate 
also. Some migh t have even p urchased defense savings 
bonds 
' a Purchase hard to classify as not contributing to 
the 
de.tense effort. 
~letin No. 1±. The role of voluntary action in SU,h 
t-'Plement ing 
and reenforcing selective restraint measures 
Particularly 
is 
well illustrated by developments in the real 
estate 
mort g age credit area. 
e:x:p 
ansion 
In an effort to curb the rapid 
of real estate mort gage credit, the Board of 
Federal Reserve System, exercising the auth-
it by the Defense Production Act of 1950 and 
l:'elat 
ed executive order, issued with the concurrence of the 
Adm1n1 st
rator of Housing and Home Finance Agency, its Re gu-
lation 
X, effective October 1 2 , 1950. Simultaneously the 
Pedel"'al 
Housing Administration adapted their regulations to 
the 
new t 
s andards developed by the Board. 
Establishment of these regulations, which applied 
to Govern 
ment-guaranteed mortgages on new and existing 
houses 
' to non-Government-guaranteed, or conventional, 
tnot>t gage 1 
oans on newly constructed houses and to loans on 
Cert . 
ain Classes of commercial property, brought about a 
sharp decline in the number of new houses started in 1951. 
On the oth er hand, failure to include credit extended on 
pure ase o existing houses 
conventional terms for the h f . 
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enhanced the competitive advantage of such properties in the 
real estate market, and in many cases their transfers were 
accompanied by an expansion of real estate mort gage debt 
Which added to inflationary pressures. 
The National Voluntary Credit Restraint Committee, 
in B o. , issued on June , 19/1, and revised in Ulletin N 4 6 c 
some respects the following September 5, recommended that 
ventional mort gage loans on existing one- to four-new con . 
famil Y residential units, together with other indebtedness 
an ing on the property, should not exceed the limit outst d' 
Wh · lch Re gulation x imposed on new construction or a limit 
Wo-th1'rds of h ' h the fair value of the property, w 1c ever Of t 
on 
a er. The Committee also recommended that loans Was gre t 
lar ger residential properties and on commercial, agri-
cultural and industrial property should in mos t cases not 
exceed two-thirds of the fair value and should be made only 
if careful screening as to purpose indicates that they are in 
harmony with the Voluntary credit Restraint Program . 
Bul l etin No. 4 issued at the June 6, 19.51, meeting 
Of the National Committee requested the following : 
r .1 · Loans on residential ro ert (one- to four-f~mily units . The committee has been informe~ that m?st 
inancing institutions are following conservative 1end1ng 
~olicies on ex isting residential properti~s (o~e-t? fo~-
'.'1'1ily units) . The committee urges all financing institu-
tions tofbllow such policies and in no case to make a 1oan 
~n existing property in an amount which woul d cause the 
cotal amount of credit outstanding (primary and al~ 
0th
er 
redit combined) with respect to the property or wi
th 
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~=sprct_to ~h~ transaction to exceed the limits which 
gu ation X imposes as to new construction. 
Co ~ · Loans on agricultural 12.F...:?l?erty . While the 
a ~ittee recognizes that in some instances a ban on 
d~ni?ultural property may be in effect a loan on resi-
a 
1
tial property, the Committee feels that normally such 
pr oan falls in the category of a ban on commercial 
b ope:ty (see Section 3 below), and t he lender should 
0
: guided by the recommendations of that section, as to 
er-all credit limits and purposes. 
f _J. Loans on residential ro art (more than four 
r arn:lY ur:ii ts and on commercial property . Loans on 
1
esident1al property (more than four family units) and 
s~ans on commercial property such as off ice buildings, 
shores, hotels, motels, motor courts, restaurants etc ., 
beould be screened as to purpose and the loan should not 
th made W1less it is in harmony with the principles of 
w·~ program . If the loan is to be made in connection 
d 1th a. sale of commercial or residential property a 
edermination by the financing institution that the sale 
!n '.h? sale price are bona fide may constitute a 
ufficient screening of the loan. The Committee con-
~eives that it is not the function of the Voluntary Credit 
.estraint Program to make the transfer of real estate 
~':'Possible or impracticable, but rather to reduce infla-
ionary pressures by limiting the amount of additional 
credit created in the process of real estate transfer. 
Financing institutions are urged to limit a loan, ~~ any type of property described in this section, 
ether or not a sale is involved, to an amount which 
w~uld not cause the total amount of credit outstandin 
~lth respect to the property or with respect to the 
;ansaction to exceed 66 2/J percent of the fair value ~ the p roperty. Also, the Committee urges that financing 
institutions require an appropriate and substantial 
amortization of principal. 
wh The Committee recognizes that hardship may arise 
ere a 66 2/3 percent 1oan limitation would not be 
;ound or equitable. such cases would include a 1oan to 
inance the sale of property to close an estate or to 
Pay estate taxes the refinancing of a maturing mort gage, gr ti:,e sale of p~operty of a bankrupt company. The 
ommittee makes no recommendations in such cases. 4- Loans on industrial .E.ropertz. Loans on industrial 
Property should be screened as to purpose whether or not 
the loan is to be made in connection with a sale of real estate property . In this instance, however, there appears 
to be no need for a percentage limitation on the amount 
of the loan since in the industrial field mort gage 
~ecurity us~ally is merely one of the factors considered 
Y the lender in determining whether to make the 1oan 
and often bears comparatively little relation to the amount 
of the loan. 
I 
I 
r 
' l 
two 
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S. Sale - lease back arrangements . The Committee 
also urges financing institutions to recognize that in 
most · instances a rr sale-lease back" arrangement, whereby 
real property is purchased by a financing institution 
and leased to the vendor or his nominee, is a sub-
stitute for a form of financing and therefore comes 
Within the Program and should be screened as to purpose. 24 
At mid-year, 1951, the National Committee issued 
more bulletins. 
Bulletin No . 5. On July 23 , 1951, the National 
Committee in connection with its attempt to bring under the 
Program all areas of credit expansion, expressed itself on 
the 
matter of foreign borrowings in United States ' markets. 
As a result of inquiries from re gional committees 
about the status of foreign borrowings in United States 1 
~arkets, the National Voluntary Credit Restraint Committee 
Vas discussed the status of such borrowings under the 
0 luntary Credit Restraint Program . 
The Committee concluded that all such credit appli-
~ations on behalf of forei gn borrowers should be screened 
0 the same e x tent, and with the same purpose tests, as 
comparable American credits . 
. It may be difficult in some cases for f inancing 
institutions or Re g ional Committees to determine whether f Proposed forei gn credit would indirectly contribute 
0 defense or other objectives of the United States 
Ghovernment . It will be particularly desirable, therefore, 
wen foreign cases are submitted for review, that 
~inancing institutions submit full facts to enable a 
JUd~ment as to purpose . In exceptional cases wh~n a 
~egional Committee finds the facts avai1able to it are 
inadequate to judge an application, the National 
Committee, if requested, will endeavor to obtatn supple-
mentary information from Government Agencies. 2j 
Bulletin No . 6 . The following day after Bulletin 
No . 5 h db itt · d t a een issued, the National Comm ee in or er o 
Clean d 4 Up some ambiguities as to the status of loans secure 
-------
24'F'ederal Reserve Bullet in , 3 7: 752- 753, July, 19 51 . 
25Ibid ., 37 :938, August , 1951. 
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on listed securities (subject to Re gulation U or T of the 
Boar d of Governors) and loans secured on unlisted securities 
issued Bulletin No . 6 in which it took the following position: 
The original Statement of Princip les of the 
Pro gram of Voluntary Credit Restraint provide d that 
11 the fore going p rinciples (the antispeculative pro -
visions) should be app lied in screening as to p urpose 
on all loans and securities whether or not covered by 
Regulation U or T . The first amendment to the 
Statement of Principles deleted the phrase 11 whether or 11 
from the Statement . This provision has been the subject 
of a number of inquiries . F or examp le, the question 
has been raised as to whether a loan on sec urities not 
covered by Re gulation U or T must be screened as to 
purpose even though the amount of credit advanced mi ght 
be p ermis sible under these re gul ations . Such an inter-
p retation would appe ar t o t reat the loans secured by 
unlisted stocks more severely than those on listed 
( i . e . , n re g i st ere d 11 ) s e cur it i e s • In order t o cure 
this ambiguity, the following principles are recommended 
for y our guidance by the National Committee. 
(1) Loans on securities covered by Re gulation U or 
Tare basically for the purpose of purchasing or carrying 
listed securities . It is recommended, therefore , that 
all loans on securities for purchasing or carrying un-
listed securities be presumed to be for a proper p urpose 
if the amount of credit extended is no greater than that 
permitted in the case of listed securities b y Regulation 
U or T . 
( 2 ) Loans on securities , whether or not listed , but 
not for the p urp ose of purchasing or carrying securities , 
should be mad e only f or purpose s consisteng with the 
Principles of voluntary credit restraint . 2 
This was to be the last bulletin to deal with a 
sp ecific area of credit demand under the voluntary program 
although amendments and revisions to the basic six bulletins 
were to follow, a long with the promulgation of other anc i llar-=--.
1 
rnemoranda . Y 
1951 
' 
2 . Revisions of Certain Bulletins 
Revision of Bulletin No . 4. At the Sept ember 5, 
meeting , the Nat ional Committee af ter surveying the 
26 I b id 
-· 
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real estate situation under its jurisdiction issued a 
The reason g iven for this chang e 
revisa1 
. of Bulletin No . 4. 
pro gram's policy was that 11 ••• • it developed 
the pr . 
in th e voluntary 
that 
ovisions f th '1 ' o e Bulletin were not being comp lied 
lth in C ertain sub t areas , that cooperating lenders were under 
s antial p pressure from lenders operating outside the 
r ogram th some relaxation of the provisions governing 
' and that 
e financing '1as of 1-to 4 -family unit residential properties 
order to prevent a spreading disregard of 
the 
necessary in 
Program•s l 27 ending standards in these areas . .... 
11 
The re . vised por t ion of Bulletin No . 4 read : 
WillT~~np~rmanent f inancing of most new construction 
on Sept tinue to be governed by Regulation X as re vised 
the re ember 1, 1951 to conform with the provisions of 
Facili~~ntly enacted Defense Housing and community 
Sec es and Services Act of 19)1. in the tion 1 of Bulletin No . 4 is revised to recommend, 
t o fo case of loans on residential properties of one -
shoui:-family units that 1oans on exis ting properties 
X or 
66
not e x ceed th; limitations imposed by Regulation 
Which 2/3 p ercent of the fair value of the property, 
..,...__;:::t ever . . he f . is greater . This means that on properties 
limit::: value of w!iich is $16,700 or less , the recommended 
"hich ions are those imp osed by Regulation X (all of 
va1u are above 6 6 2/3 p ercent) ; on properties the f air 
borre of which i s greater than $16 , 700, the limitation on 
BUJ.l~~;ng i s 66 2/3 percent . In all other respects 
in No . 4 remains unchangea .
28 
This was of a retreat from the pro gram ' s 
str , course, 
onge " r position on real estate credit and points to a 
ing of the credit restraint technique . InS
t
ead of ea.ken-· 
-------27 Senate Document No . 1 23 , part 1 , PP • 436-437 · 
28 C Fede r al Reserve BU~' 37 : 1241, October, 19/ 1 · 
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t1ghten1n0' 
o controls i th Co n e face of opp osition, the Nati onal 
l'lltnittee 
disr loosened the policy requirements to prevent further 
egard for the . of principles of the program by a larger number 
financ· J.al le aders 
er . 
The result was a setback in the 
fect1 Vene ss of the program . 
But i n spite at thi of its retreat, the National Committee , 
s same Best meeting , concluded that the Voluntary Credit 
raint 
Peeli Program was achieving significant results. 29 
ng among c o . tenti rnmittee members was that the inflation po-
a1 Was st·1 nee 1 1 strong and that the program was still 
essary inr • The reasons g iven for the then existing lull in 
lationary in R pressures were : (1) improved military position 
ore 
con.s tun a, (2 ) some waning of war psychology , (3) decline in 
er demand c
0
hlrn , ( 4) abundant crops of important agricultural 
Odit· J.es, ( 5 ) anct (?) increased taxes, ( 6 ) wage and price controls 
the JO 
co
113
u great p roductive potential of America . The 
tner Pr. Pot index had increased by only 2 .1 percentage J..ce · 
nts f 
rom M the arch to September , 1951. In that same period, 
tvho1esa1e cent price index bad actually declined by 6. 4 per-
age Points. 
It d was decided to issue a wider distribution of 
i ge st s 
the opinions of re gional committees concerning Of 
l:lp 
ec if j_ 
or c loan cases which had baffled the financial officers 
lendi 
~est ng institutions participating under the credit 
.t>ai nt technique. HThe National Committee ••.. decided 
'----
----29Ib C 
~ ., 37 : 1058 -1060 , September , 1971. 
30Ib' 
~-
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that a . d 
wi er distribution of these digests would contribute 
to a b 
etter understanding of the Progr am among financial 
instituti 
ons, the press and the p ublic •.•.. 11 31 
On September , 27 , 1951, the National Committee announced 
that the N t· 
a ional Fraternal Congress of America had joined 
in the 
Voluntary credit control device . This org anization , 
cornprisi 
ng the fraterna l life insurance companies of America, 
.Pledged its 
and its members ' supp ort to the princ i p les and 
Policies of 32 the program . 
}'.Lest Vir ginia Case Again . The po l iticians in West 
Virg i n ia who 
were concerned about their proposed veterans ' 
b onus Payment 
' 
again be g an to 
which had been held in check in early spring , 
g enerate trouble for the VCRP . 
todaThe Nat ional Voluntary Credit Restraint Committee 
v · Y coni'erred with Governor Okey L . Patteson of West 
b irt ~nia and a delegation oi' West Virg inia State and 
t~n.ing oi'fic ials who had been invited to discuss 
boeir Proposal to issue 75 million dollars in state 
thnds to i'inance bonus payments to veterans voted in 
c e ~ovember 195 0 elections . There was also some dis -
0 Ussion of a somewhat similar situation in the State of 
bregon where a veterans' bonus plan had also been approved 
Y the voters . 
In view oi' · t~e ·f;c~ ~h;t · i ~v;s~m;n~ ~ankers in 
~~:Pl ian?e with the VCR P have refrained from bidd~ng _o~ 
Pending issue of bonds the Governor of West Virg inia 
~f0 P?ses to offer these bonds to the publi~ dire?tlf ~y 
Th acing them on sale through the banks of ."lest Virginia . 
be Plan contemplates that any bonds left unsold w?uld 
. e Purchased by using various State trust funds, dis-
Posing of other obligations if necessary . 33 
-------
31Ibid . 
--
32Ib!3 . , J7 : 124J_-124J, October, 1951 . 
33Ibid . 
-
The National Committee expressed concern. There was 
no change in the position of either Governor Patteson or 
on this bonus issue as a result of the dis-the Committee 
cuss· ion at that meeting . But the fina l disposition of thi s 
controversy resulted in a tremendous blow to the effective -
ness and pride of the VCRP as an anti-inflationary force. The 
Governor went ahead with his plan to disre gard the VCRP 
and its p rinciples and financed the bonus issue in his own 
On November 26 , 1951, $37 , 500 , 000 of the veterans' manner 
. 
bon us bonds were offered to state and national banks throughout 
the State of West Virginia, both for their own and public 
Purcha se. On December 15, 1951 , the State sold $30,622,000 
Of th e b onds to p ublic banks and other groups, taking t he 
remain· ing $6 , 878 ,000 itself . In April , 1952 , the State sold 
Publicly $ '30,000,000 additional veterans bonds. This f inished 
th e second installment of ·90,000,000 authorized .
34 
The 
state and national banks of west Virginia and other finan-
c1a1 groups which participated in the transaction did so in 
direct . violation of their pledge under the VCRP , that is, if 
they had ever made such a pledge. So the case, which had 
been b . uilt up in commercial and finan cial periodicals as a 
gr eat triumph for the VCRP in early 1951 , turned out to be a 
co10 ssal and embarrassing defeat by the end of that same year . 
In mid- October , 1951, more than fifty National and 
re gional f th committee members met to discuss the progress 
O 
e 
---
Munic' 3~oo~~ •s Manual of Investments, Governments an_!] ~ 1 4,-r,:-Hi43 . -
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pro gram and some of its present problems . Among the subjects 
under consideration was a so cal led 11 leak in the dyke n, 
11 ••• thr.ough credit granted under Government pro grams in fields 
where private financin g institutions are attempting to restrain 
unnecessary credit exp ans ion ..•.• ,i3.5 The problem of allowing 
the Federal Government to compete with private financial 
i nstitutions that were attempting to follow anti - inflation 
pol i cies in their credit control under the VCRP, was one of 
the 11 drawbacks 11 of this method of inf lat ion restraint . 
Later it caused great resentment on the part of private 
financial institutions and was one of the forces which 
reduced to some de gree, the effectiveness of the program . 
Partial Digest of Opinions . At the September .5, 
19.51 , meeting of the National Committee, it had been pointed 
out that there was a great need for the assemblage and 
dispersal of a di gest of opinions rendered by re gional 
committees on typical cases referre d by lending institutions 
to their respective jurisdictional subcommittees . This pro-
c edure , it was felt, would lead to a greater strength for the 
program and a more comprehensive understanding by the public 
of its principles and policies , in addition to a more power-
ful diligence and sharper finesse in the operati on of the 
subcommittees under the VCRP . 
To fulfill this g ap, the National Committee in con-
junction with its regional cohorts di gested and published in 
35
F ede~al Reserve Bulletin , 37 : 1361, November , 19.51 . 
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the November, 1951, issue of the Federal Reserve Bulletin 
samp les of cases which had raised doubts in the minds of 
lenders and which, therefore , had been referred to the 
re g ional committees . It was felt that these cases were 
typ ical and that they would serve as guides, or benchmark s , 
for similar ones that mi ght arise in the future . It was 
also anticipated that p otential borrowers would heed the 
imp lications of this di gest of cases before approaching 
financial institutions for an e x tension of credit . 
Given below is only a partial coverage of the pub-
lished opinionated cases . They are presented here only for 
an e xpository purpose to demonstrate an ancillary technique 
of the VCRP in action . They have not been selected in any 
manner to slant or prejudice this paper . The digest was 
simply reduced for lack of space and to reduce boredom which 
is too easily entered into in a perusal of this paper . 
Partial Di gest of Opinions Rendered by 
Re g ional Committees on Typical Cases Referred 
by Lending Institutions Prior to Sep t . 1 , 1951 . 36 
Seasonal and Inventory Loans 
Borrower and Purp~ 
rnolesale seeds 
To buy and clean seeds for resale 
to retailers of seed f or use by 
farmers in necessary r e seeding 
op erations . 
Retail dry goods 
For n orma l seasonal inventory 
acquisition 
_Qpinion 
Favorable 
Favorable 
36Partial selection from digested cases p ublished in 
Feder a l Reserve Bulletin, 37 : 1362-1365 , November, 1951 . 
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1?.__orrower and P urpose 
Retail hardware, lumber and building supplies 
For normal inventory acquisition to 
care for summer and early fall trade 
Favorable 
Retail fuel oil 
To purchase 1 million g allons of fuel 
0 il (1/10 of annual volume) for 
storage and sale during the 1951-2 
season 
Retail hardware 
T? enable borrower to carry inventory 
disproportionate to his normal business 
operations 
Ret ·1 
ai sewing machine 
To increase inventory of imported 
machines in anticipation of future 
curtailment in domestic manufacture 
of' machines 
Building Programs 
Machine tool company 
To build new plant to take care of 
Present need . Present rental prop-
erty too small and unsuitable for 
increased volume and employment 
Delicatessen 
To build a new store building to 
serve a newly developed residential 
area 
Nursing home for aged 
To buy existing building which is 
suitable for needed additional space 
f'or op erations 
Retail farm tractor and implement dealer 
To erect sales and service building in 
order to retain franchise 
Grain elevator and feed mill 
To erect a new building to replace 
Present facilities which are not 
Very convenient from standp oint of 
services to customers 
Municipality 
To erect a gricultural-livestock 
exhibition building 
Favorable 
Unfavorable 
Unfavorable 
F avorable 
Favorable 
Favorable 
Unfavorable 
Unfavorable 
Unfavorable 
New Plan~ Eguipmenl 
~rrower and p urpose 
Publish er of daily newspaper 
To purcha se a printin~ press in 
~ep l acement of outmod;d press which 
o~ s n ot take care of present re-
quirements 
Tanksh· 1 P owner 
~o purchase oil tanker for charter 
0 an oil comp any 
Excavat· ing contractor 
~o purcha se diesel tractor shovel 
0 rep lace worn and obsolete equip-
ment now in us e 
Whol esale petrol e um i0 buy t ractor-trailer units necessary 
n op eration 
Laundry 
To p urchase new machinery and 
~quipment for e xpansion of plant . 
ef errable unless proaram had been 
st o arted and commitments made prior 
to inauguration of VCRP 
Social club and recre ation center 
To purchase bar and equ ipment 
together with furnishir:g s of social 
room. Present facilities not 
ade quate 
Farmer To repair and remodel farm buildings 
on 176 acre produc i ng farm 
Reta·l 1 variety stor e For modernization and enlargement 
of store building . Approval based 
on facts that architect ' s plans 
drawn and mat erials contracted for 
Pr i or to incep tion of VC RP 
1 ladies ready-to-we ar Reta·i 
To modernize store, add ne~ . 
fr ont and increase floor ca~ a~i tY 
to maintain comp etitive position 
QPinion 
Favorable 
Favorable 
pavorable 
Favorable 
Unf avorable 
Unfavorab l e 
Favorable 
· Favorable 
Unfavorable 
Borra wer and Purpos~ 
Gasoline service station 
For purchase and modernization of 
equipment and fac ilities of two 
existing gas stations 
Working Capital_ Loans 
Nood~orking Mf g . of Bus. Fix . & Equip . 
For . necessary and normal working 
capital in connection with contract 
work in process 
Metal stamping plant 
For.neces sary and normal working 
capital . Sixty- five percent of 
present volume is unde r defense 
contract 
Shoe manufacturer 
For necessary and norma l working 
capital 
Debt Retirement and Refinancin~ 
Retail automobile dealer 
To repay existing bank loan 
Manu.ract ure r of electrical appliances 
For reduction of bank debt 
Retail milk dealer To refinance existing indebtedness 
held by former owner of business 
Chain variety stores To retire outstanding preferred stock 
New Ventures 
Retail grocer To stock a new store to be opened 
in a new and expanding community now 
lackine a grocery 
Retail grocer To stock a new grocery store which 
facilities appear not to be necessary 
in the community 
Dentist To purchase furnishings and equipment 
necessary to operate a dental office . 
Borrower recently graduated from dental 
school 
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Opinion 
Unfavorable 
Favorable 
Favorable 
Favorable 
Favorable 
Favorable 
Unfa vorable 
Unfavorable 
Favorable 
Unfavorable 
Favorable 
Borrower and Purpos e 
Amusement park 
For erection of plant and p urchase 
of equipment necessary for op erations. 
Other amuseme n t and recre at ional 
faci litie s a r e a v a ilable in area 
Other Loans 
Housewife 
To buy s ing le p remi um life i nsurance 
contract. To provide for purchase 
of d iscounted p remium life insurance 
contract 
I ndivi dual 
To p urchase real estate f or investment . 
Property is already financed on a long-
term basis . 
State g overnment 
For payment of bonus to veterans of 
World War II 
118 
Unfavorable 
Unfavorable 
Unfavorable 
Unfavorable 
In t he last half of December , 1951, the financial 
insti t utions of America and the p ublic were to witness two 
more re v isions in the previously published bulletins of 
the VCRP . 
Bulletin No . 2 Revis ed. The Voluntary Credit 
Re straint Committee reviewed the outlook for business spending 
on plant and equipment and revised the second bulletin 
previously issued. The general substance of this revision was: 
1 . The program should be continued under careful 
screening of all business capital financin g programs. 
Business sp ending on p lant and equipment is at record levels. 
Still shortages of b asic materials exist . Demands for materials 
a re st i ll stron g . The supp ly situation is likely to become 
worse before becoming better. Plant expansion for nondefense 
and n on essenti a l p urp oses consume s scarce materials and 
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siphons off vital supplies. Such outlays have been large in 
1 951 , but without the VCRP, t hey would have been substantially 
larger . "However, there wil 1 come a time when these non-
defense plant expenditures will afford welcome support to 
business and employment. Business management and finance 
can jointly do a great p ublic service both now and later by 
timing p lant outlays and the financing thereof with full 
consideration of the foregoing facts . " 3 7 (This was the 
first indication of a relaxing of the VCRP . ) 
2 . The bulletin went on to point up the uses of 
funds which had a high priority under current conditions . 
They were: increasing capacity for the production of 
defense g oods and of basic raw materials (such as metal and 
petroleum); loans to railroads and other public transporta-
tion , electric, gas and water utilities; loans under certain 
conditions to construction compan ies with bona fide contracts 
for the construct ion of defense facilities, hi ghways, 
s chools, port improvements, public utilities or railroads . 38 
3. Among long term nonessential uses of loans that 
should be postponed were : (1) construction of facilities to 
improve compet itive conditions of nonessential g oods ; 
( 2 ) expansion and modernization expenditures of concerns 
in distribution or service lines where the distribution or 
3 7Federal Reserve Bulletin, 38:22-24, January, 1952 . 
38rbid . 
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service is not defense-supp orting; (3 ) expansion and 
modernization of facilities not related to defense efforts 
and (4) purchase of ex isting plants or firms to improve the 
diversification of a company's products.39 
4 . The purpose for which funds will be used rather 
than the type of financing is the important point in screening 
loans under this program . Thus it was recommended that all 
t ypes of security issues be screened - term loans, notes, 
d e bentures , bonds, preferred stock, common stock, sale-
le ase back arrangements or any other form of financing . 
Interim financing should be screened the same as final 
financin g . 4° 
5. There should be no discrimination between large 
and small business.41 
6. Financing under this p rogram should be screened 
even though the proje ct has received a certificate of tax 
amortization, or has been allotted materials under the 
Controlled Materials Plan . But these certificates and a llot-
ments should be g iven consideration but not followed blindly. 
Screening under the pro gram is welcomed by O. D. M.42 
7 . The absence of such certificates and allotments 
should not g o against a request for a loan . 43 
In conjunction with the revised bulletin, a st atement 
39rbid . 
40ibid . 
4lib i d . 
4 2Ibid . 
43 Ibid . 
was g iven of wh i ch the general gist is given in this para-
grap h. The general statement p ointed out that business 
expenditures on p lant and equipment in 1952 were expected 
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to be as high as those of 1 951. It pointed out that outside 
financing demand would be greater in 1952, than in 1951, 
bec ause tax p ayments would be greater . In 1951, tax accruals 
ran in e x cess of liabilities, this was a source of short-
term internal financing . The reverse was expected to occur 
in 1952 . The statement further called for increased vigi-
lance on the part of the VCRP in the sphere of government 
p olicy re g arding plant expansion because the government, in 
its efforts to increase plant and equipment through subsidy 
and exploration contracts, had over extended its efforts. 
There may have been an " over allotting " of these incentives . 
Because of this, there was a need fo r the VCRP to scrutinize 
this g overnment po licy. Also premature financing increases 
the pr obability that funds may be diverted to other uses not 
related to the p roject, because of the shortage of materials. 44 
Bulletin No . L1- Amended Again. At the meeting of 
the Nat i onal Committee on No vember 15, 1951 , it was a greed 
that if the Board of Governors should decide to exemp t leas:in g 
arrang ements from Regulation X there should be an amendment 
of Bulletin No . 4, revised . Effective December Jl, 1 951, 
the Board amended Re gulation X so t hat leasing arrangements 
involving ne w construction of commercial and industrial 
44Ibid . 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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Pt>opert 
Y are no longer subject to that regulation . Therefore, 
the l 
a
st Paragraph of Bulletin No . 4 was amended to bring 
these 1 . 
easing arrangements within its purview. The amended 
Pat>agraph follows: 
ur 5 . _Le asing arrangements . The Committee also 
arges f inancing institutions to recognize that leasing 
garang ~ments sometimes are used as substitutes for mort-
an~ e financing and t h erefore come withi n the Program 
sh should be screened as to purpose . This principle 
sh 0 Uld app ly to existing construction of all types and 
in °Uld_also app ly to new construction of commercial or 
su~~lving commercial or industrial property no longer 
ar Ject to Regulation X. Some examples of leasing 
g rang ements which may be used as substitutes for mort -
p a?e ~redit and where, if this is the case, the above 
arinciple (i . e ., screening as to purpose) should apply 
mre sale-lease- back arrangements , long-term leases which 
w;! be renewed for a nominal rental, and leases in 
a ic~ the lessee has the right to have rental payments 
0 ~Plied to the purchase price in a subsequent exercise 
an option to buy the leased property . ~5 
!_ational Committee Memorandum to Subcommittees . By 
e at>ly F 
ebruary, 1952, it was still app arent that the 
Volunt 
ary Credit Restraint Program was laboring under its 
Stat d 
e Principles and p olicies . This labor was due 
Pt> imari ly 
to the overlapp ing of administrative jurisdictions 
and h 
c anne1s of communication. These problems could 
only- ri c,e to ~ the surface ai'ter time and experience had 
PJ>oved the 
value of the credit restraining technique . 
is found 
Here 
anot he r indication of the time required before a 
PJ>og.:r,.ci,.,., 
-•! of this type can reach a stage of effectiveness contra -
int lat ion • 
!J:lj_ 
ght not be a useful tool in an emergency of s udden out-
bQl->s ts of upward spiraling p rices similar to those tha t 
It wa s actually another signpost that the VCRP 
-------
45Ibi d 
-· 
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shock ed the American economy immediately after the outbreak 
of the Korean War . This administrative difficulty of the 
VC RP was evident from a memorandum of Chairman Powell, 
issued to the regional committees on February 5, 1952 . 
The general content of this memorandum is found 
here as: 
Recommendations to Re g ional Committees46 
1 . Interim and Permanent Financing. If interim 
loans have been screened and permanent financing for the 
same project is of equal amount as the interim loan then 
further screening is not necessary. But if permanent 
financing to rep lace interim financing is somewhat large r in 
amount, then screenin g is necessary. 
2 . Direct or Private Placements. (1) When the 
intermediary in a loan proceeding is an investment banker, 
security dealer , or other fi nancing institution; the inter-
mediary should screen the loan . (2 ) Where there is no inter-
mediary, it is the responsibility of investing institutions 
or a gent-lender to screen the issue themselves. (3 ) If one 
financing institution has approve d or g otten the approval from 
a regional committee, other institutions joining the group 
do not have to get the O. K. also. 
3 . Loans to Retire Stock. Reaffirmation of 
the original position that this was contrary to principles 
in the . absence of extenuating circumstances. 
4 6Ibid ., 38 : 252- 253 , March , 1952 . 
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4. Screening Fore i gn Borrowi~. Screening should 
take place in the city in which the agent or principal under-
writer is domiciled . 
5. State and Local Interim F inancing . Certain 
municipalities have been arranging interim financing . At 
a later date they have requested clearance of permanent 
financin g on the grounds that inabi l ity to fund outstanding 
obligations would create undue hardship and embarrassment. 
Bulletin No . 3 specifically recommends that temporary 
borrowing for capital p urp oses, unless anticipating current 
revenues, should be judged b y the standards specified for 
long term cap ital loans. The Bulletin also urges local 
g overnments to balance operating budgets and to hold borrowfu g 
in anticipation of truces or other revenues to a minimum. 
Consequently, financing institutions are urged to assure 
themselves that interim financing b y State and local govern-
ments is evaluated under the Program in the same manner and 
by the same standards as would be applicable in the case of 
long-term financing . 
6. Transportation Equipment . The question has been 
r a ised with the National Committee whether loans for the 
p urchas e of transportation equipment already in use, i.e., 
ships , trucks, etc., were contrary to the principles of 
the p rog r am: answer, not in accord unless withdrawal of the 
equipment would impede the defense effort. 
7. Temporary Real Estate Fin~ncing . Temporary 
credit can be granted where a home buyer cannot synchronize 
the sale of his old home and the purchase of a new home. 
From February to the first half of March, there 
were no further public releases or utterances in relation 
to matters of public policy or to the effectiveness of the 
p ro gram as an anti - inflation tool. 
3 . Wane and Revocation of the VC RP 
1 25 
Fatal Bl ow Struck Against the VCRP . On March 24, 
1 952 , President Truman transmitted through Charles E . Wilson 
a request that the VCRP suspend its screening of state and 
local g overnment financing by the re g ional committees. The 
National Committee acted on March 28 , 1952 . 
His reason is reve a led in the letter itself: 
One feature of the program (VCRP ) has, however, 
worried me f rom the start . That is the f eature under 
which State and local governments were requested to 
submit their p roposals for new financing to committees 
made up of p rivate bankers and others in the private 
financial f ield f or advice as to whether the financin g 
should be undertaken during the present emergency •••.. 
This arrang ement has meant, in effect, that the 
F ederal Government has restricted the proposed actions 
of State and local g overnments in matters which should 
be decided, under our scheme of g overnment, by State 
and local initiative ••••• I believe that t he ap p li-
cation of such an arrangement to the affairs of State 
and local g overnments should be continued no longer than 
is absolutely necessary.47 
Evidently , the Chief Executive believed that the 
F ederal Government had been encroaching up on the juris-
diction of the State and local political bodies. This may 
have been true, but in the light of the Truman political 
p hilosophy of Federal Government supremacy in the sphere of 
states 1 ri ghts versus federal ri ghts, his line of reasoning 
47rbid., 38 : 364, April , 1952 . 
app ears strange to be coming from the principal proponent 
of the Fair Deal . 
1 26 
But, in the Journal of the American Bankers 1 Asso-
ciation, there was a more credible account of the forces 
behind the death of the VCRP . According to this source, 
the objection to the control that the VCRP had over State 
and local government financial matters did not emerg e from 
the fact that the program had attempted to thrust aside 
certain veterans ' bonus financial transactions , but the 
objection did arise when the VCRP stood in the way of the 
approval of a possible bond issue for the purchase by seven 
public utility districts in the states of Washington and 
• 
Idaho of the Puget Sound Power and Light Company . 48 
Public power supporters were so opposed to the VCRP 
for standing in their way in the purchase of the already 
existing utility facilities that were in the hands of a 
private company - this transaction would have been clearly 
i nflationary under the policy and principles of the VCRP -
that it was originally planned by Senator Warren Magnuson 
(Dem. , wash .) that the Defense Production Act should be 
amended to remove State and local borrowing from the VCRP . 49 
Public power advocates prevailed instead upon the White 
House to take this step without waiting for consideration 
of the Defense Production Act in June, 1952 . The amendment 
4 8Hwashington . H Banking, 44: 123-124, May, 1952 . 
4 9rbid . 
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to the VCRP , which removed State and local g overnments from 
that anti-inflation mechanism's sphere of influence, was 
app roved on April 11, 1952. 
The article in the Journal of the American Bankers' 
Association went on to reveal the lending institutions' 
re a ction to Presidential action and their reasons for 
failing to withdraw their support from the program although 
a strong blow had already been struck a gainst its foundation; 
a blow which eventually led to the sudden death of the program. 
Notwithstanding the separation of state and local 
credit from the VCR Program, the program carries on. 
Several members of the national committee, as presumably 
also members of the regional committees, were disposed 
initially to resign in indignation over the President 1 s 
a ction in dis crimination in favor of public borrowing . 
Members were persuaded to retain their VCR committee 
membership and carry on with the VCR program for a time, 
with this theory more or less in mind: 
Private finance is notoriously subject to demagogic 
attacks. If private banking , insurance and investment, 
on their own i n itiative k illed off the voluntary effort 
to curb the inflationary use by business of credit, then 
the y would quickly be charged - should inflationary 
forces resume - with having failed to succeed with their 
o~m voluntary restraint program. There were many possi-
bilities in the background among them that Congress mi ght 
be disin clined to renew any material part of the Defense 
Production Act and its so-called "anti-inf la tion 11 pro-
gram. 
On the other hand, always lurking in the background 
is the fact that the extreme radicals among the controllers 
sponsor the assumption by the administration of the power 
to ration credit in an inflationary era, through 
dusting off the Banking Act of 1933 and the Trading 
with the Enemy Act for this purpose . 
Actually officials were inclined to think the direct 
damage of releasing state and local borrowing was less 
material than the Effect this action had in undermining 
the morale of the Voluntary Credit Restraint Program 
as a whole. 5 0 
I 
I 
I 
( 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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Suspension of the VC RP . From the time that State 
and local governments were exempted from the VCRP by Presi-
dent Truman's order which " •.•. brought immediate threats of 
resignation from members of the committee and led to 
suggestions that the whole idea be abandoned, 11 5 1 the volun-
tary credit restraint mechanism had been on the skids . 
"Regional commit tees reported an increasing tendency for 
lenders to sidestep the loan review procedure . 11 52 It tl'ms 
became evident that the lending institutions bad be gun to 
lose their enthusiasm for the program soon after the State 
and local political entities received their immunity from 
its controls . This was in keeping with the principle which 
was pointed out in the early pages of this chapter when 
Bulletin No. 3 was first discussed, that all important 
areas of credit and finance must be subjected to the program, 
or they would soon lose their enthusiasm for attaining the 
purposes behind the credit restraint technique . 
On May 2 , 1952 , the National Committee made a request 
to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System that 
;he VCRP be suspended for the time being on a standby basis. 
7he Board concurred unanimously on the recommendation of the 
National Committee and suspended the VCRP effective May 12, 
2152 . 53 The reason g iven for the suspension was "in the 
light of current circumstances . rr This was interpreted to 
mean that current inflationary forces bad subsided for the 
5 l"Exit Credit Curbs ." Business Week, May 10, 1952, p . 34 . 
52Ibid . 
53Federal Reserve Bulletin , 38 :501-502, May, 1952 . 
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p resent time. 
At its Washington swan-song meeting , the national 
VCR committ e e said, "current circumstances" favored 
shutting down now. Basically, that meant infl a tion 
fires were burning low, credit was in better balance. 
That was all true. True, too, is the fact that the 
p residen;l(ad already kicked the p rops out from under 
VC R •••.• 
The inflationary situation in the first few months 
of 1952 as measured by the price indexes was rather uncertain. 
The wholesale price index which had been declining throughout 
1 951 continued to do just this in the early phases of 1952. 
In January the index for all commodities was 113, (1947-49=100), 
by May of that year it was down to 111.6.55 On the other 
hand, the consumers' price index, all items, (1935-39=100 ), 
was less optimistic. This price index had bee n rising 
throughout 1951 and reached a high of 189.1 in January of 
1952 , but by February, 1952, it had dropped to 1 87.9. Yet 
the following two months, the index revealed that the infla-
tion fires were not burning as low as was first thought. 
By May , 1952, the index had climbed bac k to 189 .o. 5 6 From 
these basic indicators of the inflationary climate, it would 
seem that those officials whose duty it was to do all in 
their power to control or reduce the forces behind price 
rising trends, should have thought twice before they recommended 
the suspension of the VCRP . But in the light of the blow 
5 4 "Exit Credit Curbs." loc. cit. 
55Economic Report, January, 1953, p. 188. 
56 I bid., p. 190. 
struc k at the fo undation of the program by the removal of 
State and loc a l government financial transactions from the 
p rogram's jurisdiction, the officials may have had no 
choice left but to suspend the program in its entirety . 
Repea l of the Voluntary Agreement Power. When the 
De f ense Production Act came before Congress in June, 1952 , 
the eve of its exp iration date, many groups favored the 
extension of the power to enter into this voluntary a gree-
ment granted the thousands of financial institutions via 
Congress, the President and the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, suggesting that the VCRP merely be 
suspended and ret a ined on a standby basis in the event of 
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an amergency. These groups included the National Voluntary 
Credit Restraint Committee , the Board of Governors and the 
American Bankers ' Association . 5 7 But their pleas fell on 
deaf ears; the authority to enter into this voluntary scheme 
with anti-trust immlIDity was stricken from the Defense 
Production Act on June JO, 1 952 , when a somewhat weakened 
version of that act was amended, revised and e x tended by 
Congress . The Congressional action meant that if this type 
of anti-inflation technique was ever to be revised in the 
future there would have to be a period of org anization and 
implementation such as that which occurred in the latter 
part of 1950 and early 1951 before this tool could ever 
become effective and puruse its purposes . It will be seen 
in the next chapter that this inherent characteristic is 
one of the basic weaknesses of the program per se . 
5 7see Banking, 44:38 , June, 1952 . 
CHAPTER V 
AN EVALUATION 
1. General Introduction 
The Voluntary Credit Restra int Program was a type 
of formalized moral suasion typified and incased in such 
lang uag e as : "requests the compliance in," "encourages 
the screening of," "asks the reliance on the good will 
of," "urges in the sp irit of, 11 and similar phrases which 
e xempl i fied voluntary a greements of this caliber . The time 
has now come to attempt an evaluation of such a voluntary 
technique of credit and inflation control . 
Di ff iculties in Making an Evaluation. In an 
attempt to evalua te the Voluntary Credit Restraint Program 
in its struggle against the inflationary forces from early 
1 951 to early 1952 and at the same time reveal its influence 
as a tool for channeling credit from the non-essential to 
the essential areas of economic activity, one is confronted 
by many difficulties in p ursuing this task . One of the first 
stumbling blocks is the inherent characteristic of the 
VCRP per se . That is, the VCRP was basically a qualitative, 
rather than a quantitative, tool for controlling credit 
e xpansion in an inflationary period . It will be recalled 
tha t in Chapter III that this voluntary program was rightfully 
referred to as "formalized moral suasion" . A true example of 
a qualitative credit control technique . It will also be 
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remembered that the VC RP 1 s dut y was primarily that of 
channeling credit into the defense and defense supporting 
industries rather than determining how much credit ought to 
be allowed to industries in those classifications . The 
program, as such, was not directly preoccupied with the size 
of the inflation g ap p er se . A loan was considered to be 
proper and within the p ropriety of the program if the purpose, 
or purposes, for which the proceeds of it were to be used 
were within the proper confines of the program as delineated 
by the principles and policies found in the "Statement 
of Principles" and the bulletins and numerous memoranda 
promulgated by the National Committee . There were no 
ceiling quotas or rationings of credit in a quantitative 
sense with a c onslderat ion as to the amount of credit that 
should be allocated to the various industries and the economy 
as a whole. 
This inherent characteristic of the VCRP and the 
point that it mi ght possibly lead to certain difficulties 
were keenly observed at a meeting of the Jrd Federal 
Reserve District 1 s Federal Reserve Relations Committee at 
a time when the VCRP was in effe c t. Vi c e President Karl 
Bopp of the 3rd F ederal Reserve Bank was discussing this 
vital characteristic when he said : 
•••• We should think in terms of total quantity as 
well as individual character . If a loan is tote made 
for a defense purpose the thing to do is to see where 
these funds are coming from, and t o se c ure them fr om 
repayments on maturing loans , ordinary personal l oans, 
ordinary business loans, and so on . The program arose 
because the volume of loans was expanding rapidly , and 
I think the criterion of thi s plan ' s [VCRP t s] success 
ultimately will have to be quantitative . It will be 
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successful if over-all we do not have an expansion as we 
may have in total production measured in real, not 
dollar, terms. We should remember, also, what Clay 
Anders on said about the velocity of circulation in 
this connection. 
Wh a t I would like to emphasize is the over-all 
quantitative problem. I think, therefore, that in 
addition to giving attention to the specific appli-
cations, we should pay attention to the loan total 
which the institution is making .l 
But, the prog ram never did treat the inflation 
problem in a quantitative sense. That is, there was no 
attempt to limit the total over-all amount of credit out-
standing for the economy by this technique. This was left 
to the combination of general and selective types of credit 
containment. In other words, if the total amount of non-
essential credit was completely eliminated, and all credit 
expansion was going exclusively to the defense and defense 
supporting industries of the economy and under these 
conditions inflation was still profusely evident, then, the 
VCRP would have made little contribution as an anti-inflation 
tool. F or one of its two main policies was to provide 
all the credit demanded by the defense effort without any 
consideration for the quantitative aspects of such a policy. 
In this hypothetical example, the program's outlook would 
have been to avoid the greater of two evils. That is, the 
VCRP would have sacrificed inflation for defense rather than 
defense for stable price levels. This would have been a 
proper a pp roach, but a more conunon sense value would have 
been to have defense and stable price levels together. Such 
1Remarks made at the 13th Session of the Federal Reserve 
Re lat ions Committee of the 3rd District F'ederal Reserve Bank. 
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a g oal would have been an impossible task for the program 
to accomplish by itself . Because of the qualitative char-
acter of the program, it has been diff icult, if not impossible, 
to measure the effectiveness of this mechanism in a statistical 
or quantitat i ve manner . 
Another reason for the unreliability of various 
statistical studies concerning the value of this voluntary 
credit re straint technique i s the fact that there was a 
multiplic ity of various other credit control tool s all 
wrestling in the same arena at the same moment with the 
same adversary . When one attemp ts to award the plaudits to 
a certain type of credit control for having adequately 
pinned its opponent's shoulders to the canvas for the three 
count, it is found that this is impossible because the 
actual struggle has turned out t o be a team mat ch . The 
award can only be granted to the team as a whole . It be c omes 
nex t to imp ossible to single out each member of the team for 
special citations . The quantitative indic ators of economic 
activity have not attained the a c curacy which allows them 
to focus on each control device in a time of inflation and 
c ome to precise evaluations abou t these tools . For example , 
in the field of real estate credit control - assuming that 
it was controlled to some extent - it is impossible to say 
that the reduction in real estate credit e xp ansion was due 
exclusively or proportionally to Regulation X, a selective 
control; to the general controls of reserve requirement and 
discount rate manipulations or to the qua litative aspects of 
the VCRP . This is bec ause all three of these types of 
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credit restraint were active in this area of inflationary 
pressures at the same time. The social scientist is handi-
capped in this respect, because he does not have the use 
of the exp erimental vacuum which the natural scientist can 
use in his search for truth. This tool g ives a great advan-
tag e to the natural scientist,for he can use controlled 
experiments dealing with large numbers and determine the 
effects of various forces upon the subject under study and 
come to fairly accurate conclusions. The use of the 
vacuum in experiments in the social sciences is practically 
impossible . The human factor is always present; individuals 
pride themselves on certain freedoms and any attempt to 
convert them into guinea pig s would be a direct affront to 
human pride and dignity. 
A third condition which made it difficult to arrive 
at any definite conclusions as to the worth of the Voluntary 
Credit Restraint Program was the fact that the economy had 
not been forced by the Korean War to the extreme predicament 
of being thrust into a total war ec onomy . The Korean out-
break was a part of the cold war state that still exists to 
date . This fact has great bearing on the matter of evalua-
tion since one of the VCRP 1 s main fw1ctions was to allocate 
credit from the nonessential industries to the essential 
defense and defense-supporting industries. The institutions 
working under this prog ram found great difficulty in distin-
g uishing between what was essential credit and what was non-
essential . This difficulty was exemplified by the necessity 
for the issuance of ancillary bulletins, and the fact pointed 
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out in Chapter IV that even after almost a year's experience, 
the VCRP was still havin g administrative difficulties caused 
by the predicament of distinguishing between essential and 
nonessential credit uses. Thus, if these lending institutions 
found this distinction between essential and nonessential 
purposes perplex ing , then, anyone attempting to arrive at 
an evaluation of the program would certainly encounter such 
a problem also. Halfway efforts are usually more difficult 
in matters of human relations than all-out efforts. The 
former requires skill in judgment and moderation as to the 
amount of endeavor needed, whereas, the latter requires only 
the maximum force with no brakes applied. The path of modera-
tion is a difficult one to travel. 
Some of these points were revealed in the reply of 
Federal Reserve Bank presidents in a request for their 
evaluation of the pro gram. 
It is very difficult, if not impossible, to appraise 
statistically the effect of a single instrument of credit 
control, such as the voluntary credit-restraint program, 
because of the multiplicity of factors and the cross-
currents which influence the demand for bank credit and 
its availability. Moreover, there is no statistical way 
of ascertaining what the amount of outstanding bank 
credit would have been during any given period if 
particu~ar credit-control instruments had not been in 
effect. 
Another point which directly bears on this question 
of the difficulty of evaluating the VCRP is that there was 
no method of quantifying the number of loans "nipped in the 
bud." By this phrase it is meant that the psycholog ical effect 
2senate Document, No. 123, Part 2, pp. 714-715. 
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of the p rogram itself caused certain potential borrowers to 
hold back their demands for credit extension at their own 
initiative. This s e lf restraining influence of the VCRP 
cannot be measured in any quantitative sense because of the 
impossibility of gathering tbis data . 
Another p oint which has been stated previously in 
other chapters of this paper is the influence of the Treasury-
Federal Reserve accord. This agreement has been explained 
in some detail in re gard to its r amifications as an anti-
inflation step on the part of these two institutions. It 
should be shown that this accord was entered into at approx-
imately the same time that the voluntary pro gram was initi a ted . 
This fact further comp licates the matter of evaluating the 
latter anti-inflation technique. When statistics reveal 
that the upward price spiral beg an to subside in March, 
1951, the same period that the accord was entered into and 
the inauguration of the VCRP was established, it becomes 
difficult if not impossible to determine the effectiveness 
of either of these two counter inflationary step s . But, it 
will be seen later that in the opinions of certain groups 
with specific financial interests that the accord played a 
substantial role in the war upon inflation . 
Further, it should be revealed that in early 1951 
there occurred a lull in the inflationary p ressures in the 
economy. This was the result of a saturated consumer demand 
for durable g oods and the e x cessive accumulation of inven-
tories by businessmen . Advocates of the VCRP would lik e to 
cred it this lull in the inflation to th e VCRP , but in view 
of the facts cited above and the fact that this voluntary 
p rogram was just getting under-way make this position a 
dubious po s ition to defend . 
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Initial Skepticism . Before entering into the more 
detailed phases of the evaluation found in this chapter, it 
may prove worthwhile to give a few insights into the climate 
of anticipated effectiveness re garding the VCRP that e x isted 
when this tool was thrust into its initial stages of con-
ception . John D. Clark, a member of tre Council of Economic 
Advisers , cooked up a plan in March, 19.51 , that would have 
frozen bank loans at a stated s.um for 30 days. Then , a thaw 
would be gin with loans outstanding held to a maximum in 
relation to previous months or some other similar base 
period . It was said that no Congressional approval would 
be necessary for implementing this plan . The President had 
the power to initiate this scheme by declaring an "emerg ency" 
under the Banking Act of 1933 and the Trading with the Enemy 
Act. Of course, one of the meanings behind the open dis-
c ussion of this plan was its use as a tool to control 
inflation, but its public discussion also had other 
implic ations . One was that it p resented a challenge or 
threat to those working under the VCRP to either make this 
program effective or suffer the consequences of stronger and 
more rig id controls. A second implication was that certain 
p olitical groups held a partial skepticism in re gards to the 
success of the VC RP . The Federal Reserve System as expected 
wa s opposed to this credit freeze device . The Treasury was 
cagey as usual. I t g ave only cautious approval, with a reserve 
thought that the plan be invoked only after the voluntary 
curb on cred it had been give n a chance to succeed or fail. 
Bec a use of this, the VCRP was placed temporarily on trial 
by many skeptics . Actually for the economy in general, 
13 9 
the se stronger plans d id not have to be p laced into commission, 
not because the voluntary mechanism was an overwhelming 
success, but be c ause the inf lationary forces by mi d-year, 
1 951, had s ubsided gr eat ly from the second half, 1950, hyper-
state of strength . J 
At that same time, in Ch i ca g o, Federal Reserve 
Governor R . M. Evans was telling his audience that, 11 the 
voluntary plan wa s no substitute for the additional authority 
the board needs to hold down credit. 11 4 That additional 
authority which was thought to be necessary was a secondary 
reserve plan for the commerci a l banks, but which never 
materialize d as an additional tool of inflation control. 
This was possibly due to the accord which had been reached 
between the Federal Reserve and the Treasury and other 
economic trends which were beg inning to be felt in the 
encounter vis a vis inflation. This brief discussi.on g ives 
some ide a of the skeptical outlook in reg ards to the anti-
cip ated success of the VCRP that e xisted in early 1951. 
3 11 P l anners Ponder Roof on Bank I s Lending if I Volunt ary, 
Curb Fails . 11 Wall Street Journal, 13 7:1, March 17, 19.51. 
4rbid . 
2 . Influential Conditions, Advantages 
and Disadvantages 
Conditions Which Influenced VCRP 1 s Effectiveness . One 
o f the purposes behin d the writing of this paper was t o 
p oint up c ertain cond itions - some inherent and permanent -
some transitional and temp orary - which had imp ortant bearing 
upon the usefulness or value of this voluntary credit control 
mechanism . Certain conditions, both in the economy as a 
whole and a s cha r acteristics of the pro gram per se, have 
been forces which enhanced the effectiveness of the credit 
restr a int program. On the other hand certain other circum-
stances p layed just t he opposite role and had a maleficent 
eff ect upon the VCRP . Listed below are some of the con-
ditions and circumstances whi ch influenced both sides in 
the evaluation of the voluntary credit curb. 
1. The American economy is char acterized by many 
thousands of financial institutions. The VCRP is said to have 
included among its adherents 90 ,000 f inancial institutions 
li sted on the Federal Reserve 1 s publications mailing list. 
This list includes 14 ,000 commerc ial banks, J ,000 investment 
banks , security dealers and brokers, 400 life insurance 
companies and 72 ,600 saving s and loan associations, savings 
banks and other minor financial institutions. These institut i ons 
are of many varying sizes from g i gantic city commercial banks , 
investment houses and nation-wide insurance firms to small 
rural banks , small town security dealers et cetera . They 
are spread over a vast geographical area; one of th e largest 
industrially and financially developed countries in the world. 
Yet, even with modern techniques of communication and trans-
p ortation, certain areas in this vast continental country 
are bound to develop their own idiosyncrasies, concepts of 
re sponsibility, justice and feeling s of membership. Because 
of this characteristic of vastness brought about by the large 
number of financial institutions in this country and their 
geographical location and disbursement, a program of this 
voluntary type depending upon the voluntary cooperation of 
thous ands of private institutions to interpret and respond 
in a similar manner to requests stated in general language, 
was bound to result in a state of mediocrity. This was 
one of the drawbacks to the VCRP . If the American economy 
had been analagous to certain European economies where the 
financial and credit ins titutions are concentrated and few 
in number, then a voluntary program of this nature could 
have been more effective in the latter environment. 
Cooperation and comp liance with certain policies is found 
to be much stronger in a small closely knit group than in 
a larg e group with a multiplicity of members loosely connected 
over a vast g eographic space . Because of such conditions 
found in the financial sphere of the American business 
world, voluntary schemes like the VCRP will suffer greatly 
from this inherent characteristic of the American economy . 
2. A second condition, which is debatable from both 
poles of the argument, is whether a voluntary program similar 
to the one under study here is more forceful in a climate of 
weak inflation pressures or in a climate of strong , hyper-
inflationary forces. An advocate of the first position in 
this argument states : 
Voluntary controls would be adequate under certain 
conditions : (1) if the shortage happened to be temp-
orary, as mi ght occur when demand had been abnormal 
because of unusual factors or when planned increases in 
production, once they became available, would make the 
total supply adequate ; ( 2 ) if production and use happ ened 
to be concentrated in a relatively few companies ••••• 5 
The areument further states that voluntary controls 
are of no use when the going gets rough and the game gets 
tough because the pressures to disregard voluntary schemes 
of restraint are too powerful for such a loosely knit device 
as a VC RP to control. 
The other position in this polemic is taken by those 
who believe that voluntary controls are useful only when 
the heat is on; when inflation has reached its hyper-state. 
The reasons given are that these stronger conditions of 
inflation are necessary to arouse the enthusiasm and interest 
of those taking part in the voluntary effort. They argue 
that an inflation of the "creeping variety 11 is too lifeless 
and drab to bring forth the interest necessary to keep a 
voluntary program alive . "Creeping inflation" tends to be 
discounted and accepted as a normal condition if it is 
allowed to exist for any length of time. It lulls men 1 s 
minds to Morpheus. Also, the 11 intentional" or "creeping 
inflation" advocated by the "inflationists" as a tool or 
policy for keeping the economy on an even keel by making it 
)Ernest A. Tupper , "Guideposts to Industrial Mobilization . 11 
Harvard Business Re view, 28 :38 , November , 1950. 
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possible for business entities to realize inventory profits 
which in turn are designed to lead to investment, employment 
and prosperity, is not intended to be controlled. It is 
induced for a purpose . To control it, would inhibit the 
attainment of this purpose of economic stability . 
3. A condition which is important to a voluntary 
credit restraint mechanism is tha t the inflationary pressures 
must arise in part primarily from the credit sectors of the 
economy. That is, the inflation must be a credit inflation. 
It would be foolish and useless to attempt to control an 
inflation of the price-wage spiral type with credit restraining 
mechanisms. But this is not to say that an inflation of 
the price -wage spiral variety may not set into motion a 
secondary credit inflation growing out of the price-wage 
spiral which would then demand credit restraining gears. 
This problem has to be approached in a pragmatic manner . 
The Korean inflation was propelled mainly at first by the 
exogenous factors of the Communist invasion which led to 
sc are buying and inventory accumulation. This, in turn, 
resulted in a l ar ge expansion of consumer credit and an 
increase in consumer and business dissaving which eventually 
led to a credit inflation. That type of inflation was later 
accompanied by a price-wage spiral ph enomenon . Thus, in this 
light, the ut ilization of the VCRP was a proper step. 
4. A fourth condition, which is imp ort ant to the 
success of a voluntary plan, and as a matter of fact most 
any infla tion controlling tool if it is to result in its 
gre atest effort, is t hat the voluntary mechanism must be i n 
the hands of the administrative officials on a stand-by 
basis ready to be p laced into effect at a moment's notice . 
Any controlling tool cannot give its greatest effort if there 
is a time lag great enough to allow prices, wages and costs 
to rise out of sight before the controls can be placed into 
use . This has been a characteristic of the post World War II 
cold war economy which played havoc with the average Ameri-
can's standard of living . Here , the VCRP is ag ain subject 
to criticism, because the program was not at the onset of 
the Korean inflation nor is it at the moment even near to 
being on a stand-by basis . As it was shown in the last 
chapter, the group interests which had a keen enthusiasm 
about the merits of the program felt that it ought to have 
b'een suspended on a stand- by basis , but these requests fell 
on sealed ears . 
5. An important condition which at first greatly 
enhanced the VCRP and which later partially led to its down-
.fall was clearly expounded upon in the last chapter . This 
is the principle that under a voluntary program all sectors 
of the economy subject to the policies and principles of 
the credit curb must be treated on a fair and equitable 
basis . Or else, if there is allowe d to exist a privileged 
few, then there soon will arise a resentment and a feeling 
of non-membership or inferiority on the part of those still 
subject to the program 1 s control . This will possibly 
result in dissension among the ranks and eventual collapse 
of the whole voluntary effort. This was clearly demonstrated 
in Chapter IV by the State and local g overnments ' relationship 
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to the VCRP in early 1951 when the voluntary pro gram was 
accep ted and became effective in thi s area. But in early 
1952, when just the opposite resulted because of the failure 
to follow this doctrine of no privileged immunity, the VCRP 
th
en began to lose its strength and soon failed . 
6. A sixth and important point which directly 
rel a tes to the evaluation of this program centers around the 
question of the types of credit that the VCRP was designed 
to control. It can be readily seen that this credit control 
curb was solely conc erned with inflation stemming from 
external sources of investment funds . These sources of 
external credit are the commercial banks, investment banks, 
life insurance companies and the savings and loan associations 
and savings bank s; the very financial institutions that the 
VCRP sought to influence under its voluntary technique. 
Aud Yet, when an inquiry is made into the ratio of these 
external sources of credit to the internal sources of credit 
th
at American business enterprises have been tapping, an 
i tnportant fact is revealed. Of the total sources of corporate 
i 
nvestment funds internal sources of corporate f unds have 
' 
run Well over one-half of all sources , excluding sources 
from banks and life insurance companies . 6 Thus, since the 
VCRp was primarily intended to prevent inflation arising 
from external sources of credit expansion rather than 
1 
nterna1 sources, and since more than half of the corporate 
funds - excluding that from banks and life insurance companies -
~ere obtained from internal sources from 1946 to and including 
--------
6Econo~ic Report, January, 1954, P • 217 . 
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the period in which the VCRP was in use; then, this f act 
greatly reduces the propriety and value in using such a 
credit control tool . But it should be remembered that the 
data cited here did not include non-corporate financing and 
sources of corporate and non- corporate funds obtained from 
banks and insurance companies . 
7. The last point which will be dis c ussed here 
is t hat a voluntary program such as the VCRP c an only act 
as a supplement to other general and selective types of 
credit restraint tools . A program of such voluntary nature 
cannot be expected to stand alone and to offer a front line 
attack upon the evils of upward sp iraling prices . Selective 
controls such as Regulat1ons W, X, T or U are designed t o 
operate in one specific area of credit restraint alone . Each 
is designed to fulfill a particular job . The Board of 
Governors in reply to a questionnaire of the Patman Sub-
committee on General Credit Control and Debt Management has 
pointed up some of the difficulties of these types of selective 
controls . 
The comparatively favorable experience of the 
Federal Reserve System in administering selective regu-
lation in the areas of stock market c redit , consumer 
credit , and real estate credit is unique ..... The 
general history of other attempts to restrain infla-
tionary credit expansion through regulation of the amount 
of funds that may be l oaned on particular transactions 
or through impositi on of ceilings on particular cate -
gories of· credit, either in this country or abroad , has 
not been such as to engender great faith in their effi-
cacy. Reasons why these methods have usually failed in 
effectiveness include , among others , the fluidity of the 
credit market , availability of alternative sources of 
funds , the ability to substitute collateral, and the 
difficulty - amounting in many credit areas almost to 
impossibility - of drafting and administering regulations 
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which will accomplish their anti-inflationary objective, 
i.e . to restrain credit expansion without at the same 
time hamp ering unduly extensions of credit essential 
to the functionin g of the economy. 
To be effective, selective regulations of credit 
must relate to an area which is reasonably definable in 
terms of such thing s as the purpose of the credit, the 
collateral for it, or the nature of the credit contract. 
Trade practices should be specialized and ·sufficiently 
standardized so that the regulation can be applied in 
terms of a continuation or extension of those procedures 
rather than a drastic disruption of them • 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
These tests are especially difficult to apply when 
the borrower is a business, and as such is engaged in 
a variety of simultaneous and interrelated operations 
that employ subst antial amounts of credit for varied 
purp oses - for example, to meet payrolls , to acquire 
inventory, to e x tend credit to customers, to pay 
dividends , or expand plant . Moreover, businesses have 
a variety of sources of funds as well as a variety of 
bases on which they may borrow..... Specialized and 
standardized lending practices are not adaptable to 
such credit, but rather loans are closely related to 
the lender's appraisal as to the borrower rs general 
credit-worthiness with terms and conditions tailored to 
fit the individual borrower 1 s needs. To apply selective 
credit re g ulation in such an area it would be necessary 
to impose standard credit terms and procedures in a manner 
which would be especially burdensome and disrupting to 
both lenders and borrowers.7 
In giving an evaluation of the VCRP, the Board of 
Governors has pointed to the contribution that this volun-
tary effort has made in the way of supplementing and reinforcing 
the selective credit controls mentioned above and removing 
some of the difficulties that these credit tools have labored 
under from time to time • 
•••• Its [VCRP1 s] major contribution has been in 
types of lending which are not well suited to the use 
of selective credi t regulation .•••• there are large 
areas of financing in which selective credit regulation 
is neither feasible nor practicable. These areas include 
7 Senate Document , No . 123, Part 1, pp . 403 -404 . 
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for e xamp le, short-and long-term financing by business 
concerns for which the multi-purpose uses of loan pro-
ceeds, as well as the varied terms and conditions under 
which such funds are obtained would pose difficult prob-
lems of administrative definition and compliance. In 
such areas~ the Program has been a most useful restraining 
influence. a 
In any discussion of the program certain over-all 
general advantages and disadvantages should be brought forth 
also . Some h a ve been mentioned previously in relation to 
other matters. But a repetition here will not be too 
superfluous. 
General Advantages of the VCRP . 1. In a n a tion in 
which businessmen value hi ghly their rights to make their oim 
business decisions, a program of the voluntary character of 
the VC RP is more acceptable to this class of the economy. 
2 . The VCRP has a selective character that mandatory 
schemes lack. The policies and principles of the program 
can be narrowed in their application as the economic con-
ditions of the time demand . 
J . Voluntary campaigns for credit control h ave a 
flex ibility difficult to achieve in direct mandatory controls 
of lending . They can be adjusted to reflect conditions among 
the several k inds of lending institutions. The lending 
criteria can be quick ly and easily altered to meet changing 
conditions. 
4. The VCRP besides having the credit restraining 
influences also carries other psychological and educational 
stimuli •. The program ma de the financial interests of the 
country conscious of their duty in the defense effort . There 
8Ibid., p. 4J8 . 
is no quantitative way of knowing how much credit exp ansion 
was turned down at the source of the demand, by the psycho-
log ic al and educational forces of this program, but certainly 
recognition must be made of this imp ortant influence. 
General Disadvantages of the VCRP . 1 . The main 
we a kness lies in the very voluntary nature of the program 
itself. There was no assurance that all the financial 
institutions were willing to cooperate . The general 
character and language of t h e standards left room for 
difference s of interpretat i on which inhibited the effective-
ness of the program. 
2 . Any attempt to "enforce" cooperation may have 
led to monop olistic misuses of the voluntary c amp aign or to 
discrimination ag a inst certain borrowers. 
J . The fact that there was constant f riction between 
p ublic and private financial institutions and that if a 
borrower was r ef used credit in t he latter sphere because 
of the VCRP 1 s policies, he might turn to the former sphere 
and receive his credit extension since many of these p ublic 
institutions were e xemp t from the voluntary program's juris-
dictions. All these factors led to a weakening of this pro-
gram. 
4. Every voluntary effort runs into the difficulty 
that it is likely to lose its force after some time unless 
it is institutionalized . It is not easy over a long period 
to maintain enthusiasm in restricting profit - making activitie s . 
It is, of course, mo s t difficult to mainta in enthusiasm if 
i t burns out tha t some lenders disregard the p rogram and 
secure a great deal of new business at the cost of those 
who are cooperative. 
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5. Instead of ti ghtening the reg ulations when there 
was evidence of non-coop eration, this voluntary program could 
only loosen the string s in hopes of preventing further non-
coop eration. This was exemplified by the issuance and 
revisions of the real estate bulletins which has been 
previously referred to in Chapter IV. 
6 . The doctrine of "the sanctity of contract" 
which has long been accepted in the English and Americ an 
law as being a valid and just rule of law prevented the 
VCRP from fulfilling a greater achievement. This was re-
vealed by the case of the life insurance companies . Because 
these financial concerns had entered contracts in advance 
to supply funds to their various borrowers, these credit 
commitments first had to be worked off before the policies 
of the VCRP could become effective as an anti-inflatiorary 
tool in this area . This took from six to twelve months, 
greatly nullifying the initial effectiveness of this volun-
tary curb. 
7. There is also the psychological factor which 
characterizes most voluntary programs composed of many 
thousands of members. This characteristic is the lack of 
perfect knowledge or the presence of imperfect knowledge 
due to poor or the complete absence of communication between 
the members of such a voluntary plan . Any single institution 
cannot definitely know that the other thousands of insti tutions 
are fulfilling their voluntary obligations in following the 
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policies of such a program . The presence of imperfect 
knowledge then creates suspicions and fears in the minds of 
the officials of the individual institutions which make up 
the membership of the program. From this relationship, 
then, there arises a psychological state of distrust on the 
institutional level, which eventually may lead to non-
comp liance with the entire policies of the program . The 
feeling is that such and such institution is not obeying the 
principles of the voluntary scheme, so why should our 
institution be subject to such p olicy ramifications. This 
type of think ing multiplied by all or a major part of the 
membership of the program soon culminates in complete 
collapse of this type of control altogether . This condition 
under which the VCRP operated is analagous to certain basic 
characteristics found in economic the ory. It is known that 
under the oligopolistic form of industry organization 
there exists almost perfe ct knowledge because of the small 
number of members in the indus try. But under pure compe -
tition, the fact that the industry is composed of a multi -
plicity of ·members means that there cannot exi s t perfect 
knowledg e . Thus voluntary agreements in a pure competitive 
industry cannot be too effective. This is not to say that 
the financial industries in the United States are org anized 
on a pure comp etitive basis. But due to the thousands of 
institutions in these industries, imperfect knowledg e does 
exist . This condition inhibited the VCRP from being a 
p rimary force a gainst inflation. 
3. Opinions 
If there is one thing that the VCRP can boast of 
having , it is a g ood ly supp ly of op inionated support . 
Everyone connected with the program and those with only 
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a slight acquaintance were willing to express themselves 
favorabl y on the scheme. The evaluation of the voluntary 
technique can be concisely described as being long on 
favorable opinions but too short on statistical data to give 
streng th to these opinions. Everywhere one searches for 
material to use in evaluation purposes he encounters the 
same familiar phrase found as a qualification to most all 
favorable opinions . That phrase is, 11 In my opinion the 
pro gram has had favorable results, although exact standards 
by which the program can be valued are lacking . " By "exact 
standards", it was meant precise, reliable statistical data . 
With this in mind, then, there will be presented only a few 
of such opinions which in the writer I s viewpoint are the 
most reliable . Some are personal, others groupal and some 
rather broad and general in nature . They were not h owever 
selected in any attempt to slant the evaluation being pre -
sented here . 
Two Federal Reserve Bank Presidents . Delos C. Johns, 
of St . Louis, a President of the Federal Reserve Bank has 
given his personal opini on as to the effectiveness of the 
VCRP as follows : 
The voluntary credit - restraint program has been taken 
quite seriously in the eighth Federal Reserve District ••••• 
•••• it is not p ossible to measure prec isely what the 
program has ac c omplished in the eighth district . It i s 
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noteworthy , however , tbat total loans at all member banks 
in the distri ct rose just $86 million from the end of May 
1 951 to the end of October 1951, as compared with an 
increase of $276 million in the like period of 1950, 
and a 3 year (1947-49) averag e gain for the same period 
o.f $146 million . 
It is also noteworthy that the record of business-
loan changes at large district banks indicates some 
channeling of credit to defense activities and away 
from non-defense activitie s . In the 5 months (June-
November 1951) new credits for defense contracts at 
these banks totaled $16 million and for defense -
supporting activities totaled $31 million. In the same 
p eriod the net increase in outstanding business loans 
of these banks to all non-defense activities was just 
,, 56 million ( less than expected on seasonal grounds .) 
While the defense loan figure is not large, it should 
be recognized that defense contracts in this district 
have lagged behind the amount that might have been 
expected given the districtrs prop ortion of national 
industrial capacity.9 
Another personal opinion of a Federal Reserve Bank 
president is that o.f Ray M. Gidney: 
• ••• I believe that the voluntary credit-restraint 
program bas made a real ly significant contribution to 
economic stability. The program is collateral to other 
anti-inflationary actions and depends on volunt ary and 
enthusiastic support of lenders. This suggests certain 
limitations on its use. Lenders must be satisifed that 
genuine efforts by monetary, fiscal, and debt-management 
authorities in particular, and all agencies of the Govern-
ment generally , are being made to mitigate inf l ationary 
forces as much as possible and to cope with them where 
they exist. Relying as the program does, in large part, 
on enthusiasm and patriotic appeal, it cannot be long 
sustained in the face of policies which do not support 
the efforts of the participants.10 
Board of Governors. The Patman Subcommittee has 
obtained the joint opinion of the Board of Governors as to 
the role of the VCRP under four different conditions: 
9
senate Document, No . 123, Part 2 , pp. 735-736. 
lOibid., p. 717. 
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(a) when the Treasury is not expected to be a large borrower 
in the for e seeable future; (b) when a large volume of 
Treasury refunding operations will have to be effected in 
the foreseeable future; (c) when it is expected that the 
Treasury will be a large net borrower during the foreseeable 
future; and (d) under conditions of total war. 
Given below is the Board of Governors' reply to this 
question: 
If a voluntary program of credit restraint is to 
be undertaken with chance of widespread acceptance and 
support on the part of lenders, several basic conditions 
in the economy would seem to be required: (a) a highly 
inflationary condition evidenced by a fairly sharp increase 
in commodity prices; (b) widespread and growing speculative 
fever; (c) rapid expansion of private credit; and (d) 
vigorous use of general credit restraints, supplemented 
by use of selective credit regulation in those specific 
areas where experience shows such regulation can be 
effective. Under this combination of circumstances, the 
dangers of inflation and the need for restraining the 
growth of credit can be set forth with sufficient 
directness and force to engender a substantial willingness 
to cooperate on the part of lending institutions. In the 
absence of these conditions, it is likely to be difficult 
to arouse widespread interest among the financial community 
and to enlist the real measure of general acceptance and 
support without which a voluntary effort will not achieve 
substantial success. These basic conditions were present 
in the months following the outbreak of the Korean war 
and doubtless contributed to the achievements of the 
Voluntary Credit Restraint Program. 
Price and credit developments in the economy, rather 
than the Treasury fiscal outlook, are thus the real bench-
marks for appraising the need for a voluntary effort at 
credit restraint. As was the case in the second half of 
1950, highly inflationary conditions may develop in the 
economy in the face of a balanced budget. Thus, even 
under conditions when the outlook may be for no significant 
amount of new Treasury borrowing, there may be an important 
role to be played by a voluntary program of credit re-
straint. On the other hand, given the same Treasury out-
look, conditions in the price and credit sectors of the 
economy may evidence no significant upward trend of prices 
and no rapid expansion of credit, and· hence little reason 
for attempting to curtail credit expansion. 
The appropriateness of a program of voluntary credit 
restraint under conditions when the Treasury is facing 
f 
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substantial requirements for new money would likewise 
dep end up on underlying conditions in the economy . If 
the large Treasury deficit arises out of substantial 
unemp loyment or reflects a conscious effort on the part 
of the authorities to resuscitate the economy through 
deficit spending , a program of credit restraint aimed at 
curbing the exp ansion of private credit would obviously 
run counter to the objectives of governmental policy . 
Given these basic conditions in the economy, the need 
mi ght well be envisaged in terms of credit expansion and 
the encouragement of spending , rather than the reverse . 
The prospect of large Treasury deficits in the midst 
of practically full utilization of resources of p lant 
capacity and labor and reflecting a substantial incre as e 
in the level of Government spending, especially on arma-
ment, poses an entirely different set of problems . Under 
these conditions, governmental policy should be designed 
to limit credit exp ansion, to channel credit into necessary 
uses, and to direct credit away from nonessential purposes -
all of which are the underlying objective of the Program 
for Voluntary Credit Restraint . Such a program could 
assist and supp lement other anti-inflation policies . 
Under the conditi ons likely to prevail in the world 
for some time to come, a prospective large Treasury de-
mand for new money enhances the possibility of a resur-
gence of inflationary pressures . It also poses for the 
governmental authorities the problem of maintaining a 
market situation conducive to the sale of Government 
securities without creating an environment favorable to 
the rap id and easy expansion of private credit . Faced 
with these prospects, it would seem appropriate to have 
ava ilable some program of voluntary credit restraint; 
such a program could be of help to the fiscal and mone-
tary authorities in coping with their vexing problems. 
To the ex tent that the expansion of private credit is 
voluntarily restrained, more funds will be available 
for investment in Government securities on the part of savings 
institutions . Also, restraint in lending will mean less 
liquidation of Government obligations by bank and nonbank 
holders in an effort to build up their lending power . I n 
turn, this assists the Treasury in its financing operations 
and the Federal Reserve System in its use of general credit 
and monetary measures. 
Under conditions of total war, there would be a 
pressing need to channel all available resources of men, 
machines , materials, and credit into war and essential 
civilian activities . Strenuous measures would be required 
to minimize the upward pressure on prices and to curb 
the expansion of credit . Substantial reliance would be 
~laced u~on direct controls over manpower , materials, 
~nventories, construction, and other forms of c apital 
investment and up on the use of credit for selected pur-
poses . Even with these comprehensive direct controls , 
however, underlying inflationary pressures would be very 
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strong and the problem of inflation would be so serious 
as to warrant the use of many and varied instruments of 
economic and credit control . Under these conditions a 
program of voluntary credit restraint would be an appropriate 
and useful supplementary measure, limiting the use of 
credit to essential purposes would he l p to curb the upward 
pressure on the prices of scarce resources and would help 
to increase the effectiveness of other restrictive measures . 
Experience with the Program shows that two related 
observations deserve special emphasis . The first is that 
a program of voluntary credit restraint is most useful 
only under conditions of pronounced inflationary pressure 
which reflect a large defense program, war , or similar 
emergency conditions. Under more normal situations 
reliance should be confined to the use of other credit 
instruments, especially general credit measures . 
The second conclusion is that if a voluntary program 
is to be of real effectiveness, it must be used in con-
junction with other restrictive credit policies of both a 
general and selective character . A voluntary program is 
not a p anacea, nor will its contribution be of much 
significance unless it is so supported . A restrictive 
general credit policy is necessary to establish an en-
vironment and set of conditions under which financial 
managements will have less desire to pursue aggressive 
lending policies . Also , selective credit controls, in 
the limited areas in which their use is appropri a te , help 
to keep the objectives of a voluntary credit program within 
feasible scope . Given these conditions, a program of 
voluntary credit restr aint can make a unique contribution 
to the objectives of over-all credit restraint by helping 
to channel available credit into defense and other 
essential activities.11 
Federal Reserve Bank Presidents . The Patman Sub -
committee also put bef ore the presidents of the Federal 
Reserve Banks the s ame question that was asked of the Board 
of Governors , that is, to evaluate the role of the VCRP under 
the f our conditions involved in that question. Their joint 
reply is presented below: 
The voluntary credit-restraint program is another 
of the types of credi t control that should be considered 
as supplementary to the basic general credi t and monetary 
measures •• ... 
11s enate Document, No . 123 , Part 1 , pp. 448-450 . 
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I f the Treasury is not to be a large borrower in the 
market in the foreseeable f uture and if other forces 
i nf l uencing the mar ket are not such as to bring about an 
over-all inflationary situation, it might be assumed that 
0 eneral credit and monetary measures were satisfactorily 
ef fec t ive, and the imp ortance of the voluntary credit-
restrain t progr am as a restrictive measure would be 
rela tive ly small. Under such condi t ions i t could be 
assumed that banks were ex tending credit in such a manner 
a s not to induce inflationary or speculative developments. 
If Treasury financing operations were of an inflationary 
character, and if general credit and monetary measures 
were exerting an effective restraint up on the over- all 
availability of credit, the importance of a voluntary 
credit-restraint program would be increased because it 
would provide gui dance to banks f or the allocation of 
t hat limited credi t supp l y in the national interest . 
The app licabilit y and the role of the voluntary credit-
restr aint program cannot be tied exclusively to Treasury 
f inancin _ operations but should be related to the full 
set of inflationary f orces influencing the market and 
their strength . Moreover, in view of the wholly volun-
tary character of this program, a reasonably effective 
general credit and monetary policy probably is necessary 
to a ssure its successf ul operation. 
The app licability and the role of the voluntary credit-
restraint program and the organization that has been set 
up to administer that program might become very important 
under conditions of total war. If under these conditions 
it was decided that credit rationing was necessary, as 
a supplement to the general credit and monetary measures, 
it could be administered much more efficiently , with less 
inflexibility and less inequi. ty, through existing groups 
such as the national and re gional voluntary credit-re s traint 
committees than through a centralized governmental body, 
assuming that the authority granted to the committees -
appropriately supervise d - and the governmental agency 
was the same . In other words , if additional authority 
were given to the voluntary credit-restraint committees 
in the event of total war, these committees, wi t h such 
modifications and additions as might prove necessary, 
should be able to serve effectively in directing the 
de gree of credit rationing that might feasibly be imp osed 
on the banking system.12 
Commercial Banks . In a questionnaire sent to a sample 
of 8 00 bank s by the Patman Subcommittee requesting a discus sion 
of the factors which contributed to the changes in their 
12 Senate Document, No. 123, Part 2 , pp . 71 6-717. 
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investment and lending policies , and their evaluation of the 
relative importance of each factor, special consideration was 
reques t ed for the following factors: (a) Increases in 
short-term interest rates, (b) declines in pric es of long-
term Government loans, (c) increases in reserve requirement s 
around the turn of the year, (d) moral suasion (including 
t h e voluntary credit restraint program), (e) changes in 
prices and in the business outlook. Replies were received 
in all from 208 separate institutions. After the replies 
were collated by the Patman Subcommittee staff , the following 
summation was given: 
The factor rated most influential in the largest 
number of replies susceptible to specific tabulation was 
the voluntary credit restraint program. Most bankers 
s tated that they approved of this program and that they 
were complying with it fully. Many stated, however, that 
their lending policies were sufficiently conservative so 
that their loans all fell within the range of the volun-
tary credit restraint program in any event. (In some such 
cases there may have been a failure to rea1ize the poten-
tial differences in criteria for the evaluation of loans 
on the basis of their individual soundness as compared 
with that of their conformity to the voluntary credit 
restraint program.) 1J 
The second f actor rated as nex t in influence was, 
changes in prices and in the business out.look; third, 
increases in short-term interest rates; fourth, declines in 
the long-term prices of Government securities and last, that 
changes in reserve requirements had only a negligible inf luence. 14 
lJibid., p. 1148 . 
14Ibid., p. 1149. 
The writer feels that some comment should be made 
upon t h is s urvey of the commerci a l bank ers 1 evaluation of 
the VCRP . The placing of the Voluntary Credit Restraint 
Prog r am first as the most important force which brought 
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about chang es in commerc ial bank lending and investing p olicies 
ahead of the strong er influences leaves a student of economics 
skeptical of the merits of this sample of opinion . It will 
be noticed that the increase in the reserve requirements 
which occurred in January, 1951 , was given the last position . 
It is true that excess reserves held by the commercial 
banks had been built up in early January, 1951, but never-
theless, a control as strong as an increase in the reserve 
requirements would appear to have received a higher position 
in relation to the weaker types of credit c ontrol . This is 
not to say that there was any deliberate attempt to falsify 
the veracity of the replies, but it is certainly evident 
that the commercial bankers were striving for the weaker 
types of control vis a vis the stronger,centrally controlled 
means of fi ghting inflation. A policy for which they can 
usually always be relied upon to espouse . 
Insurance Company Executives. In the sphere of life 
insurance companies, the Patman Subcommittee has turned up 
some interesting data concerning the effect of the VCRP up on 
their financial policies and the inflati on situation in 
g eneral . Questions were submitted to 42 life insurance 
c omp any executives . Replies were received from 38 . These 
e xe cutives were asked to describe the changes, if any, in 
their policies with respec t to holdings of United States 
securities, corporate securities and mortgages since June, 
1950 . They were asked : 
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If your policy during this period has changed, 
evaluate roughly the relative importance of (a) changes 
in the relative attractiveness as investments of the 
different clas ses of securities, (b) changed Federal 
regulations with respect to mort gages , (c) moral suasion, 
directly or indirectly, by the Federal Reserve System 
(including the voluntary credit restraint program), 
(d) the emergency of potential capital losses on United 
States secui~ities in your portfolio, and (e) other 
factors, in bringing about the change in policy.15 
The summary by the subcommittee staff revealed that: 
Most company executives replied that no change had occurred 
in their general investment policy from June , 1950, to the 
time this sample was taken. By this, they meant that no 
change had occurred in their over-all policy. Several stated 
that April, 1951, was more significant than June, 1950 . From 
June, 1950, to April, 1951, they had been disposing of 
Government securities because, (1) a more attractive return 
could be obtained on other securities and (2 ) they were 
disposing of Government 1 s in order to meet industrial 
expansion under the defense program because a backlog of 
mortgage commitments caused many to dispose of these 
securities in the second half of 1950 and early 1951. The 
significance of the April, 1951, date was the Treasury-Federal 
Reserve accord which caused a reluctance to incur the capital 
losses which would have been involved in further sales . 16 
15Ibid ., pp. 1234-1235 . 
16rbid. 
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In reply to inquiries about the VCRP, all companies 
indicated they had cooperated fully with the program and 
thought that it had been a genuine aid in combating inflation . 
Several pointed out that they had frequently rejected loans 
as not in compliance with the program . "However, several 
companies noted that, despite general complianc e with the 
program, it has had little effect on their investments because 
the supply of investment outlets which are in accord with 
the program has been adequate to meet their needs . 111 7 In 
other words, the insurance companies had not been under 
pressure to force violation of the program . 
Council of Ec onomic Advisers . The Council of 
Economic Advisers to the President was also called into the 
picture to give their estimate of the worth of the VCRP . 
The Patman Subcommmittee asked the CEA to "discuss and 
evaluate the Voluntary Credit Restraint Program which was 
initiated in the spring of 1951. 1118 The Council ' s reply 
was that it was diffic ult to evaluate in quantitative terms 
this program ' s worth, and that while the rate of loans has 
been lower since initiation of the program than during the 
previous comparable year, it was impossible to measure 
specific contributions . '.I1he period the program became 
effective -
was the period during whi ch a substantial change in 
inventory a ccumulation took place . The first 12 months 
17Ibid . , p . 12J7 . 
18Ibid . , p . 868 . 
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after the Korean attack was for the most part a period of 
rapid inventory accumulation which slowed down substantially 
during the second half of 1951 . What happened to bank 
loans during the last six months of 1951 was probably 
more the result than the cause of the chang e in inventory 
accumulation, in view of the softening of retail markets 
that developed. Nevertheless , there seems to be general 
a greement among observers that the Voluntary Credit 
Restraint Program has made lenders and borrowers aware 
of the desirability of restraint, and it seems to be a 
fair g uess that without that program there would have 
been greater loan e xpansion.19 
The CEA went on to state that : 
The Federal Reserve System has instituted a reporting 
system which shows chang es in commercial and industrial 
loans on a sample basis, broken down by the purposes for 
which the borrower uses the money . For 7 months through 
October 31, 1951, loans for defense contracts were 
expanded by about $550 million; for defense-supporting 
activities, by $620 million. The aggregate net increase 
in classified loans extended by banks included in the 
sample amounted to $1,900 million . Of this increase, 
approximately 29 percent was for purposes of financing 
defense contracts; 32 percent for financing defense-supporting 
activities; 39 percent for financing nondefense activities. 
Net loans extended to commodity dealers were reduced by 
$27 million during this period. The fact that more than 
one-third of the increase in total loans was for nondefense 
purposes, and that loans to commodity dealers were again 
on the rise, is undoubtedly in large part a reflection 
of the normal seasonal increase in the demand for credit 
and not an indication of the failure of the Voluntary 
Credit Restraint Program. 2 0 
More will be said about this particular statistical 
sample later in this chapter . Concluding the Council of 
Economic Advisers remarked : 
Summing up the achievements and the limitations 
of the Voluntary Credit Restraint Program, we believe--
although we cannot offer quantitative proof--that the 
prog ram has contributed to holding down bank loan 
19Ibid . 
20rbid . 
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exp ansion and, to some extent, to diverting funds from 
less essential to more essential usage . But we do not 
believe that any voluntary program could be heavily 
relied on to be sufficiently effective if the pressures 
for credit expansion should assume much larger prop or-
tions over a prolonged period . As previously indicat ed , 
the effectiveness of the program to some extent depends 
on supp lementary measures f or more effective general 
control, continuing measures of mandatory selective 
control such as those related to real estate and con-
sumer installment credit. 
While we fe e l it is our duty to point out the 
limit a tions of the program, we do not wish to under-
rate either the patriotic spirit of cooperation with 
which the program is being carried forward, or the present 
usefulness of the program . 21 
There will be no over-all refutation of these 
opinions presented here, although some app ear to be open to 
rebuttal . They were presented in the light of giving 
vari ous viewpoints .from sectors which were closely connected 
with the VC RP and which had the opportunity of observing 
the voluntary curb at .first hand. The opinions are open to 
criticism on the grounds of being prejudicial; the writer 
makes no attemp t to cover this fact . Reason for the lack of 
a more comprehensive coverage of opinions is due to the 
absence of this voluntary technique from discussion in the 
journals of political economy . 
4. Statistical Data 
In the use of statistical data as rein.forcements 
behind the foregoing opinions and as evidence in themselves, 
the same qualifications and conditions must be kept in mind 
in relation to statistical evidence as those pointed out 
earlier in t his chap t er when the subject of an evaluation 
was .first approached. 
21Ibid., pp . 870-8 71. 
16l~ 
Lif e Insurance Companies . The Life Insurance Asso-
ciation of America has compiled an interesting table of 
data which directly bears upon this evaluation. These data 
are presented in Table VIII . From this, drawn from report s 
submitted by 45 life insurance companies whose combined assets 
represente d 85 percent of all life insurance company assets, 
it can be ascertained that the VCRP had a salutary effect 
on the outstanding commitments of the life insurance com-
panies. It should also be kept in mind that this program 
di d not interfere with 11 the sanctity of contract" doctrine . 
That is, there was no attemp t to reduce the size of commit-
ments outstanding made prior to the initation of the pro-
gram for which the insurance firms had made contracts to 
supply investment funds . Reductions in commitments and the 
allocation of credit from nondefense industries to defense 
and defense supporting industries was confined to future 
transactions . Because of this position, the past commit -
ments of these life insurance companies could not be drasti -
cally reduced . If this reduction had been allowed, because 
of the disregard of "the sanctity of contract" doctrine, this 
would have made the VCRP more effective as an inflation 
controlling device . But in actuality , the reductions in 
commitments for nonessential purposes and the increase in 
commitments for essential purposes had to be confined to 
future -financing which did not involve the doctrine of " the 
sanctity of contract . 11 The working off of past inventory 
commitments and the allocation of new credit into essential 
and nonessential purposes proved to be a slow process . 
TABLE VIII 
OUTSTANDING COMMITMENTS OF LIFE I NSURANCE COMPANIES 
TO ACQUIRE LOANS AND INVESTMENTS FOR DEFENSE 
AND NON- DEFENSE PURP OSES1 
(In millions of dollars) 
' 
End of 
month Total Defense and Defense Supporting 
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-· Public Rail- Other Business 
Total Utility road and I ndustry 
1951-
AprilJ 4, 50L~ 1,687 383 300 1,005 
May3 4 , 331 1, 677 450 298 928 
June3 4,197 1,760 446 309 1,005 
J uly3 4 ,055 1,757 450 297 1, 011 
August3 3 ,749 1,642 409 286 947 
September 3 , 928 1,706 407 236 1,063 
October 4,037 1, 867 395 204 1, 268 
November 4,394 2 ,112 353 192 1, 567 
De cember 
1952-
I 4 , 175 2,019 310 170 1, 539 
January 4,144 1,983 302 137 1, 544 
February ·4 ,101 2 ,111 419 158 1, 534 
March L~, 090 2 , 211 508 1~. 1, 559 
April 4 ,157 2 ,181 512 1.58 1, 511 
(c ont i nued on next page ) 
166 
TABLE VIII (continued) 
Non - Defense 
To others, on real e state mortgages! 
Non- Farm Residential 
Ratio of 
St ate , Non-defense to 
To V.A. F .H. A. Count y , defense and 
Business Guar- In- Conven- & Muni - defense s up -
Total & Industry Farm Total ante ed sured tional cipal porting2 
2 ,709 963 99 1,648 650 6L~9 349 108 1. 6 :1 
2 , 564 93 7 88 1,.539 577 619 342 91 1 . 5 :1 
2 , 362 831 83 1,447 531 594 322 76 1.3 :1 
2 , 221 752 80 1,390 484 566 340 77 1. 2 :1 
2, 053 744 80 1 , 229 402 509 317 54 1 . 3 :1 
2 ,163 918 83 1,162 365 490 307 59 1. 3 : 1 
2 ,119 945 96 1,078 316 452 310 51 1.1:1 
2, 238 955 98 1,186 276 437 473 44 1.1:1 
2 ,111 1007 107 997 270 417 311 44 1 .1: 1 
2 ,114 1053 99 962 257 409 295 46 1 .1: 1 
1,937 969 102 866 222 346 298 5L~ . 91 :1 
1, 842 901 88 852 205 332 315 37 . 82 : 1 
1,946 980 85 881 200 352 329 31 . 91:1 
' 
1Note - Data for 45 companies , which account for 85 
percent of the assets of all U. S . lif e insur anc e companies; 
they were initiated by the Lif e Insurance Association of 
Americ a in accordance with the Program for Voluntary Credit 
Re str aint. 
2column computed and included by the writer. 
3Excludes busines s mortgage loans of l es s than $100,000 
each and forei gn investments which were not reported until 
Sep tember, 1951 . 
Source : Federal Reserve Bulletin 
167 
As seen from Table VIII, total outstanding commit-
ments in April, 1951, were approximately 4.5 billion dollars. 
Of this amount about 1.7 billion dollars was classfied 
as defense and defense supporting , 2.7 billion dollars as 
non-defense and .1 billion dollars for State, 
count y and mun i cipal governments. Non-defense to defense 
and defense supp orting commitments were in the ratio of 
1.6 to 1. By October, 1951, when total outstanding commit-
ments had declined to 4.1 billion dollars, total defense 
and defense supporting commitments had increased to 1.9 
billion dollars, while total non-defense commitments had 
declined to 2.1 bill ion dollars. The ratio of non-defense 
to defense and defense supporting commitments had fallen to 
1.1 to 1. In March of 1952, when total outstanding commit-
ments had leveled off at approximately 4.1 billion dollars, 
total defense and defense supporting commitments had 
increased to 2 .2 billion dollars, while total non-defense 
commitments were down to 1 . 8 billion dollars. The ratio 
of non-defense to defense and defense supporting commitments 
had reached a low of . 82 to 1. In other words, defense 
commitments were greater than non-defense commitments, but 
only after the passage of a 10 month period. Whether all of 
this shift in the outstanding commitments of this sample of 
45 life insurance companies from nonessential uses to essential 
uses can be credited to the VCRP is still a moot question, 
since in the light of the above opinions of certain insurance 
company executives that the insurance firms were finding all 
the outlets they needed for the funds they held without the 
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VCRP's influence. But surely, some of the credit can go to 
that technique of defense effort promotion and inflation 
control. As to how much credit was directed to useful pur-
poses by that tool, it i s impossible to say precisely . 
In the matter of commitments to State and local 
g overnments, Table VIII shows that the commitments to these 
g overnmental bodies declined steadily from a high of 108 
million dollars in April, 1951, to a low in April, 1952, of 
31 million dollars. But the data for these commitments to 
g overnments are not broken down into the defense and non-
defense cate gories, leaving the question of the VC RP 1 s 
effectiveness up in the air insofar as this area of finance 
is concerned. Another interesting facet found in this table 
is that the V. A. guaranteed and F.H.A. insured commitments 
declined by roughly two-thirds and one-half respectively. 
This is the area where the private and public . financial 
a gencies had clashed and a great amount of friction had 
been g enerated under the VCRP. 
Commercial Banks . A second statistical table, 
Table I X, has been offered as evidence in the evaluation of 
the VCRP, this time by the. commercial banking sphere of 
finance. This table is a sample taken from 220 weekly 
reporting member banks, which held about 95 percent of the 
total commercial and industrial loans of all weekly reporting 
member banks and about 70 percent of those of all commerci al 
banks. The table reveals the changes in these loans by 
purpose and by classified industry. 
Time 
Period 
1951-
April 
to 
June 
July 
to 
Dec. 
1952-
Jan. 
to 
Mar . 
' 
TABLE I X 
CHANGES IN COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL LOANS1 
(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) 
(- INDICATES NET DECREASE) 
Business of the Borrower 
Manufacturing and Mining 
• Petroleum I Food, Textiles Metal & Chemicals 
Liquor & App arel & Metal Coal and 
Tobacco Leather Prods . Rubber Other 
- 243 116 275 48 60 
932 -361 873 125 141 
-422 17 949 192 56 
l 
Trade 
Whsle. 
and 
Retail 
62 
16 
-124 
Business of Borrower (cont, d .) Purpose of Loans 
Public Net Defense & 
Sales Util . Con- Changes Defense 
Finance ( inc 1. struction Classi- Support- Non-
Companies transp.) and other fied ing Defense 
63 175 52 186 399 - 56 
JO 351 -61 2769 1131 1641 
-325 -8 
-74 -74 607 -680 
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Commodity 
Dealers 
-L~21 
722 
-333 
Net changes 
Classified 
343 
2773 
-74 
1sample includes about 220 weekly reporting member banks, 
which hold about 95 percent of total commercial and industrial loans 
of all weekly reporting banks and about 70 percent of those of all 
commercial banks. 
Source : Federal Reserve Bulletin 
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Not much can be drawn from the breakdown of loans 
into various classifications by industries since the classi-
fication is too general . If the classifications had been in 
greater detail, then, it would have been easier to dis-
tinguish between which loans were essential and which were 
not, thus giving a closer indication as to the effectiveness 
of the VCRP in this sphere of finance . As the table is pre-
sented, the breakdown is already given, thus it has to be 
assumed that the classifications between defense and non-
defense loans were made correctly. Concentrating on the 
"Purpose of loans 11 section of Table IX, it is seen that there 
was a decline in non-defense commercial and industrial loans 
of 56 million dollars outstanding , while defense and defense 
supporting loans increased 399 million dollars from April 
to June, 1951 . This would indicate an initial success 
for the VCRP . But the figures from July to December of that 
same year dampen the enthusiasm behind these initial plaudits 
for the voluntary action program . From July to December, it 
is seen that the defense and defense supporting commercial 
and industrial loans increased by 1,131 million dollars, 
but in this same period non- defense loans increased by 1,641 
million dollars . This time period, July to December, 1951, 
covered what some observers felt would reveal the true 
effectiveness of the VCRP and present this program with its 
first true test . 
Business Week stated in September, 1951, that the 
tough test was then on for the VCRP. It pointed up the 
f act that bank loans to business did level out after mid-
March, 1951, but were now on the up grade . That in March, 
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the program went into effect at the time of the Federal 
Reserve-Treasury accord; that in March, consumer buying had 
tapered off and that 11 •••• a sligh t but noticeable recession 
was foun d in many industries with inventories in those fields 
be ginning to look top-heavy. 11 22 It went on to say: 
So the se factors make the August-September upswing 
in business loans •••• look more and more like VCRts 
first major test. 
The national committee of the VCR has been keeping 
tabs on the loan portfolios of a large sampling of big 
national banks . It is bre ak ing these loans down by 
purpose and by type of business. Latest fi gures show 
that nondefense loans are building up at a faster pace . 
In the New York area, first to be heard from for 
the wee k ended Sep tember 12 , business loans of all 
types increased faster than in any week since last 
February . And it is estimated that abQut two-thirds 
of these are for nondefense purposes . 23 
Business Week went on to raise several questions: 
Is this advance i n nondefense loans more than 
seasonal - in other words, has inflation of bank 
credit started again? People at the Federal Reserve, 
who are in the best position to know, get evasive when 
you press them on this point . There ts a feeling that 
their seasonal adjustment factors - and everyone else ' s -
aren ' t very good. 
VCR has been fairly easy to carry out as long as 
the heat was off. But what happens when U. S . business-
men begin feeling that their inventories are too small 
and start going again to their bankers for loans to 
increase inventory? What will the bankers s ay when 
their g ood customers want to buy materials on a big 
scale to stock up against future shortages? 24 
It appears that the answers to these questions lie 
in the fact that in the second hal f of 1951 non-def ense loans , 
22 11 New Loan Rise Tests Credi t Restra int." Bus i ne ss 
Week, September 22 , 1951, pp . 148-150. 
2J rbid. 
24rbi d . 
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as classified by the commercial banks, made a tremendous 
increase in the face of the VCRP , after previously having 
declined in early 1951 . This was a blow to the foundation 
of this self-restraining method of fighting inflation. But 
in the next period, January to March , 1952, non- defense loans 
declined by 680 million dollars enough to offset the increase 
in defense loans of 607 million dollars by 73 million 
dollars, reducing the pressures on credit expansion and in 
turn inflationary pressures . These violent and erratic 
fluctuations in the quantity of the outstanding non-defense 
loans of this sample could have been due to se asonal 
causes, but they more vividly point to the further difficulty 
of arriving at an evaluation of this program . 
Investment Banks . The third important financial 
group , the investment bankers who played an important role 
under the Voluntary Credit Restraint Program, ha s offered 
s omething in the way of statistical evidence which is in-
tended to cast more favorable light upon the success of the 
VCRP . Table X, offered as evidence, is rather sket chy , as 
much of the data have been which dealt with this credit control 
tool . It covers the time period , March to November 15, 1951 , 
thus not taking into ac c ount the last five months of the 
exis t ence of the voluntary credit curb . The tabl e is 
desi gned to point out the number and dollar amounts of loans 
screened and the disposition of such cases under the prin-
ciples of the VCRP . 
Of the 1 , 321 loan applications screened by the four 
re g ional committees representing the investment banking 
TABLE X 
REGIONAL COM]vlIT'I'EE SCREENINGS OF INVl!.:STMJ:!liJ"T BANKS 
(MARCH TO NOVEMBER 15, 1951) 
No . of 
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Loan Total 
Appli - No . of Total No . of Approved 
cations Total in Loans Deferred Loans in 
District Screened. Millions Deferred in Millions App roved Millions 
--· 
Mid-
western 456 $574 35 :$74 421 4~450 
San 
Francisco 64 371 o-··-" 72 6L~ 299 
Dallas 330 170 23 68 307 152 
New York 471 1,704 8 104 463 1,600 
---· 
Total 1,321 66 $318 1,255 .$2 ,501 
-::-Reductions 
Source : Rudolf Smutny , "Investment Banking and the 
Credit Restraint Program." Commercial and Financial Chroncile, 
174: 21 , De cember 6, 1951 . 
financial field only 66 were deferred. This is roughly 5 percent 
of the total number screened. In dollar amounts, the total 
number of loans screened in this time period was valued at 
2, 819 million dollars; the 66 deferred loans had a dollar 
value of 318 million dollars . The percentage of deferred 
applications of total loans screened in dollar value was 11 
percent, somewhat of an improvement over the percentage of 
deferred applications to total creening s on the numerical 
basis. But still, the statist ical data are too sketchy and 
fuzzy to allow any weight to be attached to their significant 
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bearing on the evaluation under study here . 
Summary o~ the Statistical Data. The above empirical 
arguments presented by the three principal financial groups 
which found themselves laboring under the VCRP ought not to 
be taken at face value. First , it must be remembered that 
there was no quantitative manner of determining after a loan 
application had been turned down either by the National or 
regional committees, whether the financial institution or 
the potential borrower actually complied with the requests 
of these screening groups. Second, there was no means of 
determining whether the classifications between essential and 
non-essential purposes for loan proceeds were determined on 
an accurate basis; it can only be assumed that this task was 
performed in g ood faith . Third, there was no way of deter-
mining statistically what would have occurred in the sphere 
of inflation i.f the voluntary controls had not been imposed. 
Because of this consideration there is no base or norm to 
which this self -restraining control can be compared to 
determine its effectiveness. Fourth and last, there were 
no statistical data as to the number of loans "nipped in the 
bud." By this, it is meant that there was no quantitative 
evidence as to the amount of credit expansion prevented 
because of the p sychological and educational influences of 
the program which reduced certain demands for credit on the 
initiative of potential borrowers. 
5. Writer rs General Conclusion 
In summing up it is found that one of the first 
important conclusions to be derived from the f oregoing 
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discussion is that there c annot be drawn any definite 
conclusions regarding the evaluation of a voluntary program 
of this type or one with similar characteristics. It has 
been shown why this program h as been difficult to evaluate . 
The factors creating the difficulty were the inherent 
qualitative characteristic of the voluntary pro gram; the 
fact that the program had no quantitative maximum ceilings 
as guides in restraining the amount of credit exp ansion; 
the fact that there was a multip licity of other credit 
control tools operating simultaneously with ~e VCRP and 
the fact that the economy was still basically a civilian 
e conomy as opposed to a war ec onomy . The Treasury-Federal 
Reserve accord played an anti-inflationary rol e in the 
economy, but the fact that the accord was reached in the srune 
month that the VCRP was launched made f or further difficulty 
in the evaluation of the latter anti -inflation step. 
A second important conclusion is the pointing up 
of certain general economic conditions and characteristics 
of the program itself which either complemented and facilitated 
the work of the voluntary curb or had the opposite effects of 
making the task of that pro gram difficult to pursue. Among 
the former are: (a) the condition that the VCRP was more 
effective in a credit inflation than in an inflation ari sing 
from other causes ; this was true of the Korean upward pri ce 
spiral, (b) that there must exist no privileged immunity 
for special groups ; this was true of the VCRP until its l ater 
phases when failure to follow this principle was one of the 
factors which led to its downfall, and (c) that the VCRP was 
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only a supplemental device to the other general and selective 
credit curbs. It was not intended and could not be expected 
to stand alone against the forces of inflation. Among the 
latter general economic conditions and characteristics of 
the program which greatly inhibited the effectiveness of 
the VCRP are: (a) the fact that the American economy was 
and still is characterized by a multiplicity of financial 
institutions; this characteristic greatly reduced the value 
of this voluntary scheme, (b) that there must be no delay in 
placing the program into effect; the failure to comply with 
this principle reduced its effectiveness and (c) that the 
business institutions of the economy were and still are 
typified by a trend to internal sources of funds for invest-
ment purposes. Since the VCRP was basically a tool of 
inflation control in the area of external soorces for invest-
ment funds, this characteristic of American business greatly 
reduced this techniquers ability to stamp out the fires of 
inflation. 
Also certain general advantages and disadvantages 
were expounded upon in the evaluation, and of course, numerous 
personal and groupal opinions were considered. 
Last of all, certain statistical samples were turned 
to for fortification in the evaluation, but this method of 
scientific inquiry and analysis proved to be of very little 
value and strength in arriving at a definite and accurate 
conclusion. 
In general then, if this writer must state his opinion 
along these lines; he does so with great reluctance. Not because 
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he does not want to make his opinion known, but for the 
reason tha.t there are no specific quantitative grounds upon 
which to base such personal opinions. He takes the position 
that the Voluntary Credit Restraint Program made only a 
qualified mediocre contribution to the struggle against the 
Korean inflation. One reason for holding this position is 
that the inflationary forces had practically run their course 
by the time the VCRP got under way . From Table I of Chapter II, 
it will be seen that wholesale prices had reached their peak 
at the time the VCRP was introduced and from then on continued 
a steady downward trend. Some may attempt to attribute this 
downward trend to this voluntary program, but that would be 
a shak y position to hold in view of the other factors pointed 
to many times previously in this paper. The consumer's index 
found in Table III, Chapter II, leads one to a similar con-
clusion. Although this index continued to rise after 
March , 1951, the upward movement in prices was more of the 
11 creeping" type of inflation, which is not too susceptible 
to the influence of the VCRP, rather than the hyper-inflation 
that was characteristic of the inflation in the immediate 
six months after June, 1950. 
It has been pointed out that the program was still 
administratively and jurisdictionally entangled in confusion 
until the last quarter of 1951. Certain. administrative kinks 
were still being ironed out at that time. The West Virginia 
bonus case, although only a single incident, was a great 
defeat for the VCRP, for it revealed the utter futility of 
such a program when the cards are stack ed against it. The 
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fact that when the going got rough, as with the issuance of 
Bulletin No . 4 dealing in the area of real estate credit, 
instead of tightening the requirements, as might have been 
done in the use of other tools , the only avenue open to the 
National Committee of the Voluntary Credit Restraint Program 
was to loosen the requirements in order to prevent an increased 
disregard for the program and its purposes . The voluntary 
nature of the program per se and its basic characteristic 
of requesting financial institutions and individuals to 
control the enhancement in their profits ru1d economic in-
centives and, in turn, their personal economic ameliorations, J 
all add up to a doubt as to the success of the VCRP in the 
mind of any individual who has considered this type of credit 
control program from its many facets . Also, the absence of 
any precise quantitative conclusions that would tend to 
indicate that the program was a success, again, convince the 
writer that the VCRP resulted in a mediocre accomplishment . 
Finally, asking the American people, and especially 
thos e public officials whose duty it is to protect the 
standard of living of the American public from the degrada-
tions of inflation, to place their fai th in an inflation 
controlling mechanism for which there were no means of deter-
mining the effectiveness of such a devi ce either while it 
was in effect or after the evils of inflation had subsided, 
may be asking too much of blind faith. 
It would be like asking a blind man to perform a new 
and unexplored task. He would eventually learn and accomplish 
the task , but only after trial and error ; learning at the e:i<pense 
'i 
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of time, manpower and resources. It would be better to call 
upon a man with sight who could accomplish the task more 
quick ly and efficiently. This does not mean that the man 
with sight is perfect . We know, however, that one 
characteristic of life is the quest for perfection, but in 
moving toward that goal, it is a problem of equating the more 
effective against the less effective or a problem of relativity. 
Thus, the American people should place their economic 
well-being in the more reliable tools of inflation control 
and allow the less reliable techniques to remain as examples 
of failures remembered only in economic history. 
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